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PREFACE 
Despite a world wide reputation as heedless pursuers of the future, 
Americans exhibit a continuing fascination with the:r origins. To 
appease this historical hunger the country's presses publish a steady 
diet of books, articles, and essays examining and re-examining the 
national experience. Interpretations of this self inquiry are varied. 
Critics of the United States suggest that its citizens dissect the past 
in an effort to uncover a meaningful pattern and continuity, needed but 
lacking, in American culture and society. Writers and teachers frequent-
ly assume a utilitarian viewpoint, pointing to the practicability of 
discerning the perplexities of the present and future from the study of 
yesterday. A simpler answer, curiosity and nostalgia, probably offers 
a more accurate explanation of this preoccupation with past events. 
Whatever the motivation behind the United States' appetite for history, 
it is certain that some subjects consistently attract more attention 
than others. Perhaps the most popular topic is the.American West. The 
progenitors of America's frontier heritage--Indians, cowboys, fur 
trappers, farmers, cavalrymen, and miners--maintain an irresistable 
allure, undiminished by the volume of production chronicling their deeds. 
Oklahoma's story belongs to the historical category of westward 
movement and development. Beginning its organized political existence 
at a time wher:i the frontier was fading elsewhere in t:he West, the 
Sooner State witnessed a telescoping of the usual phases of civilization 
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building. Fewer than eighty years elapsed between the opening of 
Indian Territory to settlement and the establishment of a modernized 
society, complete with the problems of pollution and urban renewal. 
As a consequence Oklahoma historians have been presented with a non-
recurring opportunity to investigate the state's frontier background 
through studying the lifespans of still-living men. No one Sooner's 
story can reveal the entirety of the dramatic "arrows to atoms" growth 
of Oklahoma, yet each personal account contributes to an understanding 
of a unique western state. 
Sylvan Nathan Goldman's life and career are inextricably a part of 
Oklahoma history. Beyond the mere fact of predating statehood as a 
resident, Goldman provides an authentic symbol of the Forty-sixth 
State's frontier heritage and present modernity. This despite the fact 
that his life cannot be categorized as belonging to one of the usually 
conceived western prototypes. Goldman stands among America's twentieth 
century pioneers, a developer of Oklahoma's business frontier. His 
entrepreneurial achievements are augmented by inventions and commercial 
innovations, products of his independent thinking, which helped spur the 
commercial revolution of this century. While devoting a large share of 
his energies to money-making enterprises, this Sooner businessman is 
also respected for numerous civic and philanthropic endeavors. And 
finally as a representative of Oklahoma's Jewish Community, Goldman's 
life sheds light on an ethnic group virtually ignored in written 
histories of the state. 
It is doubtful whether any author ever wrote in a vacuum. Inspira-
tion, guidance, and encouragement are necessary for the completion of 
his work. In this case several individuals·and at least one institution 
iv 
contributed greatly to the finished product. Without Mr. Sylvan Nathan 
Golaman's generous gifts of time and patience the research for this 
biography could not have been completed. Other members of Goldman 
Enterprises were equally helpful in offering information and interest. 
The Oklahoma Heritage Association granted funds which allowed the 
author to pursue his research and writing on a full time basis. 
Appreciation is gratefully extended to the author's major advisor, 
Dr. Joseph A. Stout, Jr., for his guidance and assistance in preparing 
this study. That same appreciation is also due the other committee 
members, Dr. Odie B. Faulk, Jr., Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer, Dr. George F, 
Jewsbury, and Professor Harold v. Sare, who provided the necessary 
critical advice in completing the study. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. AN OKLAHOMA BOYHOOD 1 
II. COOKING FOR COMPANY "D" • 14 
III. HOW TO GROW PROSPEROUS DURING A PROSPERITY DECADE. 29 
IV. HOW TO MAKE A LIVING DURING A DEPRESSION •• 54 
V •. THE UBIQUITOUS GROCERY CART AND OTHER INVENTIONS ••• 76 
VI. MARKETS AND SUPERMARKE'l'S 100 
VII. THE SUPER MARKET INSTITUTE. • 119 
VIII. A BUSINESSMAN'S AVOCATION--GIVING AWAY MONEY AND OTHER 
PHILANTHROPIES. • • • • • • • 145 
IX. A BUSINESSMAN'S RETIREMENT •• 170 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY •••••• 187 
vi 
CHAPTER I 
Al'T OKLAHOMA BOYHO()D 
The road fron Baltimore, Marvland, to Oklahoma snapned half a 
continent. Yet, in the spring of 1889, a recent arrival to the coastal 
city, Michael Goldman, eaqerly pondered the j.:,urney west. The maqnet 
which drew him. and thousands of others to the south central plains was 
the prospect of free lands. President Benjanin Harrison harl issued a 
nroclamation declaring that a part of Indian T~rritory, the Unassigned 
Lands, woi1ld be opened for settlement on A.nril 22, 1889. This pro-
nouncemP.nt, which came to Goldman throuqh the Baltimore newspapers, 
rekindled the hopes of homeseekers at a time when thP. availahilitv of 
homesteads had shrunk to the vanishinq point. Realizing that the c'l.ernand 
could not be met by the Oklahoma District of armroximately ?.,Ono,ooo 
acres, qovernment planners decided on a land run to rfotermine ·who the 
lucky settlers would be. Amonrr the fifty thousand land rushers, ridin<J 
in a friendly family's waqon, was the sixteen-year-old Goldman. 
'rho Run of 1889 provided a dramatic climax to the yo1ith' s search 
for a nm,1 home. His quei:;t had originated in faraway tatvin, a tiny 
Baltic state which forcibly would be incorporated into the Soviet Union 
in 1~40. There Goldman had shared the precarious life of the shtetls, 
small Jewish communities which dotted the geography of Bnstern Eurooe. 
Durin'] the last two decac'l.es of the nineteenth centurv some 600,000 
of these ,Jwws fled traditional poverty and a qrowinq tide of casual 
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d.iscri:rnination and then officiallv encouraaed for nersecution •• The 
massacres and destruction of the rorrroms eventually led to still larqcr 
waves of immiqration until World War I temporarilv stopr,eri the harassed 
fraffic. An estimated 95 per cent of the United StAtes' present ,Jewish 
population is descended .from that forty year Eastern F.uropean influx. 1 
Most of the fleeing Jews themselves joined 'other inimiqrants 
in Arnerica's eastern seaboard cities. The lucJt:y ones, like Michael 
r,oldrnan, turned to relatives and co-reliqionists for help in coping 
with the New World. An uncle with'a small dryqoods store in Baltimore 
provided the young Latvian with a temproary haven. Goldman divided his 
tiJT1e hetween assisting his kinsman in the husim~ns and rtttending 
school. News of the Oklahoma land opening caTTle after he hnd achieved a 
fair working knowlddge of the Enqlish language and his new home's cus-
toms. 2 Certainly bv moving west he was following one of his adopted 
country's oldest traditions. However, few ,Jewish immigrants joined 
Geildmn.n in seekinf'!' out the frontier; an overwhelJT1inq number chose to 
remain in the cities. There were two excellent reasons for doing so. 
While unclaimed land remained plentiful in the West, good crop-pro-
ducing areas were nearly all taken. Additionally, the vast majority of 
Jwwish i:rnmigrants were tm·,n ghetto dwellers, forced from the country 
, by their neighbors i hostility and legal restirction. Th~y possessed 
neither the skills nor the inclination for an a('J'ricultural existence.3 
Only a handful of Jews appeared among the clustered thousanrls 
who stampea,ed across the Oklahoma boundaries; gaining lasting renown 
"E" h . " 4 as ~1q ty-N1ners. C'",oldrnan established no claim during the April 
run, and it doubtful that he woulr.1 have utilized su~h an acquisition 
for farming. After a brief residence in the instant town of Oklahoma 
City, he made his way to Ardmore, located in the southern part of 
the territory, where he purchased a ]60 acre tract for $200. Still 
restless and unwilling to convert his claim to raising crops, the 
immigrant youth crossed the border into Texas. At Gainesville, just 
beyond the territorial line, he obtained a position with a Jewish 
firm, Kahn Brothers Wholesale Produce and Dry Goods Company. This 
business association was to prove more enduring and intimate than 
Goldman or his employers at first realized. 
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The Kahns had immigrated in the early l880's from Alsace-Lorraine 
the border region between Germany and France, then a part of the German 
Empire. After inaugurating a thriving wholesale enterprise in 
Gainesville, the brothers began bringing relatives from Europe 
and employing them in their company. Among those who arrived in this 
manner were two nephews and a niece. The latter was fifteen year old 
Hortense Dreyfus. While her brothers absorbed the intricacies of their 
uncles' business affairs, she tried to fathom the folkways of the 
American Southwest. By the time Goldman made her acquaintance she had 
accepted the local custom of dating; the two were married in the spring 
of ]894. 
The young couple moved to Davis, Oklahoma, the following year, and 
Goldman became the manager of a failing general store which the Kahns 
had purchased. Struggling to make the business a success, he paused 
long enough on June 7, ]895, to celebrate the birth of his first child, 
Alfred Goldman. A few months later the store, operating profitably 
under his management, was sold and the family moved to Ardmore. 
Once again Goldman fulfilled the role of trouble-shooter in restoring 
an ailing venture to life. Except for a two year interval from ]902 
to 904, when the family moved to Daughterty, an engine stop on the 
Santa Fe Railroad near Sulphur, Oklahoma, Goldman continued to operate 
the dry goods store in Ardmore until 1913. 5 
November 15, 1898, The Daily Ardmoreite carried a brief announce--
ment -- "Born: This morning to Mr. and Mrs. Mike Goldman, a son. 116 
The second son subsequently was named Sylvan Natli.an Goldman. With his 
brother Alfred this fourth member of the Goldman family grew up with 
Oklahoma, as a territory and as a state. Ardmore was a young, but 
energetic frontier town. When the first white men settled the area, 
the Chickasaw Indian Nation occupied much of the region as a con-
sequence of federa.l treaty stipulations. The 700 Ranch, operated 
by a. succession of owners beginning about 1880, provided the future 
townsite with its first buildings. The ranch served as a con-
venient stopover for deputy marshals, including Heck Thomas and Bill 
Tilghman, who were striving to curtail the exceptional lawlessness 
of Oklahoma Territory. Bill Dalton of the notorious Dalton Gang was 
killed near Ardmore in 1892, and. the local newspapers claimed that 
the town was plagued by unruly elements until its incorporation in 
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December, 1899. 
The extension of the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railroad from 
Gainesville north through the Chickasaw lands initiated the actual 
town building of Ardmore. A Texas contractor; George B. Douglas, 
realizing the importance of the site as a rail depot, moved 
his family to the 700 Ranch early in 1886. By the end of February he 
had readied not only a log cabin home but also a stockade and a 
series of sheds for commercial use. On July 28, 1887, the first 
train arrived at the new depot, which for years was a lone reconverted 
4 
boxcar, and deposited a shipment of building materials. They would 
be quickly used as the rail connections rapidly attracted nearly 
two thousand settlers by 1890. That same year the burgeoning village 
received an added fillip to growth when it was chosen as the site 
for a United States District Court. However, the underlying economic 
base of Ardmore resulted because it became the seat bf cotton ginning 
and sales in southern Oklahoma. 8 
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When the Goldmans arrived in Ardmore, they discovered a sizable 
and active Jewish community. One of the town's first retail estab-
lishments, the widely known "Iron Store" (so named from its corrugated 
iron construction), was opened in 1888 by two Jewish Texans, Max 
Munzeheimer and Samuel Daube. An employee of the stbre, Max Westheimer 
joined with Frank Wymore in building the B\ue Front Store which later 
became Westheimer and Daube when David Daube purchased Wymore's 
interest. About one hundred persons belonged to the Ardmore Jewish 
fellowship at the time of Oklahoma statehood in 1907. Ten years 
before, Temple Emeth had been organized as a Reform congregation. 
Meeting first in private homes and public halls, the congregation 
later purchased the First Christian Church to use as a synagogue. 
Thirteen year old Sylvan Goldman was confirmed there in 1911.9 
Growing up Jewish in Oklahoma was an anomalous experience. Most 
of the time young Goldman's boyhood coincided with that of any other 
Ardmore youth of similar .age, however, he occasionally was made aware 
of his ethnicity. One incident, which ~ccurred when he was in his 
early teens, gave Goldman an insight into the Gentile majority's 
attitude toward their Jewish neighbors. Walking home from school with 
two Protestant classmates, he was queried as to why the Jews did not 
worship Jesus Christ as did Christians. Goldman explained that 
according to the Ten Commandents, "You shall not have other gods 
besides me. 1110 This reply failed to satisfy the other boys who then 
wanted to know why the Jews worshipped on Saturday rather than 
Sunday. This stumped Goldman, but intrigued, he·askeci his father 
., 
across the dinner.table that evening to unravel ~he Sabbath puzzle. 
The elder Goldman offered a Biblical reference by way of explanation: 
"In six days the Lord made 'the heavens and the earth, the sea and all 
that is in them; but on the seventh day he rested. That is why the 
Lord has blessed the sabbath day and made it holy." The next morning 
following his father's instructions, Goldman quoted the scripture and 
challenged his Gentile friends to count the days of the week to prove 
that Saturday, the seventh day was, indeed, a legitimate time to 
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worship. That same afternoon one of the boys admitted to Goldman that 
during the noon hour he had outlined the religious'debate for his 
father who exclaimed, "Oh, that's just like those tricky, smart Jews~·l2 
While this youthful theological clash produced humorous overtones, 
the situation sometimes contained a more rancorous element. In the 
heat of athletic contests or schoolyard fights epithets such as 
"sheeny", "kike", and "Christ:-killer" were occasionally applied to 
more traditional youthful insults. Yet for the most part, Goldman was 
not made overly conscious of his religious and cultural minority group 
status. Certainly any Jew residing in Oklahoma during the same time 
span was less likely to confront hard core anti-Semitism than if he 
were a part of the large Jewish concentrations in American cities, 
especially along the eastern seaboard. The factor that loomed largest 
in accounting for the generally amiable relationships between Jew and 
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Gentile west of the Mississippi was the relatively small number of 
Jews in that area of the country. It has also been demonstrated that 
towns with populations under 10,000 exhibited fewer evidences of dis-
crimination. Apparently, the small number of Jews in Ardmore could 
not be regarded as a serious threat to anyone's social and economic 
prestige, a·circumstance which has been identified as the basis of 
American anti-Semitism. Fortunately, the focus of ideological attacks 
on the Jews in the United States has rarely centered on irrational, 
subjective views of race and religion as was frequently the case in 
Europe.13 
Another equally crucial determinant of Jewish-Gentile relations 
in Oklahoma and the West could be deduced from an examination of the 
changing character of American Jewry. Virtually all of the Jewish 
Population of the United States before 1880 was composed of Orthodox 
groups that had irnrnigrated from German, or lands under German cultural 
influence such as Austria, Hungary, and eastern Poland. Beginning in 
the l820's, European synagogues, especially in the German states, 
witnessed an attack on traditional Judaism which had survived from the 
Middle Ages through a rigid adherence to Biblical and Talmudic law. 
The new modernizing influence was labelled Reform. It suggested an 
alternative base for religion other than traditional law by intro-
ducing a scholarly and rational investigation into the history of the 
Jewish religion. Such an effort presumably would justify various 
reforms aimed at simplifying the body of religious belief and practice, 
particularly the updating of services. Groups which had adopted the 
Reform persuasion joined·thc immigrant flow to America in the 1B40's 
and 1850's. There they established temples, a term the Reformers 
preferred over synagogues, and continued their struggle against 
shackling Orthdox tradition. 
Orthodox influence has waned dramatically among the 250,000 Jews 
thinly spread across the United States by 1880, the eve of thA qreat 
eastern Europe immigration. The German Jews who made up the bulk 
·a 
of American Jewry were generally prosperousi their religious practice 
resembling the upper-middle class Protestant churches attended by their 
Gentile neighbors. Most synagogues and temples had abandoned the con-
gregational reading and singing of the Hebraic service in favor of 
an English rendition by a minister. Many Jews attended services where 
choirs and an organ enhanced the ritual, and where women without hat or 
shawl were no longer segregated. Other Jewish rites also revealed 
the touch of Reform. Religious education, once a daily class, deeply 
steeped in Talmudic scholarship, now was relegated in Sunday schools, 
similar to the Protestant churches' informal atmosphere and thin 
theological content. Many special holidays of the religious cycle 
were discarded and even Jewish weddings forswore the traditional 
canopy and broken glass ground under the bridegroom's heel. Resident 
American Jews, products of this changed religious and social experi-
ence, looked askance at their poverty-stricken Orthodox coreligionists 
from eastern Europe. They swallowed their uneasiness, however~ 
and worked frantically to assimialte the immigrants before the latter 
could pose an embarrassment for them in front of their Gentile friends. 
Unsurprisingly, the vast number of new immigrants precluded a 
complete success for the melting pot goal of the established Jewish 
community. Orthodoxy regained a certain prominence, primarily in the 
large eastern cities which became home for most of the recent arrivals. 
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The meshing of old and new immigrants also spawned a traditiortal 
reaction against Reform the Conservative movement, which today pro-
vides American Jews with a third institutional and philosophical choice. 
Despite all efforts to the contrary, the immigrants could not hope to 
re-create in America the narrowly prescribed life of the east European 
ghettos. 14 Those few who travelled west found it particularly difficult 
to escape the Americanizing influences of Reform Judaism. The sparse-
ness of Jewish settlement beyond the Mississippi almost guaranteed 
that a large degree of assimilation would result. 
Ardmore's Temple Emeth was doubtlessly typical of Reform groups 
elsewhere in the Southwest. Unable to justify the presence of a full-
time rabbi for their tiny congregation's exclusive use, the temple 
relied on twice monthly calls by churchmen from Fort Worth, Texas. 
Between visits some members of the congregation took turns as readers, 
conducting the services in Eriglish and Hebrew. Certain of the younger 
women.assumed the responsibility for Sunday school classes. Despite 
its Reform affiliation, Temple Emeth claimed the membership of several 
Orthodox families including the Goldmans. 15 One might well speculate 
on the possible differences in upbringing, especially in regard to 
religion, that the Goldman sons, Alfred and Sylvan, might have exper-
ienced had the family lived in New York City, Newark, New Jersey, or 
some other center of Jewish population. Probably the differences 
would have owed more to geography than theology as it has been es-
timated that in 1908 only 23 per cent of Jewish school children were 
receiving any religious instruction, and a quarter of these attended 
the nearly ineffectual Sunday schools.16 The second generation of 
Jewish immigrant families generally adopted the cultural patterns of 
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the surrounding conununity. Distinctions between young Goldman's 
Jewish home and temple and his Gentile friends' homes and churches 
seemed slight to.him and his boyhood companions. The residue of 
Jewish customs and religious belief that he retained added a measur-
able dimension to his existence while failing markedly to change his 
life. 
Goldman received his eight years of formal edu.cation entirely at 
Ardmore. The hrevity of his tenure in the classroom in no way 
reflected an absence of concern for learning or any academic 
ineptitude. School was an enjoyable experience for Goldman, and he 
proved to be an exceptionally attentive student; he was described by 
a former schoolteacher as Ila very ambitious child with a good mind.1117 
~oldman was able to make use of his favorite subject, mathematics, at 
an early age. Besides the usual chores assigned youngsters in 
those days, he helped his father in the dry goods store after school. 
Somewhat surprisingly in view of his later successes as a businessman, 
Goldman developed no particular liking for the store. He later re-
called that if the working experience had any effect on his later ca-
reer it was to ensure that future business endeavors would be confined 
to other fields besides dry goods. 
Goldman's entry into the business world on a full time basis 
came rather abruptly. In 1913 his father became ill and.was forced 
to sell the family store. The GoldJT\ans moved to Tulsa where Mrs. 
Goldman's five brothers, having left Gainesville, operated a wholesale 
grocery business which was pro.spering from the oil boom in that region 
of the state. At the age of fifteen Goldman began working at a branch 
of his uncles' enterprise at Sapulpa, a small oil field community a 
11 
few miles southwest of Tulsa. Apparently, the grocery business was 
more attractive than dry goods for Goldman was to make it his major 
concern for the next forty years, barring a sinqle important inter-
ruption. Life in Sapulpa was pleasant enough. Samuel Dreyfus, who 
managed the branch operation, taught his nephew the rudiments of the 
wholesale grocery business. His duties included visiting retail gro-
cers and vending the fresh fruits and vegetables sold by Dreyfus 
Brothers, Wholesalers. 18 Not all of Goldman's time was spent at work. 
He found time to acquire numerous friends, one of whom described him 
as "a typical, happy-go-lucky American kid. 1119 Within four years 
this "kid" would join hundreds of thousands of others across the nation 
in their generation's great adventure---World War I. 
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COOKING FOR COMPANY "D" 
News of the war in,Europe filled the pages of Oklahoma newspapers 
between 1914 and 1917. Despite the 1916 re-election of Woodrow Wilson 
with the slogan, "He kept us out of war," there were many who believed, 
and some who ardently hoped, that the United States would inevitably 
enter the conflict. And thanks to close cultural ties with England, 
Allied propaganda, and unrestricted submarine warfare virtually the 
whole nation, excepting some German-Americans viewed Kaiser Wilhelm 
and the Central Powers as the natural enemy. In Tulsa, Oklahoma the 
Chamber of Commerce decided to ready the community for the coming 
trial by raising a. military unit composed of local citizenry. An or-
ganizational meeting was held in February, 1917 to discuss the exciting 
project. By the time congress declared war on April 6, two companies 
had been formed and were already accepting enlistments. 
A recruiting tent was erected on the corner of Fourth and Main 
Streets. On April 25, 1917, Goldman and two friends travelled to. 
Tulsa with the intention of enlisting._ Harold N. Reed .and Goldman 
elected to add their names to Company A. 1st Separate Battalion, 
Oklahoma Engineers, while the third member of the Sapulpa trio chose 
the ambulance company also accepting volunteers. Reed, 21, had no ~ 
problem meeting the age standard but Goldman stretched his years by 
eighteen months to satisfy the minimum requirement. The two joined 
14 
the growing company impatiently awaiting word from the War Department 
concerning mobilization and training. All of the volunteers were 
Oklahomans and represented a wide cross section of backgrounds in-
cluding oil field workers, farmers and college students. Many of the 
last mentioned were attending or had just graduated from the now 
defunct Kendall College of Tulsa where a few had majored in civil 
engineering; they were to receive an unexpected variety of practical 
applications for their education in France. 
15 
After a hurried visit to the State capitol, the new unit received 
authorization to take over the property of an old national gudrd 
company of engineers. At the same time the old national guard table 
of organization was adopted. According to that, the company required 
a complement of commissioned personnel consisting of a captain, two 
first lieutenants, and one second lieutenant. Immediately after the 
declaration of war, Van T. Moon received his commission as captain 
and company conunander. His first lieutenants were Forest R. Hughes 
and Jack Singleton while Gordon T. Granger completed the list of 
officers, serving as second lieutenant. All four men served in thei~ 
respective capacities for the duration of the war. Late in April 
the company under its new officers was officially mustered as federal 
troops and began regular drilling. Meither the engineers nor the 
ambulance company had barracks until August 5, when the Tulsa fair-
grounds became Camp Sinclair. Two weeks later the site was deserted 
after orders for departure to training areas finally arrived. 
Eighteen hours by rail brought the eager recruits to Camp Dowie 
outside of Fort Worth, Texas. Disappointment and disillusionment 
quickly followed. Both of these sentiments were easily understand-
16 
able: chagrin at learning that the regular army harbored very definite 
ideas about readying raw recruits for action and disgruntlement over 
the lengthy delay, nearly a year, in actuality reaching the field. 
Even the heartiest recruit must have felt a dampening of enthusiasm 
the first night at Bowie. A driving rain had turned the camp into a 
quagmire of foot-deep mud~ Following a hasty meal of corned beef, 
beans, and hard bread the Oklahomans retired to the relative comfdrt~ 
of an empty warehouse. The next day, companies of engineers from 
Ardmore and Oklahoma City were placed with the Tulsans to comprise 
the 2nd Battalion, lllth Engineers. Captain Moon's men made up "D" 
company while "E" and "F" became the respective designations of the 
Ardmore and Oklahoma City contingents. Three Texas companies formed 
the 1st Battalion of the regiment ~hich was assigned to the 36th 
Division. 1 
The army seemed determined that these Texas and Oklahoma engineers 
would be as ready for combat as possible. Ignoring the usual grumbling 
of the new soldiers, experienced officiers led them through practical 
engineering problems in addition to the ordinary regimen of infantry 
training. Naturally, certain specialized positions had to be filled, 
and young Goldman was nominated for the post of mess sergeant. Despite 
his youth, and remembering that his actual age was unknown to those 
making the selection, the choice was an obvious one. Several years' 
experience in the wholesale business had definitely bestowed on him 
a considerable knowledge of judging the quality and estimating the 
uses of groceries on a large scale. Goldman tackled the myriad tasks 
of preparing food for 200 men under all types of conditions with th~, 
good humor and determination that characterized his later business 
17 
activities. Before. long Company "D" was praising the improved quali~y 
of mealtimes and the man responsible, "Sergeant Goldie," an inevitabl!:e 
sobriquet in an army enamored with acronyms and abbreviated termino-
logy.2 
Nearby Fort Worth offered some diversion from the discipline of 
Camp Bowie. Unfortunately, the increasing numbers of trainees sta-
tioned at the post, reulted in the shortcoming common to most cities 
and towns located close to military facilities: too many uniformed 
men on the streets looking for a change and finding only others like 
themselves. Goldman and his cooks had less time than the average to 
explore the enticements of the Texas city. After supervising the 
cleanup of the evening meal, the Mess Sergeant immediately began 
contemplating the next morning's breakfast, a meal consumed at too 
early an hour by the soldiers' reckoning and thus necessarily pre-
pared much too soon for the kitchen staff's'taste. Virtually all 
members of the Oklahoma company journeyed home on furloughs at least 
once during the months at Bowie. Goldman's visit to Tulsa included 
a pointed inquiry from his mbther about the questionable wisdom of 
her son's joining the army. Lengthy remonstrations were required 
on the young sergeant's part to forestall a parental complaint 
to the army. Somewhat mollified by Goldman's argument that a 
cook for an engineering outfit could scarcely constitute a serious 
personal risk, Mrs. Goldman reluctantly waved her son back to the 
humdrum of camp life.3 
The regiment endured the long winter of 1917-1918, hoping for 
orders that would send them to France. Spring and early summer found 
the engineers still constructing railroads for the post's use and be-
coming increasingly restive under army discipline. They doubtlessly 
would have approved the rueful wit of a fellow doughboy, stationed at 
another camp. That impatient trooper, on observing a sign posted by~ 
a travelling evanqelist reading "Where Will You Spend Eternity?", 
scrawled beneath it, "At Camp McClellan. 114 The summer was half spent 
before the lllth received the command that would send them to France. 
On July 7 the regiment boarded a train for the East Coast. Once in 
motion the army wasted little time in processing the troops at Camp 
Mills on Long Island, New York, for the Atlantic crossing. Only 
eleven days elapsed from the time of departure from Bowied before the 
Q· ~·~·Antigone accepted the last piece of equipment and last 
soldier of the southwestern unit and steamed out of New York harbor. 5 
I 
Finding a veteran of the First World War with fond memories of 
the troopships that carried him and his comrades across the Atlantic 
might be impossible. After some fumbling starts the Navy had solved 
the basic transportation blockages resulting from overcrowded harbor 
facilities, inexperience in handling the unprecedented amounts of 
men and materiel, and the constant hazard of U-boat attack. Arrivals 
and departures were streamlined, ships were reconverted for transport 
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duties, and the vessels received alternating coats of black, white, and 
grey paint stripings, ostensibly confusing to enemy submarines by 
breaking up the ships' normal silhouettes. For the Navy's passenge~$, 
however, the overseas voyage was miserable. Efficiency in convoying 
the troops did not include concern for the human cargo's comfort. 
Bunks were stacked in four tiers and placed so closely that 
movement between the rows required a crablike, sideways scuttle 
to negotiate passage. Added to the crowded conditions was the 
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discomfort of sleeping in the stifling atmosphere below decks. The 
dubious hospitality of these accomodations decided Goldman to seek 
an alternate resting place. He discovered among the melange of equip-
ment aboard ship a large coil of thick rope, located on deck in an 
out-of-the-way ~ .! spot, which served as a circular bunk complete with 
fresh air, and occasionally rain. Even this retreat failed to protect 
the Oklahoma mess sergeant from the almost universal shipboard dis-
order, seasickness. The troops from the ro·lling plains of the 
Southwest could not cope with the rolling decks of the Antigone. 
After an uneventful twelve days' crossing they gladly disembarked at 
the port of Brest on the extreme western coast of France. 
Once again after a long journey the Oklahoma engineers arrived 
at a rainy destination. Stumbling down the gangplanks on to French 
, .. 
soil under a drizzling sky, many still feeling the ill effects of th~ 
voyage, they shouldered full packs and marched into the countryside. 
In their discomfort some probably.recalled, ironically, the post cards 
they had addressed in New York two weeks earlier. Thoughtfully pro-
vided by the Red Cross, the printed messages informed the addressees 
that "the ship on which I sailed has arrived safely overseas." These 
communications, sent on receipt of a cable confirming the ship's 
successful completion of the transport, might have described .the con-
dition of the ship, but hardly the somewhat weakened state of its 
passengers. Perhaps the satisfaction at having solid, unmoving ground 
',i: beneath their feet would have been more complete if the muddy roads 
had proven less slippery. 
After a few hours' march the regiment believed that its destina-
tion had been reached. Alongside the road were built several low lying 
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structures, strongly suggestive of military barracks. The surmise 
that the buildings were designed for that purpose was correct, however, 
the doughboys were not to be the occupants. German prisoners of war 
·, 
were incarcerated within, and the Americans marched on to an opeh field 
where tents were rapidly erected to form a temporary bivouack. Goldman 
and his tent mate took elaborate precautions against the dampness. 
They spread their raincoats on the muddy ground and laid overcoats on 
top of them to form a platform for their cots. The next morning the 
two awakened, soaked to the skin despite having slept fully, clothed. 
Luckily, the regiment repacked its gear after another wet night and 
journeyed by rail to Bar-sur-Aube in the Department de la Aube. 
Company "D" was billeted in the small village of Argancon. 
Goldman installed his kitchen on the outskirts of the town and with 
one of his cooks rented a room in a nearby farmhouse. During the next 
month, officers and men drilled hard, familiarizing themselves with 
French construction techniques and other technical aspects of the duty 
they would soon face. Ordinarily new units were assigned to quiet 
sectors of the front after a few weeks' recuperation from the troop 
ships. This orientation process was denied the lllth when the regiment 
was unexpectedly selected to be Corps Engineers for the first Army 
Corps. On September 10 the regiment entrained for the front and some 
of the heaviest action of the American participation in the war. 6 
When the United States entered the conflict in 1917, the fighting 
on the Western Front had stagnated into a dull, deadly trench warfare. 
The German!:> had lost their chance to seize Paris in 1914, but the 
French and English attempts to push them back in subsequent years cost 
more lives than the regained real estate warranted. President Wilson, 
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expecting initially that the American contribution to the war effort 
would be confined to supplying arms and munitions, was dismayed to 
discover the true status of the Allied position. The German army's 
chances appeared alarmingly viable by the spring of 1918, when 
American troops began massing in numbers sufficient to make themselves 
felt. Thanks to the co~lapse of Russia in December, 1917, the Kaiser 
could transfer enough soldiers to constitute a 100,000 man advantage 
over the British and French on the Western Front. The morale of the 
Allied armies posed a question for which there was no ready answer. 
General war weariness and lengthening casualty lists had already pro-
duced a barely quelled series of mutinies among the French poilus, 
front-line men disgusted and angered by their own staff officers' 
ineptitude. While matters had not reached this low state in the 
British lines, no one could testify to the continued reliability of 
the haggard Tommies. 
Adding to the qualms of knowledgeable Allied leaders was the 
thorny issue of unified military operations. It required a renewed 
German offensive in March, 1918 to spur to completion a long overdue 
decision, the placing of all national armies under one supreme comman-
der. French Marshall Ferdinand Foch got the job, inheriting the 
sensitive question of how to utilize the American doughboy. The 
British had earlier suggested shipping American recruits to Great 
Britain for training and then sending them to the front under British 
officers. To General John J. Pershing, commander in chief of the 
American Expeditionary Force, this idea was as unthinkable as the 
French plan to attach small units of the AEF to existing French forma-
tions. He insisted on a separate American army with a defined sector 
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of the front as its responsibility; Pershing had not crossed the 
Atlantic to command a replacement center for the Allies. His eye was 
focused on the Saint-Mihiel salient, one of three hulges poking into 
France alonq the line of trenches that stretched irregularly from the 
Belgium coast of the North Sea across parts of three countries to 
Switzerland. The American commander-in-chief proposed to break the 
salient and drive north to seize Metz, an important railroad and mining 
center. Foch objected to the plan, desiring to employ the AEF else-
where with French troops, but Pershing remained adamant on the point of 
maintaining an individual American army. Reluctantly the Field Marshal 
approved the Saint-Mihiel offensive but vetoed the Metz drive, in-
sisting that the bulk of Persinq's forces be transferred to the Argonne 
immediately after cracking the salient.? 
The lllth Engineers arrived at Frovard near Nancy on the east 
flank of the Saint-Mihiel salient the night of September 10, 1918. 
The regiment remained continuously at the front until the armistice 
was declared over two months later. As a detached unit they were sent 
where needed most which was normally the place of heaviest action. 
Goldman's responsibility of feeding the hard working engineers was 
made particularly difficult by the company's anomalous status. Since 
the unit was totally separated from the 36th Division he attempted to 
draw rations from the huge stockpiles of supplies located at various 
intervals behind the American advance. The guards in charge of the 
provisions refused his requests for food for lack of orders authorizing 
withdrawals for the regiment. The young mess sergeant quickly devel-
oped that talent for which the American military has become famous--
scrounging. 
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If the AEF had neglected C:ompany "D" in the matter of provision-
ing, then·Goldman would "requisition" the necessary items by strategem. 
Each night he selected a crew of volunteers, loaded them aboard horse 
drawn wagons and trucks, and set off for the rear in search of food. 
When a supply depot was sighted the foraging team went into action. 
Goldman engaged the attention of the guards at one point while his 
volunteers hastily loaded supplies at another. The tactic worked 
smoothly since the rear areas were lightly guarded and the stores not 
closely inventoried. Members of the company later recalled these ex-
peditions gleefully and praised the excellent meals they enjoyed as a 
result of their sergeant's ingenuity. 8 
These nocturnal excursions were not without a distinct element of 
danger. Captain Moon, the company conunander, wrote home to Tulsa 
describing the work that his engineers were accomplishing in repairing 
and maintaining roads and bridges as well as assisting the vital flow 
of traffic to the attacking doughboys. "We were not close enough to 
get a shot at the Hun," Moon said, "but we were close enough to get 
his shellfire. 119 Enemy reconnaisance flights made travel, even by 
night, a hazardous undertaking. The first night at the trenches had 
I 
given the engineers a taste of the forthcoming weeks' harassment. 
Unloading equipment and animals from the train in darkness relieved 
only by shells exploding, the company had lost several horses by 
drowning in an unseen canal. The men rapidly learned to avoid showing 
any lights at night for fear of attracting German artillery bombard-
ment. Sparks from a backfiring truck on one of Goldman's food 
procurements were sufficient to provide him with a memorably harrowing 
experience. Realizing the peril of staying with the vehicle as shells 
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began bursting around them, Goldman and four others leaped from the 
truck and raced for a less exposed position. A short distance from the 
road they discovered a shallow cave and were about to enter when a 
voice from the interior announced that the place was already occupied 
by closely packed doughboys. The foraging party immediately illu-
strated their aptitude for improvisation by dropping to the ground and 
crawling between the legs of the standing soldiers. All five engineers 
survived the shelling which continued for several hours. 
On another occasion the outcome of an attack proved more serious. 
Goldman and another soldier were driving a team of horses pulling 
their wagon when the much dreaded signal warning of a gas barrage was 
sounded. The two scrambled for their masks in the darkness and climbed 
down from their seats to affix specially built protective devices on 
the horses' heads. Only then did Goldman discover that his companion 
had not donned a mask. In answer to his excited query the soldier 
replied that he had been unable to locate it. A frantic search fe-
vealed the mask on the floor of the wagon seat and the man swiftly 
adjusted it over his face. The unfortunate delay, however, had already 
caused damage to the engineer's respiratory system. Although "D" 
Company suffered only two casualties, and those from pneumonia, during 
the war, several men sustained lasting disabilities from gassings.JO 
.After Saint-Mihiel the Engineers of the lllth started a long 
march to the Argonne Forest, scene of the next offensive. Walking by 
night and sleeping during the day, the company moved over eighty miles 
on a course paralleling the front. The morning of September 26, when 
the line troops "went over the top," Company "D" followed three hundred 
yards behind. In a repeat performance of the Saint-Mihiel experience 
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the engineers performed their construction chores to the accompaniment 
of regular shelling and bombing planes on moonlight nights. These 
attacks continued during a lull in the fighting before the last phase 
of the Argonne campaign began on October. 31. Despite the intermittent 
annoyances produced by the German artillery, the men's chief complaint 
was boredom. Goldman recalled the tedium of the trenches, for this in-
activity inspired a well remembered comic episode. Among the supplies 
shipped from home to bolster morale was tobacco, a commodity used more 
for chewing than smoking in battle zones for fear of glowing embers 
drawing fire. To ease the tension of waiting, Goldman tried some of 
the tobacco, although he admitted to "more spitting than chewing." Any 
chances that the young Oklahoman would carry the habit home were 
abruptly curtailed when a shell concussion knocked him to the ground 
and forced an inadvertent swallowing of the tobacco. Goldman recalled, 
"that was the end of me and chewing tobacco. 1111 
The first ten 3ays of November witnessed a renewal of the Argonne-
Meuse River battle. Company "D" missed little of the action, repai.rim 
roads and bridges. A captured German field piece with ammunition 
excited some of the Oklahomans imaginations; they turned the gun a-
round and began shelling in the direction of the enemy. The engineers 
decided to stick to their own specialties when/ a courier rushed back._ 
to find out who was lobbing shells at the American troops from the rear 
rear. On November 10, the company was ordered to pull back and march 
to Saint Mihiel for the long anticipated drive on Metz. The next morn-
ing at eleven o'clock confirmation of an earlier rumor that the 
Armistice had been signed reached the highly fatigued engineers. When 
they reached the forest near Apremont that night they stopped for a 
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five day rest. The first night was a memorable one as celebrating 
soidiers seemed likely to expend all their excess ammunition cornmem-
orating the war's end. 
If the fighting had ceased, the engineers' work was literally just 
beginninq. Relieved of duty as Corps Engineers, the reqimcnt started 
their last long march. On November 29, Company "D" completed a 130 
mile hike to the village of Charrey in the Yonne district. For the 
next six months the Oklahomans labored at a quarry~ extracting mate-
rials to rebuild the French roads damaged in the war effort. 12 To 
maintain morale the company allotted a small number of passes every 
two weeks. Goldman received one which enabled him to visit Nice. The 
entire city with the exception of one hotel had been reserved for AEF 
personnel. A famous resort center in peacetime, Nice reflected the 
post war euphoria with music, dancing, and wine. The brief respite 
from the drudgery at Charrey failed to dissipate the growing eagerness 
of Goldman and his companions to return home. 
After a series of depressing false rumors the lllth Regiment 
received orders to entrain for Le Mans where they would prepare for 
the voyage stateside. On May 20, the engineers boarded the U. s. S.: 
Great Northern at Brest and steamed into Hoboken, New Jersey harbor 
ten days later. The City of Tulsa was prepared for the return. Thou-
sands cheered the engineers as they marched under a specially 
constructed Arch of Triumph erected on Main Street with funds raised 
by the American legion. Following this enthusiastic welcome the 
company travelled on to Camp Bowie and was mustered out of service on 
June 20, 1919. The unit had compiled a brief but impressive record; 
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three times the men were cited in dispatches, once by General Pershing. 
Today, the surviving members of Company "D" meet annually to 
recall the hectic events of the era that was the first World War. 
Nostalgia reigns supreme at the gatherings as events terrible in the 
happening assume a lighter tone with the mellowing years. Goldman 
rarely misses the reunions and the chance to renew the rare comrade-
ship of men at war. In unison with the other survivors be expresses. 
no regret at the experience, summing up his feelings by stating, "I 
thing it [the war] was the best thing that ever happened to me since 
I came back alive." If the youth that enlisted on a whim had learned 
a lesson from the carnage of the Western Front it was that life was 
inestimably worth living.14 
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HOW TO GROW PROSPEROUS DURING A 
PROSPERITY DECADE 
The returning veterans of World War I donned their civilian 
clothes at the beginning of a fabulous era, the Twenties. Historically 
decades have designated only arbitrary and artificial divisions of ti~e 
into ten year segments, however, the 1920's have continued to evoke 
an image unmistakably separate in atmosphere and style from the pre-
ceding and following years. Hollywpod films and television have 
indelibly etched the stereotype of a jazz age of wonderful nonsense, 
replete with bathtub gin, Prohibition gangsters, flagpole sitters, 
goldfish swallowers, and flappers dancing the Charleston in speak-
easies. More se~ious observers of the decade have probed beneath this 
trivial froth of hedonism to expose profounder currents of human 
activity. Their estimates of the 1920's have included discussions of 
postwar disillusionment, international isolationism, intellectual 
revolt, and underlying economic disparities. Others have maintained 
that the decade was primarily a transitional period, marked by conflict 
between the lingering values of the frontier juxtaposed against the 
modernity of the city. Probably the people living through this much 
examined era remained largely unaware that they represented anything 
besides hardworking citizens doing their best to earn a living in a 
decent manner, the preoccupation of most Americans of ariy decade. 
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Certainly the major concern of soldiers mustered out of the ser-
vice centered on rapidly reassuming a civilian identity, which meant 
for most finding a j'ob. The former mess sergeant of Company "D" had 
little choice in the matter. Possessor of a foreshortened education 
and scant capital, Sylvan Goldman, twenty-two years old, needed em-
ployment immediately. His brother, Alfred, was ready with a suggestion 
tion. He had enlisted in the army shortly after the younger Goldman 
and had been assigned to a Texas training camp. Alfred's military ca-
reer progressed no further; army doctors discovered that he suffered 
from mastoiditis which affected his sense of hearing. Learning of an 
opportunity in the wholesale grocery business in San Antonio, he 
opted to stay in Texas after he was discharged. When the war ended 
and Sylvan returned, he approached him about the possibility of es-
tablishing a wholesale business in Oklahoma's neighboring state. 
The two brothers turned to their uncle~ Henry Dreyfus, for his 
opinion and possible financial backing. Dreyfus was readily convinced 
by their arguments. His nephews, although young men, could draw on 
a more than adequate background of experience in the wholesale grocery 
field. They would have an additional advantage accruing from the 
proposed location for their maiden business venture. Borrowing a page 
from the successful Dreyfus brothers handbook, Alfred had chosen a 
developing oil boom region, approximately eighty miles west of Fort 
worth, as the site for establishing the enterprise. The prospect for 
profit appeared likely to Dreyfus since there existed no local compe-
tition and he agreed to loan his kinsmen the necessary funds. 
Initially the Goldmans' plans proved sound in their execution. 
The sleep rural communities of Eastland and Stephens Counties were 
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experiencing an intoxicating oil boom in the latter part of 1919, when 
the brothers arrived in Texas. The brothers leasec'. a large building 
to serve as a warehouse from a bankrupted poultry and e<lg dealer in 
Cisco. It boasted a large cooling room where they could store the 
fruits and vegetables shipped by rail from the Dallas-Fort Worth area. 
The Goldmans purchased mixed boxcars of produce from the established 
wholesale bouses of th~ cities, not havinq sufficient capital at first 
to buy in larger quantities directly from agricultural production. 
centers. They sold to a variety of customers in Cisco including a 
hotel near the town's railway station, owned and managed by Conrad 
Hilton; it was the future tycoon's first endeavor in the field which 
he came to dominate. 
Expansion into the surrounding hamlets was hampered greatly by 
the exceptionally poor roads. The dirt thoroughfares made transpor-
tation uncertain and during rainy weather virtually impossible. 
Luckily a paved road was completed in 1920, connecting Cisco and East-
land. This provided the young entrepreneurs with better access to 
their market, the tiny groceries which had sprung up in the previously 
insignificant Texas communities to meet the needs of an increased 
population resulting from the oil strikes. As the only wholesalers 
available to these isolated stores, the Goldmans speedily fulfilled 
their uncle's faith in the project. By January, 1921 Sylvan was 
handling the original territory while Alfred had moved thirty miles 
north to manage a branch at Dreckenridge'. 
The nature of their undertaking left the brothers little time for 
relaxation and enjoyment of profits. Much of the latter was plowed 
back into the business which required a rather large operating expense. 
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at all times. Most of the business was transacted in small lots to a 
widely scattered and difficult to reach clientele. Credit had to be 
extend~d to the shoestring operations on at least a weekly basis. The 
grocery proprietors demanded this service partially from necessity 
and partially from the knowledge that the difficult transport condi-
tions allowed the wholesalers no alternative to leaving the perishable 
produce at the stores. As long as the oil wells continued to pump, 
however, men working on the rigs would remain there wanting to buy 
groceries and the Goldmans would collect on their investment. Unfortu-
nately the smoothly running organization was dealt a staggering set-
back, and eventually a final dissolution, when a faltering economy 
resulted in oil production outbacks. 1 
World War I had witnessed the emergence of the United States as 
the strongest economic power in the world. Although the physical 
output of manufactures and national income dropped slightly during the 
first half of 1919 compared to the war years, the nation's economy 
surged ahead into a new business boom which lasted several months. 
The high level of exports, made possible by American loans abroad and 
continued heavy spending by the federal government, accounted for the 
short period of prosperity. The business community began to slow down 
by the middle of 1920 and within a few months the country was gripped 
by a severe depression. Resulting from inflation, unwise speculation, 
a decline in government spending, a steep drop in exports, and ruinous 
losses in farm income, the economic setback featured thousands of 
business failures and approximately 4,750,000 unemployed. 2 
That the economy rebounded in 1922, and continued on an almost 
uninterrupted high plane until 1929, provided no comfort to the 
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Goldmans who were numbered among the business casualties of 1921. As 
oil field workers were laid off, the booming towns of Cisco, Brecken-
ridge, Ranger, Eastland, and other smaller villages lost their swollen 
populations nearly as rapidly as they had gained them. With the 
shrinking pool of customers drying out to the point of disappearance, 
the shoestring grocers closed their doors. Too frequently they aban~ 
doned the hastily and cheaply constructed buildings before the 
wholesalers were able to collect bills for past credit extension. By 
the time the Goldmsns liquidated their holdings, paid off their loans, 
and left Texas they retained no more than their original investment, 
and could count their profits only in terms of rueful experience. 3 
Unwilling to return to Oklahoma without a more substantial showing 
for their efforts, the brothers looked elsewhere for opportunity. 
Along with thousands of others they turned west to California. That 
coastal state's population growth rate outstripped all other states 
during the 1920's and it, along with east coast rival Florida, epito~ 
mized the real estate boom so typical of the Decade. In California's 
leading metropolis, Los Angeles, Alfred easily found a position with 
a wholesale house while Sylvan worked in a similar establishment that 
also handled groceries. Both jobs involved calling on retail mer-
chants a circumstance that inspired the brothers to think about opening 
their own grocery store. Neither possessP.d any experience in the field 
but they believed their chances might be good if enough money could be 
saved. 
This optimism was soundly based despite the young men's relative 
inexperience. Grocery stores in California and elsewhere in the 
country differed greatly from the present day model. Generally each 
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grocery encompassed three somewhat separate businesses. Fresh fruits 
and vegetables were handled by one department, most often as a semi-
independent concession. The Goldmans would have been comfortable 
managing such an operation with their considerable background in the 
wholesale aspects of produce, however, they were constrained by the 
knowledge that the Japanese-Americans constituted a near monopoly in 
this specialty. Meat markets had only recently been joined under the 
same roof with other foodstuffs and they were operated as separate, 
entities, even in the case of chain stores. The third portion of these 
early day food markets were the grocery sales which comprised any items 
not embodied in the prodedures of the meat and produce agencies. So 
prevalent was this mode of operation, that shopping center developers 
would provide the permanent fixtures for grocery stores to eliminate 
the problem of dividing costs among three concessions whose ownership" 
might change frequently. 4 
The Goldmans were still.planning their entry into the Los Angeles 
grocery business when they received an unexpected telephone call from 
Oklahoma. Their uncle, Henry Dreyfus was traveling to California for 
an important conference with his nephews. On behalf of the Dreyfus 
Brothers wholesale concern he advanced a proposition with an intri-
guing origin and portentous future. The five Dreyfus partners were 
prospering in Tulsa, partly due to the close working association they 
had developed with a local grocery chain. Rival whoiesalers had spread 
rumors to other retail store ownens that Dreyfus Brothers actually 
owned part of the chain. As a consequence, the wholesalers argued, if 
the retailers continued to order produce from the Dreyfus firm they 
would really be buying from their competitors. Added to the drop in 
business resulting from this tactic, Dreyfus Brothers was faced with -
a further loss of trade When the chain, of which they were ostensibly 
part owners, announced its intention to acquire a warehouse and pur-
chase produce in boxcar loads. 
Caught in a dilemma not of their making, Dreyfus explained, his 
brothers had agreed that he journey to the west coast with a proposi-
tion for their nephews. With mounting enthusiasm, the Goldmans 
listened to the plans for opening a grocery chain in Tulsa to be 
backed by Dreyfus Brothers and managed by themselves. They would re-
ceive a 25 per cent share of the profits plus regular salaries. 
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Before beginning such a venture, however, the Goldmans would need to 
acquire more retail experience. Dreyfus proposed financing a year's 
study for the two brothers. Their classes would be held in Los Angeles 
grocery stores and their teachers would be the men who operated them. 
The next day after his arrival Dreyfus, accompanied by his nephews, 
visited the owners of there food store chains. Some persuasion was 
necessary before the initially skeptical businessmen accepted the idea 
of allowing the Goldmans to work in various branches of the retail 
trade--without salary--in order to learn the grocery industry; they 
feared the Oklahomans' real intention was to pose a competition to 
their businesses by opening a retail enterprise in Los Angeles. 
After putting their uncle on an eastbound train, the Goldmans 
started their year of study. The curriculum embraced a wide range of 
subjects. Spending four months with each chain, the brothers worked 
in all the departments incorporated in each individual store. They 
served as clerks, filling customers' orders and performing the arith-
metic of credit business. Few groceries had developed self-service 
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at this time but the Goldmans observed the different procedures in-
volved with the innovation. They met with supervisors, meat managers, 
produce men and executives. They even helped with the myriad details 
of opening a new store. At the end of twelve months the brothers felt 
confident th~t they were sufficiently enlightened in every aspect of 
the retail grocery business save one, the utilization of their ac-
quired skills and knowledge in their own endeavor.5 
On April 3, 1926 the Goldmans opened their first grocery store 
at 1403 E. Fifteenth Street in downto~m Tulsa. When the doors were 
unlocked a year later twenty others unbarred theirs and joined in 
celebrating the first anniversa~y of the Sun Grocery Company. The 
orange and black storefronts of the chain ad become well-known 
everywhere in Tulsa as the Goldmans spread the rising sun symbol to 
all parts of the town. The extraordinarily rapid expansion had been 
spurred by the realization that Dreyfus Brothers would lose customers 
in direct ratio to the frequency with which their own chain replaced 
competitive stores. By returning most of the profits to the company, 
the family had obtained 100,000 square feet of floor spac~ with an es-
timated worth of $900,000 in less than a year. 
Sylvan Goldman headed the company in the capacity of president 
while his brother served as vice president. The two brothers' ama-
zingly accelerated expansion rate brought them to almost immediate 
local prominence. They were applying the business techniques learned 
in the California chain store curriculum with the zeal of truly devoted 
scholars. Virtually every phase of their organization reflected a 
firm grasp of current retail management principles plus a willingness 
to experiment with promising avant-garde concepts. The brothers' 
abilities complemented one anothers's very neatly. Sylvan was the 
more aggresive and outgoing of the two and was balanced by the re-
served and quiet Alfred. Both possessed a %een sense of humor and 
charm undiminished by a highly disciplined work ethic. 
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As vice president of the company the older brother assumed the 
responsibilities of general supervisor of the stores. He also acted 
as the firm's purchasing agent for all fruit and vegetable consign-
ments. Perhaps the most pivotal role that Alfred fulfilled involved 
the choosing of new store sites. None of the Sun Grocery Company units 
were ~uilt on side streets; instead, Alfred invariably picked high 
traffic areas as locations. Construction was invariably brick in the 
belief that other building materials failed to present as neat an 
appearance while providing a safeguard against fire. Two thirds of 
the stores were actually erected by the chain; the remainder were 
placed in existing structures. 6 
In addition to the normal executive functions necessary in any 
business organization, the younger Goldman ordered all grocery sup-
plies and developed the advertizing program. The nature of the retail 
food industry gave the latter a special significance. Much of the 
success of the Sun Company chain and Goldman's later business ventures 
can be directly attributed to his acute comprehension of customer 
desires. The food industry has always been particularly susceptible 
to advertizing gambits. Upon reflection, the reason was obvious to 
many in the business yet few were able to capitalize on the knowledge 
as Goldman consistently did. 
Providing nourishment for the country's mealtimes placed the 
nation's food merchants in the first position among American indus-
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tries in terms of product value during the 1920's. Accord~ng to the 
statistics of dollar volume of production, the food processors, 
wholesalers, and retailers comprised a $12.7 billion industry in 1919~ 
a figure $3.S billion in ,excess of the second ranked textiles and 
textile products value. Ten years later the food industry's dollar 
volume still resided in the number one position, however, the total 
for 1929 was slightly less than in 1919. If the feeding of Americans 
was the ranking business during the decade it was also one in which 
there was tremendous competition for the reliably available, albeit 
slightly dwindling purchasing dollar. 7 
"The wonderful thing about food from our point of view," one 
food-industry man expounded, "is that everybody uses it--and uses it 
8 only once." As a result food vendors have had a substantial advantage 
in selling their product which most other retailers have not enjoyed. 
Not only has the product obsolesced automatically (the purchased items 
were either consumed or perished) but there was generally rhythm in 
the buying pattern of most customers, replenishing their food stocks 
at calculable intervals. Until the post-World War I period there 
were remarkably few changes in food distribution. During the following 
decade five important developments took place which revolutionized 
· the retailing aspect of the food industry. These included the phe-
nomenal growth of chain-store operations, an increasing acceptance of 
self-service in groceries and later in other food items, an enlargement 
of individual retail outlet sizes, a widening of merchandizing offer-
ings of a nonfood variety, and an ever greater reliance on more and 
more sophistocated advertising techniques.9 
That the youthful president of Sun Grocery Company was cognizant 
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of the latest trends in his field can be .positively asserted. With 
the exception of incorporating nonfood lines in his chain stores, an 
innovation introduced but not widely accepted in the 1920's, Goldman's 
business practices were in the vanguard of the modernizing movement 
in the retail grocery business. He did not simply follow where others 
had blazed the trail but consistently followed his own advice offered 
to another later generation.: "The two main foundations a young man 
should have is lots of horse sense and a liking for the job he is 
doing. 1110 
The cost-reduction advantage of a chain-store operation was, of 
course, the primary reason for the Dreyfus brothers' choice of that 
type of enterprise. Goldman, however, utilized a well-established 
concept to its fullest possible extent. The chain-store idea predated 
the history of the United States. Evidence exists that'indicated there 
was a chain of stores active in China two thousand years ago. Japan 
boasted a chain of drug stores founded in 1643, an~ the Fugger family 
of Germany carried on mercantile operations of a chain store char-
acter in the early 17th century. Hudson's Bay Company, chartered in 
1670, built a chain of fur trading posts across most of Canada. For 
the earliest progenitor of the modern chain prototype most scholars 
acknowledge the pre-eminent claim of the Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Company of New York, opened in 1859 by George F. Gilman and George 
Huntington Hartford. At the end of the First World War A & P owned 
4,200 stores when its executives launched an expansion program which 
added nearly 10,000 units by the end of 1925. 
After that date A & P grew very slowly until it peaked in 1930 
with 15,700 stores. Thirty years later the chain had shrunk to its 
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1919 level, operated approximately 4,500 stores. 11 The reason behind 
this reduction also reflected the nature and success of the more modest 
Goldman chain in Tulsa. The trend, beginning very slowly in the period 
from 1920 to 1925, was toward larger grocery stores which handled a 
combination of fresh meats and a wide offering of fresh produce in 
addition to a·straight grocery line. The Sun Grocery Company's stores 
averaged close to 4,800 square feet of floor space twice the size of 
most Oklahoma groceries of that era. In addition their brick construc-
tion, although not unknown, was notable for the time. Similarly, 
combining the produce, meat and grocery concessions under a single 
roof did not constitute a revolutionary idea, but the concept of dir-
ecting them through a centralized management and ownership as the 
Goldmans operated was extremely rare even in Calfornia chains which 
were noted for their up-to-date methods. 
It was the merchandising talent of Goldman, however, that 
accounted for the unusual success enjoyed by the Sun chain. The 
power of advertising has never been properly assessed so far as its 
influence on people's buying habits is concerned. Whether customers 
were stimulated to buy products they might not otherwise have pur-
chased is problematical. In any event, the 1920's witnessed a tremen-
dous reliance being placed on advertising. Goldman undoubtedly 
believed in its potency, especially the newspaper variety that remained 
most prevalent medium of commercial communication throughout the decade. 
He began with the choice of a company name--sun. A single-syllable 
word easily remembered, it evoked pleasant connotations and allowed 
the use of the striking orange and black storefront motif. For pur-
poses of newspaper advertisements and handbills Goldman used a barely 
rising sun symbol with a base inscription which informed the reader 
that Sun Grocery Company was the "Mos.t Economical Under The Sun. nl2 
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Economy was the key word in the majority of Goldman's advertising 
copy. He employed this theme in variegated and imaginative ways to 
convince the. public that the Sun Company's policies were solely aimed 
at providing the lowest possible prices for food items. Advertising 
colmnns stressed the advantage of volume buying over individual stores' 
capacity to sell as cheaply to the consumer. This message was relayed 
subtly and somewhat obliquely in a passage from Goldman's first 
anniversary interview: "Quality is the first thing I consider in our 
purchases. our enormous buying power takes care of the prices. 1113 
The economy argument was wielded to educate the public to accept an 
innovation that the Sun Company borrowed from other chain operations--
self-service. Actually, the first step taken by the Goldman chain 
toward this concept, which was to wreak a basic change in many retail 
businesses, was a contest. The company offered $150 in prizes to the 
winning slogans stating why the Sun Stores' policy of "no delivery" 
meant money saved to grocery buyers in the now traditional 2s'words 
or less.14 Many shoppers had adopted the habit of telephoning their 
food needs to grocers and leaving the responsibility of gathering the 
items and carting them home to store personnel. Others visited the 
stores and expected their parcels to be delivered later in the day. 
Goldman's contest served the dual purpose of relieving his chain from 
a time-consuming, worrisome task and providing excellent publicity 
emphasizing the pains taken by the Sun Company to save its customers 
money. 
During the chain's second year of operation, Goldman experimented 
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with self-service inside the stores. There was a strong resentment 
on the part of some customers who felt that gathering their own gro-
ceries was demeaning. A more significant problem involved a 
technological gap; many food items were stocked in bulk and were 
simply too unwieldy for housewives to handle comfortably. Prepackaged 
food in smaller quantities and some sort of conveyance system would 
have to be devised before the self-service concept could eventually 
triumph over the older style. 
The Sun Company's expansion program outstripped its first year's 
accomplishments during the second twelve months of operation. Looking 
beyond the boundaries of metropolitan Tulsa, Goldman made the decision 
to widen the territory serviced by the orange and black stores to a 
number of smaller communities. By the spring of 1928 Sun stores had 
opened in a string of towns extending in a southerly progression from 
Tulsa to Henryetta, fifty-five miles distant, and including Kiefer, 
Mounds and Beggs. A second line reached as far southwest as Chandler 
and featured units in Sapulpa, Bristow, and Stroud. The chain boasted 
half a hundred stores after a brief two years in business.15 
The Goldman brothers had justified their uncles' faith in their 
ability to apply the lessons gleaned from the year's working experience 
in California. They had consistently utilized the latest techniques 
in building the Sun chain. One reason for their phenomenal success 
had little or no connection with modernizing ideas. It stemmed from 
the enlightened personnel policy laid out by the company's chief 
executive, a factor whose efficacy become a hallmark of all the later 
Goldman enterprises. The chain employed over 150 persons in 1928 
when it had reached its maximum growth level. In that day of full 
service groceries, Goldman realized the imperative need to man his 
stores with employees who exhibited courtesy to the customer and 
loyalty to the company. Although salaried, the clerks and store 
managers shared in the profits of their particular store through a 
rising scale of bonuses. Unlike many businessmen, Goldman readily 
1rasped the basic psychology of employer-employee relationships. Too 
few executives understood that company loyalty had to be cultivated· 
from the top, that an actual demonstration of interest and concern 
would engender a positive response more quickly than an expectance or 
of inactivity on management's part. 
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Goldman's progressive theories were also manifested in the Sun 
Company's promotion policy. Virtually all the firm's executive and 
management positions were filled by men who had been recruited from the 
ranks of existing personnel. A. K. Weiss held the position of secre-
tary-treasurer; Charles Nachtmann, market supervisor; Scott A. Millis, 
grocery supervisor, and M. P. Green, office manager. Nachtman was 
the only one of these with substantial experience in the grocery bus-
iness and was also the only man over forty. His background as a 
onetime independent store operator and meat market manager for other 
stores was regarded by Goldman as indispensable to the organization 
since the meat concession was the area of concern within the chain's 
combined units in which the two senior Sun executives had the least 
knowledge. Nachtman was given complete control over his specialty, 
this leaving the Goldmans free to deal with their spheres of expertise. 
The most interesting and revealing story relating to the company's 
personnel policy was that of Scott Millis. He began as a grocery 
clerk in the first Sun store about two months after it opened. When 
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the sixth unit of the chain opened, Millis was chosen to manage the 
new addition. Four months later Goldman appointed him grocery super-
visor, a position which included a chair on the company's executive 
board. His work placed Millis in the position of rnlddleman between 
the main office and the individual store managers. Obviously, Goldman 
kept a close watch on his employees, looking for those with the poten-
tial to assume greater responsibilities. Perhaps the major strength 
in this practice was that the young president maintained a consistent 
open mindedness; he refused to categorize any employee as occupying a 
lifetime position if an untapped ability.could be brought to fruition. 
Goldman's flexibility extended to unusual lengths in the case of 
Millis. •ro fill his new grocery supervisor's former position as mana-
ger of the Number Six Store, he willingly broke one his own original 
company rules by selecting the person he believed best qualified, a 
woman. Alice I'!illis, wife of Goldman's newest executive, proved an 
able and businesslike manager during a period in which women's liber-
ation more commonly conjured. images of flappers daringly experimenting 
with short skirts, cigarettes, bootleg gin, and pseudo-Freudian free 
love.16 
The highly successful young leaders of the Sun Grocery Company 
must have felt a certain satisfaction with life in December, 1928. 
In two years' time they had fashioned a chain of fifty-five stores, 
all of which were profiting mightily in an era of 29 cents-a-pound 
pork chops, 10 pounds-for 26 cents potatoes, and 42 cents-a-pound 
bacon.17 The Goldmans were decidedly unprepared for the appearance. 
one morning of a man announcing his intention of buying them out--
stores, warehouse, name, everything. Refusing initially to reveal 
his financial backing, the man finally convinced the two brothers 
that the proposal was serious. The Goldmans' uncles were consulted 
and they expressed an interest in sellinq if the purchase could be 
enlarged to include their wholesale business. When confronted with 
this counterproposal, the buyer listened equably and almost immed-
iately accepted the new condition. After some brief bargaining 
sessions the deal was made in January, 1929. 
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According to .the terms of the purchase contract, the buyer, now 
revealed as Skaggs-Safeway Stores, Incorporated, agreed to pay apnrox-
imately $1,500,000 for the sun Grocery Company. In a companion sale 
the Dreyfus Brothers, Wholesalers firm was acquired by the Western 
States Grocery Company. One of the nation's largest grocery chains, 
the Safew.ay Company had not previously entered the Oklahoma retail 
market. The company representative in the neqotiation insisted that 
the Goldmans remain with the Tulsa chain organization until the take-
over was accomplished. For the next six months the former president 
and vice president of Sun Stores acted as Safeway's Oklahoma manager 
and assistant manager respectively. The name of the stores was changed 
to Safeway but the orartge and black painted fronts were retained. 
If the Goldmans experienced any regrets over the sale their share 
of the purchase price and the conditions under which it was paid, 
served to alleviate them. The brothers acquiesced to an arrangement 
whereby they would receive issues of Safeway preferred stock in ex-
change for their interests in the Sun Company. The New York Stock 
Exchange listed Safeway Stores at $140 a share at the time the sale 
was negotiated in January. Delivery of the Goldmans' issue would not 
be executed until the second week in March. If the market price of 
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Safeway stock declined in the interval more shares would be added to 
the brothers' issues to make up the loss incurred since January. 
However, in the event that the stock exchange quoted a higher price 
for the Safeway listing in March, the Goldmans would realize a 
bonus from the increased value of their shares. Thanks to the wildly 
bullish market of early 1929 the two Tulsans receive<'l. their Safeway 
stock in March at $160 a share, a quotation that boosted their earnings 
from the Sun Stores sale to a heady $300,00o. 18 
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Goldman suddenly felt quite wealthy. That spring of 1929 had 
transformed he and his brother from hardworking grocery executives to 
monied stockholders. Unsurprisingly, advice on the correct care and 
handling of their building fortune was not slow in coming. The stock 
broker who answered the young men's daily inquir,ies as to the health 
of their Safeway shares ofrered the benefit of his considerable exper-
ience. He cautioned them not to leave all their financial eggs in a 
single basket; diversification of their investments would prove a sage 
course. The wisdom of this counsel seemed exceptionally logical and 
was easily facilitated by the sale of part of their Safeway holdings 
and reinvestment in several "blue-chip stocks." 
Two or three weeks spent in observing the continual upward trend 
of the st~ck exchange dispelled any doubts the brothers entertained 
concerning another suggestion their broker made. If the Goldrnans 
wanted to take full advantage of the current bull market, he urged, 
they should utilize the device of trading on margin. Under this 
arrangement the stock buyer relieved himself from the limiting burden 
of ownership, putting up the full purchase price for his securities 
orders. Instead the broker accepted a cash percentage of the actual 
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price of stocks from a buyer who hoped to pay the balance of the pur-
chase at a designated future date with the earnings of the stock's rise 
on the exchange. The Goldmans could pay $10 down on each $100 stock 
order and let the rising market take care of the remaining purchase 
price some months later. Naturally, if the market price of their 
shares fell during the scheduled time period they would hav.e to pay 
the balance in another way.19 Congratulating themselves on their pru-
dence in the face of the overwhelming temptation represented by the 
1929 market, the brothers 'settled on a 50 per cent margin limit for 
their securities buying activities. 
With this financial compromise completed, the two decided that 
they had earned a respite from business. A trip to the Pacific coast 
woild be relaxing an.d might offer an interesting opportunity for in-
vestment. The jaunt became a family affair with their uncle, Henry 
Dreyfus, and their parents accompanying them. After a leisurely trip 
across western United States the two car caravan arrived in Los 
Angeles. Following visits with relatives and friends, the brothers and 
their 1 uncle decided to drive southward on a sightseeing tour. They 
travelled as far as Tia Juana, the Mexican border city, before re-
tracing their path td Los Angeles. At a dinner party the three were 
introduced to the owners of a small retail drug chain named, oddly 
enough, Sun Stores. This coincidence was explored conversationally and 
the tenor of the talk quickly assumed a businesslike air. The evening 
ended with a titillating proposition from the Californians. 
It seemed that the Sun drug chain was prospering, however, there 
existed one flaw in its operation that concerned the owners. Not 
having sufficient volume to buy directly from the drug manufacturers 
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in large quantities, the chain was forced to deal with profit-reducing 
middlemen. Familiar with the huge success that.the Oklahomans had 
enjoyed, and learning of their search for a new field of investment, 
the drugstore merchants eagerly submitted the thought that the two 
parties join forces to meet their desired ends. If the Oklahoma gro-
cers would use some of their capital to start a drugstore or two, then 
they could all pool their purchasing resources and supply their stores 
at wholesale prices. The.venture sounded plausible to Dreyfus and his 
nephews agreed. The drugstore business, they believed, would be simple 
in comparison to the intricacies of the retail food line. After all, 
once stocked, the drugstore virtually ran itself without the worries 
of spoilage, produce procurement, and meat marketing that demanded so 
much time in the grocery business. 
With the idea of expanding their potential market, the three 
visitors from Tulsa took their new friends' advice and headed north 
to Oregon and Washington. None of the trio had traveled in that region 
of the country before so they continued to combine tourist activities 
with scouting the territory for possible drugstore sites. At regular 
intervals the Goldmans bought newspapers, hurriedly turned to the fi-
nancial pages, and briefly relished the stock quotations which continued 
to adhere to the gratifyingly steep upward incline of the past several 
months. Labor Day found the Oklahomans in Vancouver, enjoying the 
Canadian resort area. Beginning their return trip south, they stopped 
in Seattle, Washington to actively pursue their somewhat haphazard 
search for a possible store site. One was discovered by the simple ex-
pedient of driving about the city and relying on the refined instinct 
for good retail store locations derived from their grocery experience. 
Near the city's public market, where the seasoned produce men must 
have naturally gravitated, they spotted an excellent possibility. A 
• 
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large FOR RENT sign graced the otherwise empty show window of an equal-
ly barren store located advantageously between two busy thoroughfares. 
Further inquiry led to a lawyer who handled the property for 
its absentee owner living on the eastern seaboard. An hour's question-
ing convinced the Oklahomans that the store would serve admirably 
as the site of their first drugstore. Accordingly, a ten year lease 
was settled with the proviso that the lessees need pay only half the 
normal rate for the first two months until they actually opened the 
store. The attorney invited the others for lunch while his secretary 
prepared the formal contract. Among the topics discussed by the men 
during the meal was, inevitably, the weather. The Oklahomans made. 
much of the beautiful, mild climate of Washington in August and com-
pared it to the hot, dusty days of home at the end of summer. Their 
host acknowledged the salubrious state of the season and noted that it 
would continue until November when Seattle's "dry rain" would begin. 
Puzzled his guests questioned the attorney about this apparent con-
tradiction in terminology. It was not a great mystery, he explained, 
"dry rain" was simply the local residents' half-humorous phrase to 
describe the moisture-laden mist that dominated the Seattle atmosphere 
.from late autumn to early January. 
The Goldmans and their uncle exchanged bemused glances and calmly 
informed the lawyer that they could not sign the lease. They quickly 
explained that Alfred Goldman and Henry Dreyfus suffered from arthritis 
a condition severely aggravated by prolonged exposure to damp weather. 
Rather abruptly the Tulsans' plans of forging a chain of drugst9res in 
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league with their Los Anqeles friends was halted. The latter had al-
ready expressed an intention of extending their operations to San 
Francisco and their would-be partners had agreed to position themselves 
north of that city. Explanations and good-bys completed, the family 
caravan, two cars strong, left Los Angeles early in September. The 
Goldman brothers were relieved at the peculiar manner in which they 
had escaped involvement in what would have been a very expensive in-
vestment in Seattle and consoled themselves by reading reports of the 
still rising stock market. Within weeks of their return to Oklahoma 
the two would regard that institution with less eg:uanimity. 20 
On Thursday, October 24, 1929 the first of several financial jolts 
startled the nation. The stock exchange rallied that day from a 
frightening low but the recovery was ephemeral. Five days later the 
New York stock market experienced the most devastating twenty-four 
hours in the history of markets. Succeeding days and weeks failed to 
bring a cessation to the decline of the market and eventually the na-
tional economy. Those who remained optimistic during the waning days 
of an autumn discovered that the decade of the 1920's ended before the 
close of 1929; the New Era of boundless faith in the ultimate progress 
of the United States had disappeared by Christmas. 
In Tulsa the Goldmans were among those who tried to weather the 
shock by hanging onto their investments. They finally sold their port-
folio in the summer after the Crash, having already borrowed money to 
meet margin demands during the winter. Between them the brothers re-
tained about $25,000 of the original $300,000 they had received from 
the sale of Sun Stores. 21 The prosperity decade of the 1920's had 
witnessed the building of two successful businesses and subsequent 
losses. The Goldmans had proved that they could grow prosperous in 
good times, now they would try to make a living during bad times. 
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HOW TO MAKE A LIVING DURING A DEPRESSION 
Eminent businessmen are frequently asked to reveal the secret 
of their success. Goldman has been called upon many times to answer 
that apparently simpl~ question. His favorite short reply rests on 
his office desk; inscribed on a small plaque, it reads, "I am a great 
believer in luck--the harder I work, the more luck I seem to have." 
This might easily be shrugged away as the sententious moralizinq of a 
man who has forgotten his younger struggle for prominence. Such an 
interpretation would be a mistake. Goldman and his brother, Alfred, 
had amassed cons~derable wealth at relatively young ages through a 
coJ'l'lhination of luck and hard work. The stock market crash that re-
duced their affluence to a fraction of its original level had dealt the 
same blow as well to older, more experienced men. Ndt especially 
comforted with the thought that they had salvaged something from the 
disaster, that the stocks had continued to drop after their withdrawal, 
the two young Oklahomans contemplated ways and means of recouping 
their losses. The incredible recovery they achieved in the midst of 
America's worst depression can only be attributed to the Goldmans' 
determination to capitalize on moments of good luck and try to force 
bad luck to reverse itself. 
That the United States was actually in a depression by the end 
of the winter of 1929-1930, no one seriously doubted. So many busi-
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nesses closed that a popular joke, revealing the gallows humor with 
.which Americans attempted to comfort themselves, suggested that the 
only people making money were those who owned high rise buildings; 
they rented rooms to those who were jumping out of windows after 
ruination in the collapsing stock market.! As the depression wore 
on, contradicting the opinions of many that it would be of short 
duration, such jocosity became less and less frequent. For the over-
whelming majority of citizens the American dream abruptly dissolved 
into a nightmare. The security and happiness that they expected as 
a re~ard for thrift and hard work disappeared when the seemingly 
endless vista of continous prosperity faded into the reality of lost 
savings, unemployment, foreclosed mortgages, and forcible evictions. 
Poverty, a condition thought to exist only in isolated pockets of 
the nation, was now evident everywhere in alarming proportions. And,· 
as the depression showed no signs of lessening, but rather darkened 
further an already gray horizon, the people surrendered to a numbing 
dispair. Only very gradually would the nation regain the confidence 
lost in the early years of the depression. 
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Sylvan and Alfred Goldman met the adversity of the times by moving 
to another area of the .. state. Thousands, and later hundreds of thou-
sands, of Americans eventually did the same, although few converted 
their geographical relocation as profitablY •. Actually the brothers had 
little choice in leaving Tulsa if they desired to return to the gro-
cery business. Part of the purchase agreement that they had signed with 
Safeway in 1929 stipulated that the Goldmans could not establish a 
grocery store in any community where the old Sun Chain had operated. 
Originally the selling contract had specified that the restriction 
extend for a ten year period, but Safeway's legal staff had advised 
the company that a five year maximum existed in regard to such con-
tractual pledges. Two possibilities presented themselves in 1929. 
Oil fields around Shawnee, .Bowlegs, and Weleetka in east central 
Oklahoma were producinq an atmosphere of boom economy which a grocery 
chain in those towns should reflect. The Goldmans were unable to se-
cure the holdings in those towns offered for sale and were left with 
their geographical choice, Oklahoma City. 2 
On the occasion of this their third major business venture the 
two brothers acquired additional responsibilities. While living and 
operating their Sun chain in Tulsa, they had attended a cousin's en-
gagement party. The latter arranged for the Goldmans to escort two 
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of her friends from out of town, Margaret and Helen Katz of Stillwater, 
Oklahoma. The girls' father Jaco~ Katz, owned and operated a depart-
ment store which he had opened in the 1890's. After a pleasant evening 
the brothers asked the Katz sisters to join them at their cousin's 
wedding and the proposal was accepted. The two couples, Alfred and 
Helen and Sylvan and Margaret, dated occasionally until Goldmans sold 
their Sun holding and left for California. 
In 1929, despite the financial problems preoccupying the brothers' 
thoughts, Alfred found time to renew his acquaintance with Helen Katz. 
The two were married before the end of the year in time for the new 
bride to make the'move to Oklahoma City, Margaret Katz came from 
Stillwater to visit her sister several times whic11 gave the younger 
Goldman brother a chance to see her as well. The trips grew more and 
more frequent until they finally ran together permanently and the two 
were married June 7, 1939. Thus the brothers had an additional motive 
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to make their business move to Oklahoma City prove profitable. 3 
The state capital represented the largest population center within 
Oklahoma's boundaries as a potential market, however, the latecoming 
Tulsans felt some trepidations over the move. The pall of depression 
that hung over the nation cast an equally enervatinq shad.ow on the 
city. Competition was not lacking either with the presence of Pigqly 
Wiggly, Kroeger, and Safeway food chains, three of the country's lar-
qest. Between 1930 and 1937, eleven grocery chains left the tough 
metropolitan area or declared bankruptcy. Obviously the Goldman bro-
thers would need every ounce of energy and expertise to succeed in this 
far from promising prospect. 
Marshalling all their resources, the two called on their uncles, 
Morris and Henry Dreyfus, to join them in the Oklahoma City venture. 
The former assumed an active role in the new business while the latter 
provided financial support but stayed in Tulsa. The-family expended 
most of its capital on the purchase of six small groceries, five of 
them located in the suburbs and the sixth on the corner of Robinson 
and Reno Streets in the downtown area. Borrowing from their experience 
in Tulsa, the Goldmans turned the city site into a self-service oper-
ation under the name, Standard Food Market. 4 An early customer 
suggested the designation, Sunshine Stores, for the outlying groceries 
since all of them boasted fresh coats of bright yellow paint. 5 All 
of the buildings were quite small compared to later designs1 the 
Standard Store possessed a mere 25 feet X 50 feet floor plan. None of 
the store sites included adequate parking facilities, a condition 
which influenced an early decision to offer free deliver service at 
the suburban locations. Goldman reasoned that boys on bicycles could 
deliver groceries and build up business during.the hard times when 
potential customers were reluctant to use their automobiles. As soon 
as possible he phased out this obsolete service which contradicted 
his concept of retail management. 
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Necessity also dictated other store and chain policies. All 
sales were cash because the struggling young company possessed no 
capital reserves to back a credit program. The money pinch presented 
the Goldmans with ;:mother problem that required a special strategern. 
If the new chain was going to compete with established businesses, 
competitive pricing was a must. The wholesale grocers of Oklahoma 
City had to be. persuaded to give the stores a discount price on pro-
duce orders. This would allow Goldman to advertize cheaper fruits and 
vegetables than rival stores and thus establish a steady trade. Un-
fortunately the six stores did not represent enough buying volume to 
warrant such an arrangement. The single bit of leverage Goldman could 
wield resided in the family reputation. Oklahoma City wholesalers 
were keenly aware of the new chain operators' past record in Tulsa 
as grocers and produce men, With this fact in mind Goldman queried 
the wholesalers about the possibility of buying at a discount. He 
countered their reluctance by hinting at the possibility that his 
family might well establish their own wholesale house in the city 
barring an agreement on the discount question. The ploy worked per-
fectly. The wholesalers had no way of knowinq that neither the 
Dreyfus brothers nor the Goldmans commanded sufficient funds to back 
the bluff. 
The Standard and Sunshine stores now boasted a specialty to 
draw customers. The wholesalers who provided this advantage lost 
nothing in the process as they slightly altered their delivery routes 
to include the new customers. Despite the success of this arrange-
ment Goldman still faced an additional obstacle, paying the weekly 
produce bills. The situation called for more commercial sleight of 
hand. Noting that the wholesalers allowed ten days for payment on 
delivered items, Goldman began switching suppliers, ordering fruits· 
and vegetables froM one firm this week and another the following 
week. This enabled him to meet his credit deadlines with the profits 
earned by vending the produce during each ten day grace period. 6 
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Ohtaining goods at an advantageous price had proved complicated 
enough, yet the involved machinations would result in wasted motion 
unless customers purchased the hard-won offerings. Before anyone 
could buy the stores' products they must become aware of their avail-
ability. Given Goldman's past achievements in advertising there 
seemed to be no particular difficulty in this respect. However, ohce 
again funds, or more accurately an insufficiency of funds, caused 
Goldman and his partners to seek a substitute for the preferred but 
expensive newspaper medium. They substituted by issuing floods of 
handbills touting the superior quality and low prices at their stores. 
To supplement this practice Goldman instructed company personnel to 
use the stores themselves as billboards, painting the windows with the 
news that bananas were purchasable at 3 cents a pound, oranges at 15 
cents per dozen, and lettuce at 5 cents a head~7 
The most remarkable aspect of this nascent food chain, other than 
its continued existence in the middle of a depression, was its constant 
growth and expansion. Goldman never paused to reflect on the possibly 
dire consequences of reinvesting profits during a period of general 
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economy retrenchment. Possessed of a determined self confidence. he 
epitomized his own financial philosop~1y that years later he set down in 
print. On the subject of placing one's self in debt for business 
purposes Goldman recommended borrowing all the funds available "if 
you know what to do with the money and how to invest it properly and 
profitably." In the same optimistic vein he decried the fear of power-
ful competitors such as those he had faced in the 1930's, suggesting 
that "it isn't the size of a company that counts, but the advantages of 
being flexible, using good judgment and being able to grab opportun~ 
ities ••• while larger operations must debate or wait on company routine 
8 
and red tape." 
There was nothing about the aggrandizement of Goldman's initial 
beginning that could be termed indecisive or cautionary. As the 
sunshine store leases expired they were either renovated and enlarged 
or moved to better locations. Simultaneously with the improvement 
and enlargement process the stores, renamed Standard Food Markets, 
became self service. The free delivery feature was dropped as emphasis 
was placed on eliminating costs to maintain competitive prices. This 
meant affecting a tremendous change in traditional concepts of grocery 
management. The experiments in Tulsa during the 1920's had attempted 
to condition shoppers to self service with little notable success. 
Ironically, the depression by fostering an acute awareness of all 
price variations actually aided in the developement of modern markets. 
Each remodeling, relocation, or addition to the original six 
stores brought innovations to the field of retail food merchandising. 
In August, 1932 a store located in the Farmer's Public Market was 
added to the chain. The new unit contained a bakery which Goldman had 
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enlarged to bake bread for all the Standard Stores. Producing the 
bread on such a scale allowed him to sell the staple for five cents a 
loaf. This proved to be an excellent attraction at the stores which 
made no direct, profit on the item but reaped the benefit of increased 
numbers of customers. The following year Standard erected the first of 
its large model markets. The big 50 feet X 135 feet floor space was 
enhanced by a huge parking lot. Built in a residential area of 
Oklahoma City, the store reflected a nationwide trend toward large 
suburban outlets with spacious parking facilities to satisfy the new 
custom of driving to market and carrying home larger orders of gro-
ceries thus eliminating the need for daily trips. 
While these improvements in facilities were important, they were 
primarily adaptations of what other retailers were doing across the 
nation. However Morris Dreyfus and the Goldmans were among those who 
pioneered self-service produce departments. The pre-eminence of 
Standard Stores in this aspect of food retailing was acknowledged in 
1938 when a national trade magazine, Super Market Merchandising, asked 
Goldman to contribute an article on the subject. It explained much of 
the philosophy behind the whole concept of self-service stores through 
detailing the specifics of produce merchandising. 
According to Goldman self-service departments were practical and 
profitable because they added to a store's income by tending to in-· 
crease volume while reducing labor and operating costs. Customers 
could browse through the fruits and vegetables and choose whatever 
looked tempting. Instead of relying on a clerk's judgment the shopper 
selected his own quality and quantity, feeling free to change his 
mind without becoming embarrassed by his own indecision. Goldman's 
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article anticipated the major objection of many grocery managers to 
self-service produce--the tomfito squeezer. He labelled as groundless 
the fear that enormous losses would be incurred from the lady who 
manhandles fruits and vegetables, a cliche figure in countless comic 
strips and movies. To counteract this nemesis and maintain a smooth-
running department, store owners should stress proper training for the 
produce managers who grade, price and display the sometimes fragile 
items. These operations consume time the article suggested but using 
checker and sacker personnel to help in readying the produce in the 
early morning, slow business hours would offset any labor utilization 
disadvantage. After discussing s~veral technical points of self-ser-
vice Goldman ended his arguments by indicating his opinion that 
eventually all stores would be ·forced by competition to adopt the new 
methodology. 10 
In 1934 Goldman's expansion progra:rn. took a giant step forward 
with the purchase of five self-service Humpty Dumpty stores. Acquired 
in a receivership sale, the new addition to the chain retained their 
name and were operated on a separate basis to the public eye although 
in actuality they were centrally managed and direc:ted by Goldman. Not 
until the war years was the general public made aware that the two 
groups of stores were connected through a common owner. This occurred 
in 1943 w.hen a shortage of newsprint prompted the decision to merge 
Standard and Humpty Dumpty advertising space. Much of the chain's 
proliferation after World War II came under the Humpty Dumpty name. 11 
Somehow the appellation, "Humpty Dumpty," seemed more suitable 
for the type of stores that were evolving in the 1930's and 1940's. 
It might have appeared odd to a casual observer that despite Goldman's 
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obviously burgeoning chain he was operating fewer stores in Oklahoma 
City after ten years than in Tulsa after two during the 1920's. The 
.answer did not lay in the depression but in the site of the stores. 
In 1938 Goldman erected his first o.ut-of-town unit at Shawnee, a store 
which could only be described as a "super market." The following de-
cade witnessed still larger units which carried to fruition the trend 
which Goldman helped foster in the 1930's--stores so biq and different 
from the old corner groceries that their develor-ment constituted a 
revolution in the retail food industry. 
The origins of this dramatic change in the nation's number one 
industry are nebulous, primarily due to confusion surrounding the de-
finition of a supermarket. To the average person the term has become 
so common as to suggest nothing more than a large grocery store, a 
notion backed by many dictionaries. Simplicity alone can recommend 
this definition which poses a secondary question of how to define 
"large." Perhaps the most colorful and image-provoking description 
appeared in a rather whimsical book purporting to record the story of 
·the world's first supermarket, an entity described as "a large store 
majoring in food products and minoring in comestic aids, kitchen gad-
J 
gets, cleansing agents, paper products, stainless steel razor blc1des, 
and magazines. 11 12 A more precise definition was finally evolved in 
1936: 
A Super Market is a highly departmentalized retail estab-
lishment, dealing in foods and other merchandise, either 
wholly owned or concession operated, with adequate parking 
space, doing a minumum of $250,000 annually. The grocery 
department, however, must be on a self-service basis.13 
TWenty years later the minimum volume to qualify as a supermarket 
was raised to $400,000 annually. 14 
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The various components of a supe~arket as defined above existed 
in this country for decades before the birth of the modern version 
of such stores in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Large markets, 
usually operating under public auspices, were a feature of many cities 
such as the Faneuil Hall Market of Boston and the Lexington Market of 
Baltimore. By 1918 over 174 sizable retail markets, some privately 
financed, could be found in the United States. Although vastly dis-
similar in appearance they .all had the common characteristics of a 
large area, several stalls, booths or departments leased to individual 
I 
proprietors and a big cumulative volume. Propably the Crystal Palace 
Market of San Francisco, founded in 1922 and housed in a 68,000-square 
foot building, came closest to qualifying as the major forerunner of 
the modern supermarket. Its 110 leased departments did an annual 
multimillion dollar sales volume aided by a 4,3SO~car parking lot and 
extensive advertising campaigns. However, the establishment lacked 
self-service, one oft.he distinguishing marks of supermarkets.IS 
The man generally credited with introducing this revolutionary 
idea to food retailing.was the amazing Clarence Saunders of Memphis, 
Tennessee. He made self-service the basis of his intriguingly named 
Piggly Wiggly Company whose stores were eventually scattered across 
the country with combined annual sales of 180 million dollars. These 
establishments started in 1916, while no larger than other grocery 
stores of the period, featured turnstiles at the entrance and a floor 
plan that required shoppers to pass virtually all of the displayed 
merchandise before exiting through checkout stands with their pur-
chases. Saunders sold franchises to others who operated under the 
Piggly Wiggly name and several of the leading chains including Kroger 
and Safeway bought them before converting their own stores to self-
service. Piggly Wiggly stores continued in operation, especially in 
the western states, long after Saunders lost control of his company 
in a 1923 stock irnbroglio.16 
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California and Texas furnished social and economic c'limate 
friendly to the further development of supermarkets. In the 1920's 
Ralph's Grocery Company, Carty Brothers, and Alpha Beta Food Markets 
built retail food stores in California that were entitled to use the 
appellative, "super', even though they did not. In Texas ABC Sto:tes, 
Incorporated, Henke & Pillot, and J. Weingarten, Incorporated operated 
supermarket prototypes by the early 1920's. Later in that decade 
store and chain owners in both area began utilizing "supermarket" to 
describe their operations although the term was not a corporate or 
trade name until 1933. Despite their early and attractive appearance, 
these southwestern stores failed to startle the nation with their 
presence as did the depression decade supermarkets developed in New 
York and New Jersey. Michael Cullen, formerly an executive with Kroger 
organization, opened the first of what one author has titled the 
"cheapy" supermarket. These were gigantic enterprises featuring very 
low prices, crude interiors, and flamboyant advertising. Cullen's 
fantastic success with his first store at Flushing, New York resulted 
in a chain of King Kullen Markets selling every type of merchandise 
before his death in April, 1936.17 
The neighboring state of New Jersey fostered the inauguration 
and rise of a. similar type of operation which received nationwide 
notice and powerfully influenced the growth of the supermarket industry. 
Robert M. Otis and Roy o. Dawson leased a vacant automobile plant at 
66 
Elizabeth, New Jersey in 1932, and used its 50,000 square feet to sell 
groceries and other merchandise at exceptionally low prices. The as-
pect of this and later Big Bear stores that drew the comment and 
imitation which made the chain famous was its advertising technique. 
Supermarkets were never mentioned in Big Bear advertisements. In-
stead, the company name was exploited in such a manner that Big Bear 
always "crushed," "slashed," "banged," and "crashed" prices to amazing-
ly low levels. Specially marked items were invariably "sensational," 
"colossal," "stupendous" or "lowest" buys available. The chain itself 
claimed pre-eminence as "America's Greatest Thrift Center" or "World's 
Champion Price Fighter" "where millions shop and save" because Big 
Bear had "no high-salaried executives," "no large overhead," "no fancy 
frills or fixtures," and "all your needs under one roof." At the end 
of a year's operation Big Bear's five million customers at the oriqinal 
store alone gave partial credence to the advertising that became fami-
liar through imitation to every literate American.18 
For the average citizen struqqlinq with the depression it was 
enough that the supermarkets offered a chance at a cheaper grocery 
budget. In Oklahoma City, Goldman and his competitors strove to qain 
their shares of the public's food dollar. If Standard-Humpty Dumpty 
thrived much of its success was due to Goldman's willingness to adopt 
others' merchandising advances and ability to develop his own inno-
vations.19 
The steady but spectacular growth of Goldman's food chain belied 
much of the real difficulties he and his partners encountered doing 
business in the depression atmosphere of Oklahoma. One of the more 
perplexing problems had its origin in the banking crisis of 1933 and 
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subsequent attempts by the federal government to assuage its alarming 
affects on the national economy. The governor of Nevada closed his 
state's banks in October, 1932, when it became apparent that they might 
collapse due to an inability to cope with the strain of continued hard 
times. During the next two months bank failures in other western 
states spread a growing awareness that a new financial cataclysm simi-
lar to the 1929 stock market crash might be eminent. This premonition 
became a harsh reality in the following February and early March. 
Banks were failing all over the nation causing the governors of 38 
states to suspend the financial institutions' activities. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, impatiently awaiting his inauguration on March 4, had 
already publicly expressed his concern that the whole economic struc-
ture seemed unlikely to hold together until he took his oath of office. 
Much of the nation shared his dubious thought as news of continuing 
hank failures were interspersed with the ominous reports of stock and 
commodity markets closing in t!ew York, Chicago, and Kansas City. 
Oklahoma Governor William H. Murray joined his California, 
Louisiana, and Alabama counterparts who closed their respective states' 
banks the night of March 1. Four days later President Roosevelt de-
clared a national bank holiday, a fortunate euphemism whi~h in itself 
did something to relieve people's tension. However, no one knew when 
the country's financial system woul<l reopen or under what circumstances. 
The few days that Roosevelt and Congress consumed in fashioninq legis-
lation for a ne,;,1 banking la,., were uneasy ones for many people as in 
ingenious methods designed to carry on normal activities without money 
were devised. Some northern states accepted Canadian currency as a 
circulating medium; southwestern states used Mexican pesos, and local 
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businessmen tried a variety of credit and money substitutes. 20 
Goldman's experience in dealing with the bank holiday illustrated 
the imaqination and boldness which distinguished so much of his entre-
preneurial career. Not long after establishinq himself in Oklahoma 
City, he had concocted a project of sales promotion especially designed 
to appeal to the depression-conscious public. A printshop was engaged 
to produce a series of coupon books in $5, $10, and $20 denominations. 
Each hook contained one dollar coupons with perforated divisions which 
could be torn out to make change. Customers could purchase these each 
payday and use them to buy their groceries until the next payday. 
Families who wanted to ensure an adequate food supply but feared t"O 
trust their will power at budgeting found the coupons convenient. 
Those forced to leave their children with babysitters while they worked 
also appreciated the device as the coupons could be redeemed by anyone, 
but only for groceries. Naturally the coupons were not acceptable at 
stores other than Standard stores. 
The coupon books had already become an established part of chain 
policy when the March, 1933 bank holiday was announced. Goldman, fol-
lowing the lead of Oklahoma City's other chain op13rators, issued 
instructions to his store managers not to cash any checks until after 
the federal government's reorganization of the banking system. During 
the morning of the banks' closing the president of Standard Food 
Markets received a telephone call. It was from a store manager ques-
tioninq the no check dictum in light of a request to cash one from 
Goldman's own wife. Humorous though the situation seemed it caused the 
chain president to pause and think about other Oklahoma City housewives 
in similar predicaments. He reversed his earlier decision and tele-
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phone<l the store managers to cash all checks for the amount of pur-
' 
chase or in the case of payroll checks, issue food cdupons. 
Having arrived at this judgment, Goldman characteristicaliy ex-
plored the matter for possible ways of turning it to his company's 
advantage. Realizing that workers all over the city·had to be paid 
and that there simply existed no currency in sufficient quantities 
to .cash the checks, he decided to propose a unique plan to several 
business acquaintances. In lieu of meeting their payrolls in full with 
momentarily worthless checks Goldman offered to sell his business 
fri':!nds coupon books which could be distributed as part of their em-
ployees' salaries.· The plausibility of this plan was not lost on the 
men and hundreds of· workers received Standard coupons fn their pay 
envelopes. An unexpected extension of the idea occurred when street-
car conductors were issued coupon books from which they tore the 
correct subdivision of coupons to dispense change to riders. 
The executives of the Standard chain were pleased with the 
increased flow of shoppers into their stores. They could reasonably 
expect to retain some of the new customers as regular patrons. There 
was only one drawback. · As the cashed checks collected on C'..oldman' s 
office desk they finally reached such proportions that their sum total, 
if uncollected, would bankrupt the entire operation. Although the store 
managers had been cautioned not to accept checks from strangers, 
several of them had hinted to Goldman that ,they were suspicious of 
some persons' checks. When the banks reopened during the second week 
in March the Standard accumulation of paper promises was hurriedly 
deposited. Over half of them came back stamped "insufficient funds" 
and even 1'\0re dismayingly "no account." Putting aside his initial 
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consternation, Goldman divided the'returned checks among the stores 
that had taken them and attached special instructions concerning their 
collection. Small signs were printed with the pointed observation, 
"We cashed your check when no one else did." Strategically posted near 
each checkout stand they had the desired effect. Most of the customers 
quickly settled their debts explaining that they had not yet been ab.le 
to deposit funds to cover the checks written during the bank holiday 
while others admitted they had no checking accounts and had been driven 
by desperation to deceive the store managers. Within a month every 
returned check had been redeemed save one. Ironically it bore Goldman's 
initialed approval. A neighbor who was not a customer had asked the 
Standard president to cash a check for $25 in coupons. The man moved 
awa¥ shortly afterward his nonpayment representing the only deficet re-
sulting loss had paid a handsome dividend of increased business.21 
Another depression-related problem was not so susceptible to such 
an amenable and profitable solution. Chain store operations of what-
ever type began to be the recipients of much criticism and animosity in 
the 1930's. Since the turn of the century the chain store movement 
had gained momentum at a rate which seemed alarming and finally down-
right menacing to independent retailers. Grocers were particularly 
upset since in .1930 a full 38 per cent of total food sales in the 
United States belonged to multiunit companies. The independents had 
no way of knowing that this figure was to :r;eniain consistent and even 
drop slightly as single unit operat~ons grew to supermarket size or 
formed buying associations to offset the chains' volume business ad-
vantage.22 Before these events occurred, however, resentful and often 
antagonistic indepen~ents successfully brought tremendous community 
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pressure to bear against their larger competitors. They charged the 
chains with unfair price cutting, coercing manufacturers and producers 
to sell them products at reduce<l rates which were not passed on to the 
consumers, taking money out of local communities into the pockets of 
aJ,sentee owners, evading taxes, and instituting monopolies. Hundreds 
of thousands of dollars poured into the coffers of local and national 
antichain organizations numbering over 260 by the 1930's. 
The groundswell of opinion against multiunit businesses induced 
a plethora of discriminatory legislation aimed at the chains. Southern 
state legislators, beginning in the 1920's, introduced special tax 
laws to hamper chain operations. Lawmakers in other parts of the 
nation followed their lead and before the advent of World War II over 
700 bills were considered either in the national or the states' 
legislatures. About fifty of thes;'e proposals passed into laws and 
nearly all were declared unconstitutional. Most of the laws imposed 
licensing rates that ranged as high as $700 for each store in excess 
of fifty owned by a single company.23 The culmination of the anti-
chain movement's activities was reached by June i9, 1936 with the 
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. This legislation, primarily the 
product of Congressman Wright Patman of Texas, amended the Clayton 
Act of 1914 in several particulars whose ambiguities continue to 
confuse the courts. The most important features of the act proposed 
to limit quantity discounts to vendors and prohibit advertising allow-
ances to customers.24 
Oklahoma never passed any discriminatory anti-chain legislation 
during the depression but the hard times and unfavorable chain store 
publicity elicited their own worrisome response. Between 1933 and 
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1935, Standard-Humpty Dumpty Stores were continually picketed by at 
least four trade unions seeking to negotiate wage and hour agreements. 
Although no d~monstrable damage to business was experienced by Goldman 
and his partners, the rhetoric of some union spokesmen was irritating. 
Union workers distributed handb:ills which claimed that the grocery 
company was guilty of "flagrant violations of federal labor laws" 
regarding wage and hour standards. Another grievance, obviously re-
flecting antichain sentiment, charged that Standard-Humpty Dumpty 
stores were taking profits from Oklahoma City for the benefit of ab-
sentee owners and that Goldman's statements to the contrary were false. 
Other "fair stores" were listed as alternative grocery shopping markets 
to Goldman who was "trying to outchain the chain stores." Despite the 
unions' campaign Standard-Humpty Dumpty maintained satisfactory rela-
tions with its employees throughout the depression years.25 
Goldman's Oklahoma City business venture, begun in a depression 
atmosphere, could be accounted a solid success before the hard times 
disappeared in the coming of the Second World War. What had started 
as a group enterprise eventually became Goldrr'an's sole responsibility. 
His three closest business associates, all members of the family, were 
no longer with the company, two of them due to tragic circumstances. 
Henry Dreyfus, Goldman's uncle and business counselor, died in an 
automobile accident in 1935. Two years later, his brother, Alfred 
Goldman, fatally succumbed to a prolonged case of pneumonia. Immedi-
ately after the clash of World War II Morris Dreyfus, who had been su-
pervisor of stores, retired from active participation in the company 
organization. 26 
If Goldman's achievements had been confined to his part in build-
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ing the Standard-Humpty Dumpty chain his career would be reckoned 
notable. However, the extension of the chain a,i:i;:-ing and after the war 
plus a proliferation of other business ventures in which he played a 
major role enhanced his importance in the Oklahoma business scene. 
Added to these commercial enterprises was an important role played 
in national and international food organizations, especially the 
Super Market Institute. Perhaps the phase of his career which earned 
Goldman his greatest renown was one that began in the depression era 
with an idea. The idea became an invention and the invention a symbol 
of the retail food industry everywhere in the world. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE UB IQUI'rous GROCERY CART 
AND OTHER INVENTIONS 
Life in the United States has produced a multitude of everyday 
objects whose origin has never been questioned and utility rarely 
remarked. Perhaps their constant presence has rendered them so mun-
dane that people simply overlook the obvious. Among those items 
thrown off by the technological whirl of the machine age was one that 
has become the symbol of the superrnarketing industry. Three of 
America's best known magazines chose to feature the device on their 
covers to advertise issues devoted to the retail food trade. 1 When-
ever cartoonists have sought to suggest the presence of characters in 
grocery stores the object has appeared in their drawings. Now world-
wide in its application to myriad uses Sylvan Goldman's invention, the 
grocery shopping cart, has become a ubiquitous sign of American in-
genuity. 
An ordinary folding chair yielded the inspiration which spawned 
the device that helped revolutionize the retail grocery store. 
Sitting in his office one day in 1935, Goldman's eye strayed to a 
chair which suddenly seemed to offer a solution to the problem he was 
mulling--how to sell more groceries. There was a natural limit to the 
grocery shopper's buying capacity that had nothing to do with the size 
of his pocketbook. Stores were equipped with market baskets to carry 
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purchases that quickly became heavy, particularly for the woman buyer 
who did most of the shopping. If casters were affixed to the legs 
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of a folding chair and a basket placed on its seat, Goldman reasoned, 
then the most fragile woman shopper could load many more grocery items 
on such a cart than could be carried under her arm. 2 
With this vision clear in the mind Goldman excitedly sent for 
Fred Young, one of the Standard-Humpty Dumpty company carpenters. 
He explained his concept to Young and after some discussion Young took 
the chair to his worktable for the first of a long series of tinkering 
sessions. Almost forty years later Goldman recalled the process by 
which the shopping cart took a definite shape and gave Young a full 
share of credit in providing the mechanical skills necessary to perform 
the task. "I'm no mechanic" Goldman espostulated, "I might be able to 
make a toothpick out of a piece of wood with a good sharp knife. But 
if you have a good imagination and can think of the idea you can al-
ways find some one to build it for you. 3 
The two men worked several months in this manner; Goldman suggest-
ing innovations and improvements and Young applying them to a working 
model. It was decided that the aluminum frame carrier mounted on 
wheels could accomodate two shopping baskets. Acc~rdingly, skeletal 
shelves were devised to hold metal, wide mesh baskets. The lower 
shelf was approximately nine inches from the floor and there was a 20 
inch clearance between it and the upper shelf. When opened the appar-
atus measured two feet in length, 18 inches in width, and stood just 
over a yard high. The rear rubber wheels accounted for four inches of 
that height while the front swivel casters had diameters of three 
inches. One of the invention's best selling points proved to be the 
small space occupied by the carrier when folded. After removing the 
baskets from its shelves the cart occupied a scant five inches of 
floor space. Perhaps the most impressive dimensions from a grocery 
~tore manager's viewpoint were t.~ose of the steel-wire baskets mea-
suring 19 1/2 inches long, 13 inches wide, and 9 inches deep. 4 
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Goldman's folding carrier was not the first attempt to "come to 
grips with the problem that had to be solved before the modern super-
market could exist, the problem of a vehicle in which to carry one's 
purchases as he works his way through the aisles. 115 John and Paul 
Cifrino, the founders of Upham's Corner Market in Boston, Massachusetts 
were among the first to try to reach a solution. In the early 1920's 
they evolved a system whereby customers shopped from counter to counter 
in their large store examining groceries and receiving slips of papers 
from clerks designating those items they chose. The purchases were 
transported by means of a conveyor belt to the checkout stands. This 
enabled the customer to complete his shopping without having lifted 
anything heavier than the slips of paper with which he claimed his 
marketing choices. Unfortunately for the Cifrinos their system suf;.. 
fered from two defects which proved impossible to overcome. The 
conveyor belts developed a dismaying aptitude for breakinq down 
during rush hours. Improved technology might have alleviated this 
drawback, however, the result would have been wasted effort. The sy-
stem required a large number of clerks to operate which would 
necessarily have precluded its use in self-service situations which 
predominated, and indeed, were a prerequisite of developing super-
markets.6 
Another effort bore a closer kinship to Goldman's contribution. 
79 
Like many innovations in the retail food business, it grew out of the 
always fierce competition among the industry's membership. One of 
the earliest and largest supermarket operations in the Southwest was 
Henke & Pillot, located in Houston, Texas, Pioneering in self-ser-
vice stores in 1919 they laid out a floor plan in the shape of an 
"M" with shelving around the perimeter that was stocked from the 
rear. Along the shelves they built a fifteen inch wide track raised 
about 30 inches from the floor and fitted with low side rails.· Bas-
kets equipped with tiny wheels and grooved to slide inside the rails 
were pushed by the customers aroJJnd the store. While this eliminated 
the burden of carrying overladen baskets it was not adaptable to stores 
with different floor plans. In addition shoppers were forced to follow 
the entire track which discouraged those who entered the store for a 
few items and were blocked by slower customers. 
J. Weingarten, Inc., the chief competitor 'of Henke & Pillot in 
Houston, requested one bf its employees to devise an answer to the 
stationary track. Ellis D. Turnham met the challenqe by reviving the 
handle from a toy express wagon, making the front wheel stationary, 
fitting the wagon's bed with a basket in such a way that the customer 
could pull it around by the basket's handle.· Later Turnham constructed 
a steel carrier that could be pushed, however, it had no folding device 
. 7 
and carried only one basket. 
These early experiments while intriguing in their possibilities 
failed to make a lasting impression on the retail food scene. 
Goldman's grocery cart fulfilled all the requirements of supermarket 
operators. It provided an efficient and rapid means of streamlining 
the self-service concept. As long as shoppers were limited to buying 
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in amounts that they could physically handle s 0les would be unreasonably 
curtailed. Fixed means of carrying purchases did not allow sufficient 
freedom to display all the variegated wares that supermarkets were gra-
dually adding to the standard stock items. And finally, Goldman's car-
rier possessed the folding feature that made it a practicable workinq 
unit for stores whose livelihood dependec'!. so greatly on an FJconomical 
utilization of space. 
Interestinqly, the origination of the concept and its development 
into a usable apparatus proved far easier th.an actually marketing the 
carrier. Goldman's invention revealed an alert and imaginative mind; 
the manner in which he promoted his creation illustrated his consid-
erable talents as an entrepreneur and merchandising specialist. On 
June 4, 1937 the inventor began advertisinq his new product with a 
flair that was typical of supermarket ballyhoo with an added ingrediant 
of titillation that showed Goldman's shrewd understanding of human 
nature. The advertisement featured a picture of a rather wan-
appearinq woman shopper clutching her purse in one hand and a heavily 
loaded wicker market basket in the other. In bold type the ca)')tion 
beside the illustration read "Basket Juggling Is a Lost Art At Your 
Standard Food Stores." The text accompanying the visual art emphasized 
"the newest innovation in shopping! Exclusive now at your Standard 
stores." Further on were described the joys of "Wending your way 
through a spacious food market without having to carry a cumbersorne 
shopping basket on your arm •••• Just pick your items from the shelves. 
They will be checked and placed in your car without havinq to carry 
a single item." This rhetoric was so distinguished hy its flamboyant 
"hardsell" flavor as by the careful omission of any specific inforrna-
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tion concerning the device that was to transform shopping from drud-
gery to ecstasy. Goldman had very cleverly touted his product without 
i 8 
mentioning its name thus piquing the curiosity of €very reader. 
One week later the same format was repeated in another newspaper 
advertisement. It announced that "Standard's new 'No Basket Carrying 
Plan' met with instant approval last week-end." Again there was no 
descriptive mention of the miraculous wonder worker. 9 From the tenor 
of the copy one might well have presumed that the folding carrier was 
an instant success--just the reverse was true. It seemed that the 
women customers displayed an extreme uneasiness around the new bits 
of machinery while men shoppers eschewed the carts on the grounds 
that they resembled perambulators which were definitely unmasculine 
objects. After a couple of weeks of disappointing results Goldman 
improvised a new method of gaining adherents for his carrier. He 
hired professional models, male and female, "to show the carts weren't 
wheeled monsters. The men soon joined in and then the women. We were 
in husiness. 1110 
In the beginning, Young, with the aid of one assistant and a high-
school youth who worked after school, produced the carriers in a 20 by 
50 foot carpenter's shed located behind Standard's main office build-
ing. The men constructed only enough to supply the Standard and 
Humpty Dumpty stores where Goldman was experiencing so much difficulty 
in convincing people to use them. Eventually, however, as the idea 
became popular and the shoppers accustomed themselves to the change 
Goldman began thinking of producing the carts on a commerical basis. 
With a capital stock of $10,000 the Folding Carrier Company was 
chartered late in 1937. TWo years later the young firm employed fif-
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teen fulltime employees including salesmen who toured the country 
demonstrating the carts. For several months, sales were rather slow 
as the carriers seemed unnecessary to many grocery owners. Once again 
Goldman devised a new merchandising technique to aid his salesmen. 
Recalling the models used to demonstrate the carts, he decided to film 
the public in the act of using his invention. The infant company's 
salesmen, armed with the visual aid, returned to their territories 
with renewed confidence which was soon rewarded. By thJ time the 
United States entered World War II, thirty men working at top speed 
in two shifts were required to meet the demand for shoppinq carts. 11 
Goldman's success with the carriers was not without its problems. 
Orders arrived faster and faster so that it became apparent that the 
Folding Carrier Company would have to expand very rapidly if it were 
to maintain a commanding lead over its competitors who were already 
moving into the field. Unable to spare sufficient time from his gro-
cery chain to oversee the company's accelerated production schedules, 
Goldman promoted Kurt H. Schweitzer to the presidency of the firm. 
Married to a distant cousin of Goldman, Schweitzer had joined the 
carrier company as its eastern sales representive. He had moved up 
quickly to become vice president and general manager before assuming 
the role of: presiqent. Goldman, freed from thebulk of administrative 
responsibility, remained active in the enterprise, particularly in the 
areas of promotion and product development. 
The original carrier underwent a long series of improvements to 
make it more adaptable to the increasing number of tasks. it performed. 
The early models reflected the transitional stages of the carts' 
acceptance. Two types of baskets were available to store owners un-
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sure of consumer reaction to the new product. Sold as separate items 
one style of basket was specifically designed for the carriers while 
the other container was equipped with rubber-covered folding handles 
for shoppers suspicious of newfangled notions. As the carts grew more 
popular the baskets became integral parts of the carriers. In 1940 
the Folding Carrier Company advertised an altered version of the shop-
ping cart. It features a longer carrier capable of holding two smaller 
sized baskets on top while the lower platform was replaced by struc-
tural supports to compensate for the heavier load of the elongated 
upper frame. This. innovation was offered in response to complaints 
by some grocery checkers that lifting the lower baskets to the check-
out counter was troublesome and that when loaded the regular-sized 
baskets were too heavy for female checkers. 
The problem of maneuvering the loaded baskets from the carrier 
and sacking the groceries with the least wasted motion led Goldman to 
fashion a completely new checkout system for groceries. Normally 
food market managers situated their cash registers on waist-high coun-
ters located at the front of the store. Before the advent of the 
shopping cart customers simply placed their wicker baskets on the 
counter for the clerk to empty item by item while noting prices on his 
register. If business were brisk a sacker would gather the groceries 
from the counter into paper sacks. Goldman's top-positioned double 
basket cart was devised for clerks who had to reach across t.~e two 
to three foot wide loading counter to lift the baskets off the carrier. 
To use the double-decker cart originally designed by the inventor a 
change was required in the checkout counter itself. Folding Carrier 
Company's advertising contained instructions and diagrams explaining 
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how to renovate a store's checkout system to accomtnodate not only the 
carriers but .another Goldman invention as well. 
According to the diagrams on L-shaped counter would serve best. 
The right angle of the "L" faced the customer as he left the store. 
On the corner of the angle rested the cash register; its sides forming 
parallel lines running diagonally from the right-angled corner. Im-
mediately to the storefront side of the register a square space was 
cut out of the counter's interior. Six inche~ of counter space separ-
; 
ated this cutout from a larger diagonally cut section, about three 
feet across. The shopper·' s:, loaded carrier was to be pushed into this 
larger slot and inloaded by .the store checker with his left hand while 
using hi_s right to tally the items. As he lifted the groceries from 
the basket he would pack them in an already opened sack resting on and 
being supposted on three sides by Goldman's newest gadget, the grocery 
sacker. This ingenious but simple device stood in the interior coun-
ter cutout between the shopping cart slot and the cash register. It 
consisted of a three sided metal wire stand, approximately three feet 
high, with a shelf built into the frame 18 inches from its top. An 
opened sack place on the shelf and steadied by the wire framework would 
provide an easy receptacle for grocery items as they were taken from 
h . b k 12 t e carrier as et. 
Although the grocery sacker eliminated the need for an additional 
worker at the checkstand the innovation never became popular. Its 
inventor remained convinced of the sacker's worth and was nonplussed 
at the scant enthusiasm accored his checkout counter aid which the u. 
s. Patent Office awarded six patentable claims. The cut checkstand, 
however, caught the notice of many store owners and managers who 
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followed Goldman's suggestions or devised similar plans to utilize the 
shopping carts. 
The invention and manufacture of the folding carrier led directly 
to other ideas concerned with store efficiency. Before designing the 
ill-fated grocery sacker in 1941-1942, Goldrnnn had already marketed 
another product of his continuous penetrating scrutiny of the developing 
supermarket. He had observed that one of the most laborious tasks 
in any store involved stocking shelves with groceries. As supermarkets 
listed more and more varieties of goods on their inventories the men 
who replaced purchased items on to the ever higher constructed 
gondolas found their jobs slower and arduous. Frequently interrupted 
to perform other duties, the stockers left cartons and boxes in the 
aisles where they obstructed the increasing flow of cerrier traffic. 
The answer to this problem was Goldman's store service truck which 
streamlined the difficult stocking process. Patented in May, 194014 
the truck was being widely used a year earlier when first placed on 
the market. Among the buyers were such famous retailers as Wrigley's, 
Stores, Incorporated, Safeway Stores, ABC Stores, and Montgomery Ward.15 
A still larger customer for the service trucks and the shopping carts 
was officially designated in 1941 when both Folding Carrier Company 
products were placed on the federal government's General Schedule of 
Supplies •16 
The store service truck marked the first improvement over stocking 
gooceries by carrying individual boxes from the store room by hand. 
Constructed of heavy duty steel the 16 inch by 36 inch bottom support 
frame held up to 500 pounds of merchandise, normally about six to 
eight cases of canned goods. Rolling on ball-bearing wheels and 
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casters, the truck's load was steadied front and rear by steel frames. 
The unique feature of the implement lay in a hinged top rack which. 
was brought over the top of the truck's front upright frame to latch 
onto the back frame. Each box of cans or other item was placed on this 
rack eliminating the necessity of stooping to empty the box's contents 
for stocking on high shelving. So grateful were many stockers around 
the country to have a device that could transport heavy boxes from the 
l 
storeroom easily that unless briefed many failed tc'' notice the pre-
sence of the top rack which hung discreetly parallel to the front 
f h . 17 rame wen not in use. 
Another Folding Carrier product that found an appreciative public 
was a natural offshoot of the shopping carrier. If grocery buying 
were rendered easier through the use of a cart then a similar conveyance 
might be useful in other businesses requiring the handling of multiple 
articles. By 1940 Goldman's firm was filling orders for his Folding 
Inter-Office Basket Carrier. Designed for office use, these carriers 
rapidly became popular with secretaries who handled large amounts of 
files, books; and mail. They closely resembled the shopping cart in 
construction and possessed the usual folding feature for storage pur-
poses. The baskets measured 14 by 20 by 8 1/2 inches deep and judging 
from the widely varied buyers held any numl:>er of-objects when used. 
Included in the list of requests for the carriers were the Dupont 
Company, the U.S. Navy Supply Division; and a host of grateful, over-
loaded librarians. 18 
Once launched into the metal basket-manufacturing field via the 
grocery cart invention Goldman's fertile imagination continually dis-
covered additional applications in his grocery stores. The familiar 
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olive green painted metal that had become synonymous with Folding 
Carrier products provided the structural content for two types of 
.merchandise holders. The.National Biscuit Company, processor of 
crackers and cookies, was the recipient of the bulk of Goldman's _floor 
display stands. These devices were lightweight Hireframe standr-; spe-
cially Suited to displaying cellophane-wrap~ed foods. Covering less 
than four square feet of floor space, the three-tiered stands could be 
placed virtually anywhere in a store. 19 Gerber Products Company of 
Fremont, Michigan utilized another Folding Carrier wire display in the 
late 1940's to successfully experiment with a bit of customer psy-
chology. Gerber's main item of production, baby food, could be 
advantageously displayed in three and five dozen jar capacity wire 
baskets. Goldman had been requested directly by Gerber's to manufac-
ture the display baskets for the hard-to~stack glass jars of baby 
food. Gerber's executives believed that a jUiilbled array of baby food 
would increase sales since many customers would hesitate to disturb 
a conventionally neat arrangement by buying one or two cans. 20 
A decade earlier Goldman's practiced eye had fixed on his gro-
cecy stores' dairy cases. The result was still another merchandising 
innovation which proved as popular with dairy companies as retail 
grocers. In the 1930's, that era of glass milk bottles and completely 
closed cooling storage cases, two of the biggest problems of both 
retailer and milk suppliers were display and keeping the product 
·fresh. Loaded from behind, the .milk displays tended to become hap-
hazard in appearance as shippers fumbled among the different sizes 
of bottles. Goldman eliminated this untidiness and its resultant 
difficulty in restocking fresh milk by placing the bottles in appx-o.,... 
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. . 
priately sized metal holders. There were two models to choose from 
the patented Handy Milk.Bottle Racks. One type consisted of a slanted 
slide rack in which gravity forced the rear bottles forward as cus-
tomers removed those from the front. In the second design a spring 
holder drew the bottles forward on a flat surface. The base on either 
model was made of galvanized steel as were the springs on the second 
type while the bott;J.es were held in line by steel wire. Quart, pint 
and half-pint bottles could be accommodated by different sizes of 
holders. Popular Mechanics magazine and a trade journal, Dairy World, 
published articles featuring Goldman's invention with pictures and text. 
Both . models s.old we.11 until the advent of nonglaSs milk containers. 21 
World War II greatly affected the Folding Carrier Company as it 
changed or modified the direction of most American business activities. 
Goldman and Schweitzer dealt with wartime materials shortages, a 
dwindling labor supply and retooling for war production. Constantly 
on the lookout for new products the two discovered a possibility in 
the very stringencies brought about by wartime necessity. Metal quick-
ly became .a scarce commodity as the United States began turning out 
the guns, ships, airplanes and other materiel required for an eventual 
victory over the enemy. As a manufacturer of shopping carts, baskets, 
and grocery service trucks, Folding Carrier could not expect, and did 
not receive, a high ranking on the metals priority list. By 1942 
the company's advertising carried pictures and descriptions promoting 
a wooden dowel basket and carrier. The only metal used in the other-
wise oak construction was in the casters, wheels, and frame fastenings. 
Wood was also utilized in xnanufacturing ration-stamp change boxes. 
During the war meat markets were ordered by the government to give 
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change from purchases with red stamps in one, two, five, and six point 
denominations. Goldman's little device, measuring less than nine 
inches in length, proved very popular with harassed butchers handling 
· 22 
the flimsy stamps. 
Even before Pearl Harbor brought the nation into the conflict, 
the armed forces were seeking manufacturing plants which might be con-
verted for war production. The Navy Ordnance Department requested 
complete, detailed .information on Folding Carrier's facilities and 
capabilities in December, 1940. This formal action followed an inspec-
tion visit by navy personnel in August which had already determined 
the probability of using the Oklahoma City plant. On December 8, 1941, 
the day after the Japanese attack, Schweitzer received a warning from 
the navy advising precautions be taken to prevent sabotage of the 
factory's facilities.23 
· Less than a month of war had passed before Folding Carrier re-
ceived its war contract. The basket carrier assembly line was to 
manufacture tiny arming wire assemblies for 1,000 pound bombs. Accord-
ing to the terms of the contract over 100,000 of the small but essential 
components were manufactured. Company employees were made to feel 
the importance of their task by close inspections from federal quality, 
safety, and security team inspections. After Lieutenant General 
Leonard H. Campbell, Jr., Navy Chief of Ordnance, wrote a special 
letter of commendation for the retooling efforts successfully accom-
plished by the Folding Carrier Company during the war.24 
The postwar years were a continuation of Folding Carrier's pros-
perity and growth. In 1950 operations were moved into a six story 
structure to provide the necessary space to expand production to meet 
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a renewed demand for shopping carts and other products. OWned by the 
National Biscuit Company, the building was purchased by Goldman for 
over $200,000 to replace the plant that had housed the assembly line. 
The new location was equipped with a complete chrome plating apparatus, 
the only one in the state, so that the firm's metal products no longer 
exhibited the olive green color that had marked them since the 1930's.25 
More than the color had changed in the company's major line of 
merchandise, the shopping cart. In 1947 Folding Carrier introduced 
the patented Nest Kart. The new cart enabled grocers to stock one 
piece carriers in a smaller area than the older models. The back 
section of the carrier's basket, now an integral part of the frame, 
swunq forward when a second carrier's front was pushed against it, thus 
allowing any numher to "nest" each partially enclosed by .the one be-
hind. The baskets were shaped so that the front end's dimensions were 
much smaller than the hinged road and which resulted in a use of only 
a few added inches for each additional nesting cart's storage space. 
The 1950 model possessed a 5600 cubic inch capacity basket plus a 
lower front slanting shelf for bulk purchases. Tubular one piece 
frame construction with a chrome finish gave the cart a much more 
streamlined appearance than the older prototypes had offered. 26 
Later in the decade the nesting carts featured another advance, 
a built-in baby seat. Constructed of a closer meshed wire, the baby 
seat accommodated children by a hinged plate which could be dropped 
from the upper portion of the rear end of the basket exposing a di-
vided opening through which the child's legs fit. When marketing the 
original folding carrier Goldman had never foreseen that the cart's 
biggest attraction would lay in its baby-sitting potentialities. 
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Harried mothers were glad to place their young children in the safety 
of the upper basket leaving them two hands for shopping. Goldman 
quickly seized upon the practice as a tremendous selling point in his 
advertising campaign. An early carrier model was equipped with a 
special baby's seat attachment which unlike the 1952 version had the 
child facing toward the front of the basket. Research and experience 
had shown the advantage of having the often inquisitive youngsters 
face their mothers pushing the carts rather than the tempting array of 
articles in the shopping basket. 27 
Not all customers appreciated this feature of Goldman's inven-
tion, the possibilities of which he himself had failed to anticipate. 
In July, 1942 Dallas, Texas newspaper readers were surprised to dis-
cover that a complaining motion had been placed before the city manager 
which would prohibit putting children or pets in <Jrocery carts while 
shopping. Ostensihly the babies' wet diapers caused the baskets to be 
unsanitary for the next customer. A storm of protests greeted a de-
cision by the Dallas health department which ruled in favor of the 
complainant. Ho other city dared follow the 'l1exas health officials' 
action when adverse criticism by aroused mothers included epithets 
such as "heartless, selfish child-haters" and "narrow-minded, thought-
less politicians." Luckily the entire episode subsided peacefully as 
no ordinance was passed leaving qrocers to enforce the health depart-
' l . . 28 ment s cec1s1on. 
To take care of older children the Nest Kart Junior ,..,as marketed 
in 1952. A miniature version of the regular-sized carrier, 22 inches 
long, 14 inches wide, and 28 inches high, the junior cart was tested 
in California and Oklahoma stores with interestinq results. Not only 
did the toys keep the children occupied but their parents almost 
invariably allowed them to buy their selections. Four out of ten 
mothers left the stores after purchasing two complete carts full of 
food as the youngsters proved as susceptible to impulse buying as 
29 adults. 
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There seemed to be no end of refinements that might be made to en-
hance the practicality of the grocery carts. Folding Carrier 
experimented with a variety of designs and basket sizes trying to reach 
as large a market as possible. Goldman's 1939 model offered an 
optional advertising plate which fastened onto the front end of the 
basket. Although the 1952 carriers could be similarly equipped the con-
cept was never widely adopted. Perhaps the idea was simply ahead of 
its time since in 1974 Business Week erroneously reported shopping 
cart advertisements' "first big test in 1,050 supermarkets in New 
England and upstate New York." An accompanying picture revealed the 
close resemblance of the "new" device to Goldman's 1939 modet. 30 
Improved .construction, including rubber bumpers and more efficient 
wheels and casters helped keep Folding Carrier ahead of the rest of 
the industry and provided a steady growth for the Oklahoma City plant's 
sales and its Canadian subsidiary, Nest-Kart Limited of Canada. 31 
Constant attention to improvements in constructinq and marketing 
the shopping carts was necessary if Folding Carrier was to.maintain . . , . 
its lead in manufacturing and sales. At one time in the late 1930's 
the Oklahoma firm produced about 70 per cent of the national market. 
However, a. number of competitors entered the field with slightly mod-
ified carts. This constituted a relatively simple operation since 
Goldman's patents were rather easily evaded. It had required a lengthy 
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appea1 32 before the 1939 folding cart patent application was 
qranted and periodically conflicts developed with other Goldman patent 
claims and other applicants' inventions. One such incident, occurring 
in 1949 and involving a Kansas Cit'!, llissouri firm, Telescopic Carts, 
Incorporated, led to an out of court settlement. Qrla E. Watson, 
president of the rival company and Goldman agreen i:hat the latter would 
withdraw his application and let Watson's stand despite the fact that 
Folding Carrier's was filed first. In exchange for this concession 
Goldman received a lic.ense which gave him a major interest in Watson's 
patent. The two businessmen in actual practice would grant sublicenses 
to other manufacturers only with the consent of both parties. 33 
The agreement, which was intended to prevent lengthy litigation, 
ended in court by another route. On May 21, 1951 the U. s. Department 
of Justice filed an antitrust suit against Folding Carrier Company 
and Telescopic Carts, Incorporated. Also named in the charges were 
Goldman and Watson who, the suit stated, were attempting to monopolize 
interstate trade in shopping carts and conspiring to limit the number 
of conpanies manufacturing them. Goldman and Watson admitted they had 
tried to minimize the number of licensed companies manufacturing tele-
scopic carts because their patents had been flagrantly ignored in 
several instances. They noted that many canpanies .held licenses and 
that the patent in question had already been held invalid by a federal 
court nearly three months earlier. In that decision the court had 
ruled against the patent be.cause Goldman had as early as 1942 "reduced 
to practice" his application by constructing a number of carts with the 
telescoping feature thus failing to fulfill the one year's grace period 
allowed after reduction to practice. In both the March and May suits 
Goldman and Watson were enjoined to grant licenses on all their 
patents at a 'reasonable' royalty rate and were prohibited from enter-
ing into any agreements for the manufacture or sale of carts.34 
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An alert and progressive company then, was the sole means of main-
taining a sizable share of the shopping cart market. Folding Carrier 
continued to compete successfully and a final Goldman invention in 1956 
helped the firm's profit growth. Inspired by his own difficulties ex-
perienced during extensive travels the inventor devised the Airport 
Personal Luggage Cart. Similar in construction and appearance to a 
folding shopping carrier minus its basket, the carts were well re-
ceived in tests at train stations and airports. The cart contained 
space for two or three suitcases and included the baby seat made famous 
by the grocery carriers. Six-inch diameter front ~heels and eight-
inch rear wheels gave the new product an outdoors tltility and excellent 
mobility. The only adverse comments were filed by red caps who felt 
their jobs were threatened by the new carriers. 35 
In August, 1961, a Chicago financier, Henry Litvak, bought the 
Folding Carrier Company from Goldman. The following year it became 
the property of Union Asbestos and Rubber Company of Chicago, now 
Unarco Inudstries, through a merger operation. Folding Carrier's 
500 employees and its management staff were not substantially changed 
in the transfer of the company's ownership. 36 
TWenty-three years before a store owner in Paducah, Texas had 
called Goldman's shopping cart, "the greatest asset to self-service 
·grocery stores in years."37 Certainly this was not an overstatement as 
was apparent the next year in 1939 when the Institute of America 
Inventors extended its membership to Goldman. 38 The Smithsonian 
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Institution of Washington, D. c. acquired Goldman's original proto-
type in August, 1972. c. Malcom Watkins, chairman of cultural history 
at the Smithsonian Institution, referred to the a'cquisition as "a very 
significant addition to the growing collection of objects ••• related 
to the history of American business and merchandising. 1139 
These official recognitions have insured Goldman's place among 
American inventors. The actual worth of his contribution has been 
better illustrated by the wide and varied uses of the shopping cart. 
That the average citizen appreciated the shopping cart was perhaps 
shown most graphically by the passage of a Los Angeles, California 
city ordinance making the "borrowing" of shopping carts from super-
markets punishable by a fine of $50o.40 The Federal Reserve Banks 
have used the carts to transfer coins and currency in their vaults, 
while the importing and exporting Siphya Store in Bangkok, Thailand 
employed "shopping wagons or vans" ordered from your esteemed [Folding 
Carrier] company. 1141 Over 250,000 grocery stores have used the cart 
which has became the ubiquitous symbol of the retail food industry 
in the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER VII 
MARKETS AND SUPERMARKETS 
Seemingly, Sylvan Goldl11cln should have been so busy with his 
-inventions that the.management of his grocery chains would have suf-
fered from neglect. Nothing could have been further from reality. 
Much of the inventor's success could he measured by the extent to which 
he delegated responsibility for his burgeoning business enterprises 
thus leaving himself free to direct them all without becoming hope-
lessly mired in the day to day operation of any single one. While 
Kurt Schweitzer ably handled the Folding Carrier Company's expansion 
in the 1940's and 1950's, Goldman's energies were primarily aimed at 
enlarging and extending the Standard-Humpty Dumpty facilities. His 
dual roles of inventor and entrepreneur did not prevent the Oklahoma 
Cityan from assuming a major part in the establishment of the Super 
Market Institute (S. M. I.), an organization which recognized Goldman's 
seminal contributions to the food industry revolution by electing 
him president and choosing his shopping cart as an organizational 
symbol. 
World War II and a resultant shortage of newsprint had forced 
Goldman to combine Standard· and Humpty Dumpty advertising. Although 
the stores continued as separate corporate entities many of their 
functions and all of their executive control emanated from one source. 
Expansion was carried on under the Humpty Dumpty name. The first 
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out of town store bearing the younger chain's designation was opened 
in Lawton, Oklahoma in 1940;.it was the ninth Humpty Dumpty stdre. 
Others followed in quick succession as Goldman set the pace for super-
market growth in the state. Before the war's end stores were located 
in Duncan, Bethany, Ada, Norman, and Midwest City. In addition there 
were stores in Oklahoma City being opened, renovated, and enlarged. 
One of these, built in 1942 on North Indiana Street, brought into 
operation the largest supermarket in the state. The 12,500 square 
foot store was completely air conditioned, featured flourescent light-
ing, and contained its own bakery serving all types of pastries and 
breads. To keep pace with the many merchandise changes in the stores 
a new warehouse was acquired in 1941 and two more were leased soon 
afterward to cope with the new stores' huge volume of sales. 1 
Flexibility and boldness continued to mark Coldman's business 
operations. In April, 1945 he purchased a meat packing plant in 
Marlow, Oklahoma Which was destroyed by fire five months later. Un-
daunted, the Hill Packing Company was acquired the next year to supply 
the chains with meat. During these war years ration stamps consti-
tuted a continual problem for.self-service stores as long lines fonned 
at checkstands while clerks fumbled with the bits of paper. To speed 
up the process Goldman devised checkstands on wheels which could be 
hurried into place to relieve congestion at the fixed checkout points. 
Naturally Goldman turned the idea over to the Folding Carrier Company 
which was soon offering SpeeDee Checkstands to its customers. 2 Another 
innovation employed by Goldman during the war was a series of cooking 
schools conducted for housewives acquaintinq them with t."1e hundreds 
of new products stocked by supermarkets. 3 
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By 1946 the Standard and Humpty Dumpty chains were totally com-
mitted to the supermarket revolution. The next decade witnessed a 
continuation of the trend already begun to close the smaller, down-
town stores and relocate in the suburbs. Nationally the retail food 
industry moved in the same direction. Between 1945 and 1958 an in-
crease of 213 per cent in the number of supermarkets was recorded. 
over twenty thousand supermarkets were operating by 1958, and their 
rise in sales volume since the war totalled 637 per cent. This growth 
of the supermarket industry reflected efforts by both independents and 
chains to augment the size of store units. 4 
Several factors can be enumerated to explain the supermarket 
explosion. Some of these might be categorized as external determi-
nants, changes in American society that favored the new food retailing· 
mode. Beginning with the late war years there occurred significant 
shifts in the distribution of the national income. Of most importance 
to the growth of supermarkets was the relative gains made by lower and 
middle income workers at the expense of those in the higher brackets. 
These increased f.unds could be expected to show up in food purchases. 
Not only did more Americans have more to spend but they tended to buy 
more expensive foods with the major increases in fresh vegetables, 
fruit, meat, and dairy products. Technological advances also helped 
alter Americans' shopping habits.. Automobiles, whose numbers mounted 
steadily in the postwar years, enabled customers to carry home larger 
purchases from supermarkets that were generally located in areas de-
ficient in public transportation service. Using the same line of logic 
Goldman's grocery cart also accomplished a great deal in influencing 
larger less frequent purchases. Refrigeration in the home and at the 
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store added to the reduction in the number of shopping excursions • .. 
Meat could be stored longer and frozen foods were introduced, thanks 
to the improvements made over the old style icebox. Naturally the 
23 •. 4 per cent population increases recorded between 1930 and 1958 meant 
more potential food buyers, however, the salient aspect of this demo-
graphic statistic lay in the redistribution of middle and upper income 
families to the· suburbs. A general decentralization of retail trade 
followed in which supermarkets benefited enormously through partici-
pation in shopping centers.5 
While these external factors partially accounted for the dramatic 
rise of the supermarket ultimately the individual success or failure 
of a store or'chain rested on management policy and perspective. There 
can be no doubt that Goldman's imaginative leadership consistently 
provided the impetus for growth. Realizing the need for competent 
subordinates, he inititated a training and promotion policy that in-
sured a supply of responsible personnel. The efficacy of Goldman's 
efforts in this area became'widely known. In 1949 this was illustrated 
when the Industrial and Business '!'.raining Bureau of the University of 
Texas requested access to the Standard-Humpty Dumpty training files to 
use in establishing a retail grocers training program. 6 
Goldman perceived the basic problem of supermarket operations--
bigness. If stores were growing larger, which they were, and chains 
were proliferating numerically and geographically, another established 
fact, then an organization.had to be developed to achieve maximum 
results with a minimum of effort. The job of the top management level 
was twofold: it must set the goals of the enterprise and translate them 
in such a way that everyone in authority understands the company's 
objectives. For the most efficient operation management should mold 
the organization into a team effort with its members fully cognizant 
of the chain of command and their chances to propel themselves up-
ward through the chain. 7 
After assuming full control of Standard-Humpty Dumpty in 1946, 
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Goldman set about recruiting men who could make the decisions necessary 
in directing his organization's expanding activities. He chose William 
A. Coleman as his executive vice-president in 1948. Coleman had joined 
the company two years earlier serving in the capacity of general man-
ager. Goldman searched over twelve months before deciding on Coleman 
who could claim 21 years' background of work in a national food chain. 
His new employer was impressed with the breadth as well as the length 
of his experience which included stbre management, warenousing, 
financing, and personnel. Goldman's judgment was vindicated by 
Coleman's contributions to Standard-Humpty Dumpty, the most notable 
being the installation of the retail balance form of store inventories 
which created increased control over gross profits while decreasing 
operating losses. In January, 1955, he assumed the office of president 
of Standard-Humpty Dumpty.a 
Taking over some of Coleman's duties after his promotion was a 
longtime employee of the company, I. R. Moore. In 1934 Moore had 
started his career in the retail food industry as a part-time worker 
in a Standard store. He very quickly revealed an aptitude for design-
ing displays and organizing work which was noted by promotion to a 
assistant store manager. Later he filled the post of superintendent 
of stores until the Standard and Humpty Dumpty operations were combined 
and he rose through intermediate steps to become vice-president and 
director of sales in 1955. At the same time H. Virgil Sturkie, for-
merly the retail operations manager was elected a vice-president of 
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the company. He had advanced upward from position to position since 
beginning as an apprentice meat man in Goldman's original Oklahoma City 
store. 9 
These three men, Coleman, Moore, and Sturkie, and their careers 
with Standard-Humpty Dumpty exemplified Goldman's personnel and pro-
motion policy. He.believed that advancement should be encouraged from 
within the organization if the man was qualified for the position; if 
not, the head of the company must look elsewhere to bring in the re-
quired talent. Goldman's predileciton for promoting company men was 
based on something rather more substantial than sentiment. Beginning 
in 1948 he inaugurated a regular series of training programs covering 
every phase of supermarket activities and .eventually extending to all 
levels of employees and management. A special training school was es-
tablished and periodic refresher courses as well as initial instruction 
were mandatory. The curriculum was practical and serious with courses 
continuing for several weeks and. classes as lengthy as four hours were 
conducted by full time training supervisors or company executives. All 
of those attending sessions received regular wages for their partici-
pation which took place during working hours. 10 In 1950 Goldman 
evidenced his growing concern for the basic principles of human rela-
tions by starting a series fo conferences for supervisors, store and 
department managers. Each participant in the conferences, which were 
limited to ten participants for the five two-hour sessions, brought a 
personal case history to discuss with the group. After analyzing the 
problem the group attempted to derive solutions based on the mutual 
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rights involved in contacts among people. Goldman believed that the 
entire store group would reflect the attitudes of its management staff 
thus that staf.f should be the right catalytic agents to produce a con-
tented and efficient store.11 
A 1963 study of supermarket operations suggested that very few 
retail grocery stores accurately measure the performance of their em-
ployees. Fewer still, the researcher indicated, possessed any but the 
haziest notion of how to motivate personnel to excel at their jobs. 
Prior to the introduction of unemployment compensation, limitations 
on arbitrary discharge, and greater employment mobility, tho standard 
method of motivation was essentially negative and self-directed. Em-
ployees were either warned to perform adequately on pain of losing their 
positions or exhorted to work for the employer. Under this sort of 
arrangement wages were reduced to payment for hours spent on the job. 
"Wages recruit people, but applause motivates them." Salary checks and 
fringe benefits could not motivate performance because they were re-
wards enjoyed off the job. Applause or achievement recognition, was 
a re~ard tied into performance. Interest and morals induced better 
performance; applause induced morals and interest. 12 
Goldman understood this dictum and followed its teaching. He con-
stantly tried to instill interest in the work of Standard-Humpty Dumpty. 
One of the most effective means he fou'nd to accomplish this objective 
was to establish goals through competition. Each Christmas season 
heralded a renewal of sales contests with .cash and gift prizes to the 
winners. In the autumn Standard-Humpty Dumpty's Circus of Values con-
test featured efforts by individual stores to outdo each other's 
circus decorations. The top prize awarded the winning store was $1,000 
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based on percentage sales increases. On a less dramatic but extremely 
successful scale female checkers at various stores were regularly given 
orchids in recognition for following correct proc.edures and maintain-
ing low cash error figures. 13 Research by investigators has concluded 
that such recognition creates tremendous morale boosts and that the 
tangible rewards are of secondary concern to the participants in the 
contest. 14 
Current management studies have emphasized the fundamental ne-
cessity of not formulating policy in a vacuum ignoring the human ele-
rnent. A manager must communicate to his employees a sincere belief that 
their jobs are important and that they are interested in them as per-
sons. Workers should be informed about company policy and plans and 
h h t . . h 15 ave a c ance o express an opinion on t em. Goldman obeyed all 
these rules in conducting Standard-Humpty Dumpty business affairs. 
Probably the chief organ of communication between employer and employee 
was the Super Marketer. Goldman authorized its inception in 1947 as 
a mimeographed newspaper filled with personal notes about company per-
sonnel and short news items concerning the grocery business. Within 
two years the monthly publication was printed on rag paper with photo-
' graphs. Contests, training classes, editorials, and informative 
articles on technical aspects of the industry stimulated interest in 
the company. In 1951 the newspaper informed its readers that question-
aires were being sent to each employee's home. Anonymous replies to 
queries about Standard-Humpty Dumpty management were requested. After 
the survey's findings were compiled meetings were held to discuss the 
problems shown in the results and suggest remedies. 16 
Through such practical concern for the rank and file of the 
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organization Goldman retained an efficient "team" $pirit that aided in 
Standard-Humpty Dumpty's tremendous growth during the postwar years. 
By the middle l950's the chain totalled 33 stores. None of the open-
ings, which were all attended by appropriate and well publicized 
formalities, gave Goldman any greater personal satisfaction than the 
Ardmore store built in 1956. Four years earlier a Humpty Dumpty store 
had been opened in Tulsa which had symbolically erased the memory of 
the 1929 setback. Now, however, Goldman was allowed an opportunity to 
return to his boyhood surrounding as an eminently successful business-
man. The details of the Ardmore store's opening derived an equally 
significant meaning as a classic example of the supermarketing art. 
Size alone rendered the new enterprise impressive. Eighteen thou-
sand square feet provided ample operating room for the store's 30 full 
time employees and 51 part-time wo.rkers. The building was surrounded 
by li~hted concrete parking space for 500 cars. Inside, the edifice 
fulfilled the exterior's promise. Pastel shades of paint covered 
the walls while the floor which would bear heavy traffic was rubber-
tiled. The aisles separating the shelves of food products were wide 
enough for three shopping carts to pass simultaneously, pushed by 
customers enjoying the air-conditioning, piped in music, and fluor-
escent lighting. In the interest of speedy service the store was 
equipped with the latest technological advances. The checking stands 
featured electronic counters operated mechanically within electric 
eye; they stopped each purchased item automatically before the checker 
rang it up on the cash register. A final belt carried the groceries 
to the sack boy who placed the filled sacks in a tagged cart from which 
he later unloaded into the customer's car as it was driven by the store 
front. Check cashing services were handled by spec..i.al booths which 
kept the checkout lines from becoming clogged while electronic doors 
swung open automatically for those leavinq the store. 
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The Humpty Dumpty unit's offerings of merchandise also reflected 
the latest supermarket innovations. The meat, produce, heveraqe, milk, 
and bread compartments were completely stocked from the rear. The pro-
liferation of products included nonfood as well as edible items. l\. 
complete line of kitchen and housewares were stacked cheek by jowl 
with an amazing variety of foodstuffs including 48 counter feet of 
diat,etic foods, 210 feet of candy, pastries, ice cream, pet foods, and 
frozen foods. 17 
Goldman's mother attended the Ardmore opening as she had all the 
previous store inaugurations. She must have contemplated the vast 
differences between her son's ultra-modern supermarket and the frontier 
groceries of her m·m earlier Oklahoma Territory experience. Gone were 
the bulk foods, crackers and pickles by the barrel, sugar and flour in 
25 pound sacks. No longer present were the slahs of meat waiting for 
the hutcher's knife to carve the customer's desired cnts or the 
glassed-in counters containing the small assortment of foods which the 
grocery clerk removed upon request. Gone also was the. dimly lighted, 
fly-infested, hot in the summer and cold in the winter store interiors. 
The contrast of old and new constituted a true revolution in the re-
tail food industry. 
Viewing Goldman's Humpty Dumpty opening from a different vantage 
point, however, a definite connection with the frontier past might be 
discerned. In many ways the supermarket completed a circle in the 
history of American consumer buying habits. The centers of retail 
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business and social life in the eighteenth and nine:teenth centuries 
were the village store and the trading post. They drew people from 
wide areas who regarded their presence in the community as a bl~ssing. 
The trader or storekeeper never bothered with advertising and viewed 
his customers' search for items among his myriad stacks of merchandise 
with complete equanimity, secure in the knowledge that his selection 
was the only one in town. For rural Americans journeying to the gen-
eral store was a festive occasion during which they encountered 
neighbors, friends, and one stop shopping. The supermarket's mixed 
lines of groceries,and nonfood items plus the flamboyant atmosphere 
created by advertising and store merchandisinq hav.e reawakened a tra-
ditional American buying pattern.18 
The initial advertisement for the Ardmore store opening in 1956 
epitomized Goldman's merchandising'genius. He purchased a full two-
page section of the local newspaper to ballyhoo the supermarket's 
wares. Among the enticements listed were gum, cotton candy, and 
balloons for children accompanied by their parents who could them-
selves claim free cigars and cigarettes, coffee and donuts, orchids 
and plants. Circus rides were available with ever $2.50 purchase 
which might include specially priced women's hosiery, woolen com-
forters, electric frying pans, and c.hocolate covered cherries. No 
where in the advertisement was mention of groceries made. 19 
Goldman firmly grasped the ultimate goal of his stores, the sell-
ing of products to shoppers. Merchandising meant making certain that 
the goods were presented in an effective manner, and for the super-
market era this has often been equated with sensational advertising. 
Mass displays have become proven psychological inducements. to buy 
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various items. Goldman utilized the concept on a grand scale, some-
times with surprising results. One of the wartime shortages that 
troubled Oklahoma housewives was laundry soap. Near the end of t.~e 
fighting in 1945, Standard-Humpty Dumpty obtained a large supply of 
soap and it was decided to offer the long unavailabl~ commodity through 
a newpaper coupon advertisement. No one anticipated the fervor with 
which the Oklahoma City women would respond. In their passion to 
obtain the means for maintaining clean households they bought every 
issue of the newspaper containing the coupon and then bombarded news-
boys for more copies. Later editions did not carry the special offer 
and hundreds were disappointed until they were reassured the following 
day that the supply of soap was not exhausted at all the chain's 
stores.20 
On another occasion C,oldman advertised a giant breakfast cereal 
sale in a unique manner. To attract more than passing notice an entire 
hox car, filled with cereal, was positioned in front of a Humpty Dumpty 
store. In 1955 a similar idea was employed to publicize the opening 
of a new chain unit in a shopping center when an oversized, 15 foot 
high display appeared in the parking area labelled "the world's lar-
gest shopping cart." Naturally the huge replica, loaded with groceries 
bore a prominent sign indicating its manufacturer the Folding carrier 
Company. There seemed to be no limit to the possibilities of selling 
by size. A national dairy products firm was commissioned to process 
what was billed as the world's largest cheese, a circular, five foot 
high speciman.21 
Despite the magnitude of these merchandising devices they could 
not compete with Humpty Dumpty's next promotional endeavor. On 
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September 13, 1958 approximately 62,500 Oklahomans sat in the University 
of Oklahoma's owens Stadium at Norman and watched a professional foot-
ball game. The event, publicized as the "Grocery Bowl," was attended 
only by those who had accumulated the requiren totals of cash regis-
ter receipts from Goldman's chain. An unexpected repercussion occurrerl 
when a member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Torn Stevens of 
Shawnee, charged the Humpty Dumpty stores with unlawfully utilizinq 
state-owned facilities. When questioned about the accusation Roscoe 
Cate, financial vice-president at the University of Oklahoma, said 
that the decision to lease the stadium had been made by the school's 
regents. They had accepted $7,000 as a fee of which $1,000 went into 
the stadium's operating fund. The remaining $6,000 was actually a 
gift which was earmarked to purchase a high speed computer for the 
University Foundation.22 
The postwar development of the Standard-Humpty Dumpty chain in 
Oklahoma reflected national supermarket t.rends in ways other than 
organization, operation, and management. In the early 1930's vir-
tually all supermarkets were independents, however, the chains began 
adopting the new merchandising methods pioneered by their single large 
store competitors in the 1940's while other chains, like Goldman's, 
were built from one unit. By 1950 approximately 37 per cent of the 
supermarkets could be categorized as independent single unit operations, 
a statistic which dropped to 20.7 per cent in. 1958. Not only were 
chains gaining a larger share of the industry, but combinations of 
chains were forming that further consolidated the multi-unit operations. 
This horizontal integration or merging of stores and chains was much 
more apparent than the process of vertical integration taking place 
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concomitantly. If a supermarket chain owned a warehouse and pro-
vided its own produce needs or acquired a packing plant to process its 
own meat requirements then this constituted vertical integration. The 
obvious benefit of reduction of expense through horizont~l and ver-
tical combinations resulted from smoother coordination of the chain's 
various components. 23 
The Standard-Humpty Dumpty company under Goldman's guidance 
performed the functions of both vertical and horizontal integration. 
The Dutch Oven Bakery had supplied the stores with pastries and bread 
since 1932 while the Goldmans' past wholesaling experience had enabled 
the chain to move easily in that respect. On January 13, 1951 Goldman 
purchased the Oklahoma Frozen Food Corporation which gave Standard-
Humpty Dumpty an entry into the fastest growinq prepared food 
industry. Later in the same year the Sylvan nrug Company which oper-
d . . . d 24 ate units in Humpty Dumpty stores was organize. By 1955 when 
r,oldman made the decision to join in a merger of grocery chains his own 
organization was already advantageously integrated. 
Charles Allen, Jr., a 53-year-old New York investment banker, 
engineered the merger that eventually brouqht Goldman into the eleventh 
largest grocery chain in the country. He started with the ACF-Brill 
Company, a corporation that had begun in 1869 making horsecars. In 
June, 1951, Allen and his associates bought control of the concern 
for about $5.5 million. At that time the company was manufacturing ten 
per cent of the buses produced in the United States. In a field c'lom-
inated by General Motors Corporation business futures were never 
certain, a fact which led Allen to sell its manufacturing plant in 
March, 1954. The company then possessed cash assets of nec1rly $7 
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million but had no business or marketable product. 
Through an intermediary, Marx H. Hausman, two brothers, Nathan 
W. and John E. Lurie,.approached Allen with a proposition. They 
owned the 60 supermarket Wrigley chain that operated in Detroit and 
surrounding territory in southern Michigan. Hausman, a semi-retired 
septuagenarian, had originally conceived the idea that he laid before 
Allen after having interested the Luries. The trio wanted Allen to 
erect a corporate structure that would hold together a group of gro-
cery chains. The high volume, low profit margin supermarket husinP,ss 
would he amenable to such an increase in size. Allen's researchers 
revealed that during the first nine months of 1955 over 35 mergers 
had been effected among supermarket chains. The financier was also 
attracted by the retail food industrv's stability ancl the high averaqe 
sales amassed by the Luries' chain.25 
The first step toward forming the corporate edifice was taken hy 
Allen in July, 1955 when he purchased a 50 per cent interest in 
Wrigley's Stores, Incorporated. The next month the directors of ACF-
Brill and Wrigley's formally merged and agreed to acquire additional 
supermarket chains. On the first of Novemher Standard-Humpty Dumpty's 
33 stores joined Big Bear Markets of Michigan, Incorporated who con-
trolled 33 stores, in merging with Wrigley's and ACF-Brill to form 
ACF-Wrigley, Incorporated. Oklahoma Frozen Food and the Dutch Oven 
Baking Company, both controlled by Goldman, also became integral parts 
of the new corporate entity.26 
Goldman received 415,000 shares of ACF-Wrigley stock and $5 
million for bringing has assets into the corporation. He simultan-
eously assumed the duties of ACF-Wrigley president and became a rnemher 
of the company's board of directors. Nathan Lurie chaired the board 
and his brother filled the position of executive vice-president. 
Norman Hirschfield, president of S.N.G. Industries, Goldman's 
Oklahoma holding company, since 1954 and an old friend of Charles 
Allen, was elected financial vice-president. 27 
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The new enterprise experienced remarkable growth during its 
first six months in business. Two additional chains were brought 
under Wrigley control Foodtown, Incorporated of Cleveland, Ohio and 
Fred P. Rapp, Incorporated, St. Louis, r1issouri, were purchased in 
February and June, 1956, respectively. These acquisitions raised the 
number of supermarkets to 148 and helped establish an annual sales 
rate in excess of $300,200,000 making ACF-Wrigley the nation's tenth 
largest food chain. Headquarters for the augmented corporation was 
Oklahoma City where offices and a refrigerated warehouse occupied 
144,000 square feet of floor space. Goldman continued as president 
until January 28, 1959 when he stepped down to become chairman of the 
board; Hirschfield was promoted to _the presidency while William 
Coleman, another old Goldman associate was elected executive vice-
president. The rise of these former Standard-Humpty Dumpty men was a 
tribute to Goldman's abilities as a developer of executive. talent.'-8 
The corporation expanded in the years of Goldman's presidency 
and board chairmanship. Its.phenomenal success was largely due to the 
wealth of experience from whic~ the company could draw. The Lurics 
and Goldman had been members of the Super. Market Institute since that 
organization's inception and the chains acquired by them were operated 
by others with similarly wide but common backgrounds. The chief ac-
quisition made after 1956 was the 11-store Bettendorf chain of St. 
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Louis, Missouri. Further expansion came as a result of enlarginq 
existing member chains. ACF-Wrigley consciously tried to open mar-
kets in shopping centers which the board was convinced were the best 
prospects for high average sales.29 
In December, 1959 Goldman sold his interests in the prosperous 
ACF-Wrigley concern and soon after retired from the grocery business 
altogether. He was sixty-one years old and tired of the continual 
demands on his time and energies. The remainder of his business career 
was. to prove more profitable than these exciting and extremely compe-
titive decades in the grocery and supermarket industry. He had played 
the role of innovator in every aspect of the retail trade and would 
continue to utilize the merchandising techniques and knowleclge of human 
behavior in his second career. Despite the concentrated effort ex-
pended in building a supermarket etnpire Goldman's contribution tb the 
industry stretched beyond the boundaries of Oklahoma. His membership 
in national organizations and attention to local civic responsibilities 
combined to add a not inconsiderable dimension to his personal business 
career. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE SUPER MARKET INSTITUTE 
The retail food industry was irrevocably altered by the advent 
of the supermarket. Goldman and others like him across th11 nation 
worked independently in the late l920's and early 1930's in developinq 
their stores and chains of markets. As the economy of the United 
States grew ever more complex, their efforts proved increasingly diff-
icult. Engaged in a revolutionary period of the industry's history, 
it became obvious that the marriage of technology and entrepreneurship 
which had fostered. the supermarket needed some degree of central 
direction. Goldman was to play a dynamic role in the organization 
that strove to structure the new science of supermarketing in an 
orderly fashion. 
Undoubtably the Super Market Institute played a seminal role in 
the amazing success of the new merchanoising concepts. By 1936 there 
were approximately 1,200 supermarkets scattered across the country. 
Although all were components of a significantmovement toward change 
in the food industry none possessed an awareness of the others. Many 
of them introduced new selling ideas in their own stores without real-
izing that the same thing was occurring elsewhere. Ironically, the 
man who first recognized the need for an organization which would 
apply cohesive force to the industry was not himself directly engaged 
in the retail food business. M. M. Zimmerman, the chief founder of 
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the Suner Market Institute, was a writer. ne had ample opoortunity to 
follow the developing trends in food distribution heginning in 1914, 
when, as a staff writer for !:!1-nter's Ink he auth<;>rea a series of 
articles on chain stores. In 1931 his second series on the same suh-
ject was published in book form. The thrust of his study surygested 
that the voluntary movement by independents constituted the best means 
of competing with the chains.1 
Five years later Zimmerman wrote .a third series of articles 
analyzing the techniqnes of the supermarkets. The research for the 
articles convinced the journalist that the new markets composed a 
separate and unique phenomenon and deserved their own news organ, 
Super t!e_:i;ket Merchandi? in_g_, which he founded in November; 19 36. lili th 
the aid of Zimmerman's trade magazine supermarket operators beqan 
communicatinrr with one another. The result of several months' public 
exposure of their conuoon problems and goals was a meeting on May 11, 
1937 in the editor's New York office. A twenty-three-man organiza-
tional committee was set up to call a national c6nvention. In July 
Zimmerman's journal announced the SupermMarket Institute convention to 
be held during September in New York City. The meeting would feature 
speakers on mass distribution trends and problems as well as organizing 
the proposed association.2 
The charter of the Super Market Institute (SMI) revealed that the 
organization would not only establish and maintain a cooperative union 
among owners and operators but would serve as a central clearinghouse 
for research and data concerning the industry. When the convention was 
called to order in New York's Astor Hotel on September 27, 1937, about 
one thousand persons were present. Most of this number were repre-
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sentinq manufacturers and. processors from other sectors of the food 
distribution scene. Among those manufacturers who set up disl)lay 
booths was Goldman's own Folding Carrier Corporation. The invention 
that would contribute so much to the ultimate form th.it grocery stores 
' would assume in the coming years, the shoppinq cart., attracted a great 
deal of attention from the conventioneers. 3 Only 124 actual superMar-
ket operators attended the meetinq; rroldman was amonq them. He 
listened to William H. Alhers, president of Albers Super. Markets, In-
corporated of Cincinnati, Ohio, deliver a speech emphasizing the 
importance of supermarket owners adopting a policy of promoting na-
aionally advertized brands. He pointed out the need to build custom~r 
and manufacturer confidence by,. offerinq known brands at reasonable 
prices, something the chain stores had failed to cccOJTtplish. Albers 
realized the primary importance of demonstrating that the bud.d.ing 
superrnarkP.t industry would be a responsible business.4 
ThE'! convention agreed with Alber's reasoning and showed the 
Ohioan their approval by electing him the Institnt.e's first presi-
dent. Zirnrnerman became the SMI executive secretary and Goldman was 
chosen as one of eight directors at large who supplcmept.ed the list of 
six regional directors. The nP-xt year's convention met in Chicaqo. 
Alhers was reelected president and Goldman once again was picked to 
fill a director's post. The major portion of the conclave's attention 
was claimed by the "Clinic of the Super Market" which became a main-
stay of all future conventions. This program consisted of sessions on 
how to operate a supermarket. Most of the speakers utilized film 
slides to illustrate their practical presentation on widely varied 
subjects such as Goldman's "The Produce Department on a Self-Service 
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Basis--Is It Practical and Profitable. 115 His article was later con-
densed and published as part of a series by the Alnericna Institute 
of Food Distribution of New York. 6 
Goldman never missed a convention during the war Years. His wife 
accompanied him to the 1939 meeting in Cincinnati and served on the en-
tertainment committee. 7 Diversion from the alarming war news from 
Europe was welcomed. The Super Market Institute, recalling the accu-
sat.:i.ons of profiteering hurled at some branches of the food industry 
during World War I, discussed the possible effects of the European 
conflict on the 1940's grocery market. A resolution was passed con-
demning profiteering and pledging to "do everything within our power ••• 
to bring foods to the ultimate consumer at the lowest cost • .,fl 1Uso 
scheduled on the 1939 agenda was a panel discussion forecasting super-
market trends for the coming year. Goldman predicted a continued 
prosperity if the United States.stayed out of the war. He also her-
alded the demise.of the old style supermarket saying "that the day 
is past when a large, unattractive garage building can he used for a 
food market where.customers can be drawn solely on p:tice appeal." 
He did not discount the importance of low prices, however, he noted 
the chain competition could meet the supermarkets' prices thus 
other features such as ample parking facilities and attractively 
desiqned interiors would be required to outdraw the multi-unit oper-
ations.9 
By the date of the 1940 convention the threat of American in-
volvement in the war seemed less likely. At any rate the bulk of the 
prograrn was devoted to operational studies. Again Goldman was chosen 
to participate; his topic concerned "The Outlook for Super Markat 
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Expansion During the Coming Year." The general tenor of his and other 
speakers' remarks was optimistic. 10 The next four conventions were 
conducted in a war atmosphere. They were notable for the gover~ent. 
participation in the programs. The Office of Price Administration, the 
President, and various other federal officials arid agencies briefed 
the delegates on food rationinq and allocations. 11 Goldman was asked 
to serve on the Oklahoma state committee of the Food Distribution Ad-
ministration in 1943 and he added that duty to his lengtheninrf H!'.'lt 
of wartime responsibilities. 12 
Some 600 operators attended the 1944 SMI meeting and cast their 
votes for Goldman to fill one of the vice-presidency vacancies. 13 He 
served in that capacity until 1950. 'l'hP postwar conventions ·were 
jubilant affairs with the number of delegates sharply increasing at 
each conclave. ThP organi:?:a.tion had outqro,..m its teTl'porary off ices in 
the Super Market Publishing Company and now warranted a full time per-
manent staff with new accommodations in Chicago. The Institute invited 
Don Parsons to become SMI's executive director. Parsons accepted in 
Octoher, 1949 bringing a wealth of background experience to the posi-
tion. He had worked as promotion manager for r~cCall' s · Magazine and as 
an officer of the Federal Advertising Agency, employments that had 
made him entirely familiar with the national pro}~lems of merchandising 
~·1ithin five years he headed a staff. of twenty-five who carried on the 
necessary administrative work of the Institute while engc!,ged in their 
major task of research.14 
Goldman's reelection as vice-president in 1948 invested him with 
a unique honor. Since he was then serving as vice-president of the 
National Association of Food Chains, the Oklahoma merchant became the 
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only person to serve in both capacities simultaneously. 15 The 
twelfth annual SMI convention proved to be the vice-president's most 
harrowing; he served as its general chairman. The success of the 
Chicago meeting led the delegates to pick him for the same job for the 
next year.16 Goldman must have wondered, half seriously, if the 
Institute'saction in choosing its seal two years before had been part 
of a "softening up" process to obligate his assumption of•these onerous 
tasks. The SHI device consisted of a circular illustration with 
"SUPER MARKET INSTITUTE--That there may be more for all" inscribed 
around it. The main figure in the illustration was unmistakably a 
shopping cart loaded with groceries. 17 
If Goldman did harbor any suspicious, which was unlikely, con-
cerning his consecutive chairmansh~ps, th~y were dissipated at the 1951 
Chicago convention. The Standard-Humpty Dumpty chief executive became 
president of the Super Market Institute, a position to which he was 
reelected a year later.18 His tenure was notable in many respects, 
not the least of which was the advent of the Korean War and its effect 
on the entire food industry. The Asian struggle did not divert the 
Institute from inaugurating several new programs which greatly expanded 
its scope of operations. Finally, the Goldman presidency dealt with 
government officialdom in an.effort to create a closer harmony between 
Washington and the food industry. 
Almost ten years before the outbreak of the Korean War, President 
Roosevelt had established the Office of Price Administration and 
Civilian Supply (OPA). This agency, headeq by Lion Henderson, was en-
joined to guard against inflation brought about by World war II. 
Henderson's efforts to hold the line had become hopeless by early 1942 
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because he lacked any real authority. Congress responded to FDR's 
plea for legislation to correct this deficiency with the Emerqency 
Price Control Act of 1942. Henderson, the Pr.ice Adminstrator, was em-
powered to fix prices and rents in special areas and award subsidies to 
producers who would agree to stabilize their prixes. The OPA issued 
a General Maximum Price Regulation which was aimed at keeping prices 
at the March, 1942 level. A large loophole in the freeze developed 
as food prices rose 11 per cent that year. Once again Roose'lelt asked 
Congress for help and received it in the formof the Anti-Inflation 
Act of October 2, 1942, giving the president authority to stabilize 
wages and prices at a definite level. There was considerable conster-
nation in many quarters of the economy but the inflationary spiral 
slowed to a 1.5 per cent of living raise between the spring of 
1943 and the end of the war in 1945. 
After the war President Truman wanted to maintain t!1e OPA in 
operation. However, Congress contemplated ending the agency for sev-
eral months before passing a very weak Price Control bill which the 
chief executive angrily vetoed. A few days later on. July l, all 
price controls ceased and the cost of 1.:i.ving leaped ahead. The stop-
gap law initiated months later was allowed to expire and inflation 
continued although the economy exhibited a general prosperity until 
the fall of 1949 and the early pa:r.t of 1950 quickly escalated beyond 
a mere police action and Truman imposec'l. wages and prices controls. 
The Office of ]:>rice Stabilizatibn (OPS) assumed virtually the same 
responsibilities of the defunct OPA. 
The membership·of the Super Market Institute was directly affected 
by every move the new agency might propose. An emergency meeting of 
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the Institute was called in August, 1950 to discuss the !)roblerns of 
doing business during wartime. They realized the necessity for price 
stablizations to control inflation and passed resolutiohs favorinq them. 
To keep an eye on the precise nature of any governmental action a 
special Washington counsel, David Ginsburg, was appointed hy the 
Institute's board of directors in December, 1950 to represent SMI 
interests. At the same time a Washington news reporting service was 
retained which communicated all pertinent data to Chicago hy teletype. 
The biggest problem obstructing .effective action lay in the difficultv 
of gaininrr a clear expression of the Institute's membership. Ques-
tionaires had heen issued asking for members ' opinions httt .the 
situation shifted so rapidly in the nation's capital that SMI workers 
there were frequently forced to rely on their own initiative.20 
The problem of a united stand regarding price ceiling was acute. 
For example the meat prices suggested bv OPS simply would not allow 
a margin of profit for grocery stores in some areas of the country 
while in others the level was so high that it was not feasible. In 
September, 1951, OPS regulations allowed retailers to charge $1.19 for 
sirloin steak, however, Oklahoma City area housewives would probably 
not pay higher that 98 cents. From the government's viewpoint it 
seemed suspicious when SMI and other retail associations asked for 
widely varying price markups. Ginsburg reported to the SMI directors 
that their quick action in asking for a general price freeze in 1949 
when OPS was create.a had helped allay fears in that government agency 
that the supermarkets operators were self-seeking.21 
Price Stabilizer Michael V. Disalle had met with the SMI Defense 
Committee·in February of 1951. Headed by Goldman, the committee pre-
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sented DiSalle with a special report detailing several steps it deemed 
necessary to obtain relief for supermarket operators squeezed by the 
freeze order issued January 26, 1951. On behalf of the Insitute 
Goldman expresses their acceptance of obtaining quick relief from 
inflationary pressure but now without establishing complete permanent 
regulations.22 
Considerable friction developed between the OPA and the Institute 
in the last half of 1951 and continued until the latter part of 1952 
when controls were loosened and finally dropped. SMI's Washington 
representative, Ginsburg, enjoyed some success on the vital issue of 
convincing the OPS that up-to-date statistics should be used in setting 
price levels. Much of the supermarket operators' chagrin in the face 
of OPS rulings emanated from the fact that the price regulations were 
adjusted according to 1944 data. Ginsburg insisted on remindinq OPA 
officials that such rulings could only be regarded as highly temporary 
and that new Grocery Margin Survey ought to be made subject to tech-
nical review by the Institute and Other retail business qroups.23 
Upon leaving office in May, 1953, Goldman reflected on the con,plicated 
struggle to reach workable agreements in price stabilizations and 
concluded that they had served the useful but temporary psychological 
purpose of allayinq fears of shortages, however, he was convinced they 
were no longer needed ·~and will not be again in the foreseeable fu-
ture.1124 
At one point in the often rancorous SMI-OPS dialogue the two en-
tities, representing private enterprise and government, had reached 
an amiable accord. Goldman, while presiding over the 1952 Institute 
convention in Cleveland, Ohio, received a telegram frorn his Humpty 
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Dumpty executive vice-president, William Coleman. On the morning of 
May 15 Goldman•shared its contents with the assembled SMI delegates. 
Colemnn's message requested that they take action to alleviate the 
potato shortage. Black marketeers had conrnered the supply of potatoes 
and were forcinq grocers to pay extra for normal deliveries and refu-
sing to supply them at all unless they agreed to purchase quantities of 
high-priced onioni:;. As a result food retailers were charging as much 
as $1.50 for a 10-pound sack of white table stock potatoes although 
the official OPS ceiling was only RO cents. 25 
The Institute passed a condemnatory resolution less than an hour 
after listening to Goldman's reading. They were "of the opinion that 
the time for drastic measures to halt this despoiling of the public 
had arrived." The resolution recommended that SMI members to-
gether with all other food retailers try to persuade the public to 
halt or at least curtail its potato purchases and substitute alternate 
foods such as rice and macaroni.· This action, the Institute believed, 
would wreck the r,rofi teers' 'plot and stabilize both the price and dis-
tribution of available supplies until the temporary shortaqe of 
notatoes enrled with the harvesting of the new crop. 26 
All three national wire services carried the news of the reso-
lution. Ellis Arnall, the new director of OPS, commended the maneuver 
and urged American housewives to boycott potatoes. He denied rumors 
that his office intended to lift controls over the vegetables which 
he said were in·short supply due to a reduction in planting the pre-
vious year.27 The New York Office of Price Stabilization assumed an 
active role in stopping the potato.profiteers. Seventeen investigators, 
headquartered at Utica, were assignad to one part of the state. Their 
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probe uncovered complaints by retailers that they had been forced to 
buy poor quality lettuce and other unwanted produce in order to pur-
chase scarce potatoes. In Auburn, New York restaurant owners admitted 
buying seed potatoes which were not covered by federal price controls 
but were prohibited for use other than for planting by national and 
28 
state law. 
Before the furor had abated with the deliveries of the 1952 crop 
of potatoes the SMI-inspired boycott had stirred up a general debate 
on the federal_farm program. Goldman and the other Institute leaders 
could congratulate themselves on a highly successful publicity cam-
paign which had enhanced the supermarket operators' national image 
and performed a genuine public service. 
Of more enduring importance to the Institute than his role in the 
price stabilization· controversy was Goldman's substantive contributions 
to SMI's long range research programs. This facet of the supermarket 
organization's activities loomed as the best answer to the growing 
need for a reliable guide to the industry's increasingly complex future. 
Before his election as president Goldman had participated along with 
the chiefs of 296 other comapnies·in answering questionaires as part 
of an SMI survey. The forms, sent out in February, 1951, were returned 
by nearly two-thirds of the Institute's membership. A total of 4,199 
stores with a combined 1950 sales volume of $2,613,200,000 were repre-
sented in the findings. Despite the fact that the nation's five biggest. 
food chains did not belong to the Super Market Institute the survey 
29 
provided a fairly valid record of the industry at midcentury. 
Probably the most striking aspect of the survey report was em-
bodied in the expansion figures. Over a four year period SMI members 
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had built 37 per cent of the 1950 aggregate of stores. In addition 
another 38 per cent of existing units had undergone major remodeling, 
Even more impressive was the projection for the future; in 1951 the 
number of new supermarkets was anticipated to increase by 21 per cent 
with substantial improvements scheduled for an additional eight per 
cent. The average sales volume of individual units had risen in 1950 
to approximately $900,000. This enlargement convinced SMI analysts 
' 
to revise the definition of a supermarket in regard to minimum sales 
volume from the 1937 figure of $250,000 to $500,000 a year. By this 
definition 54 per cent of the SMI stores could be classified as super-
markets. These units illustrated the efficiency of larger operations 
by garnering 81 per cent of the total SMI member sales. 30 
The only disquieting statistic recorded by the survey dealt with 
profits. The trend toward higher store operating expenses had continued 
in 1950. Coupled with higher taxes and price stabilization problems 
over three-fourths of the companies showed greater overhead expenses 
especially in the area of salaries. Consequently less than half of 
the SMI member stores revealed higher net profit figures while a large 
minority, 44 per cent, suffered reductions. Since the food industry's 
overall profit margin consistently measured only 1.5 to 2 per cent 
these statistics seemed particularly ominous.31 
Goldman once remarked that "making a living selling groceries 
was a tough, technical business. 1132 This knowledge prompted much of 
his labor as SMI president from 1951 to 1953. For several years prior 
to Goldman's election the Super Market Institute had held mid-year 
discussion meetings to supplement the annual conventions. At the 
December, 1951 Hollywood, Florida meeting Goldman advanced two proposals 
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for the board of directors discussion and consideration. The first of 
these envisioned a continuing series of area meetings devoted to the 
practical aspects of supermarket operations. Th~ other involved an 
expenditure of SMI funds for a scientific study by competent management 
engineers on productivity per-man-hour. 33 
A former Institute president, Claude Edwards had outlined a compre-
hensive program and philosophy of operation at an earlier discussion 
meeting in 1949. The Korean war and the subsequent preoccupation with 
Washington activities prevented the SMI membership from acting on 
Edwards's ideas. Goldman had taken note of SMI's budgetary balance 
which showed a surplus of over $255,000 in June, 1951, and had concluded 
that the money should be utilizea. 34 That plus factor added to the 
apparent stability of the economy created a favorable climate for the 
organization to embark on new programs. 
In his official proposal Goldman revealed his personal theories 
on the role of the Super Market Institute. A trade association such as 
SM!, he argued, had a primary obligation to help its members earn a fair 
profit on their operations. However, a corollary responsibility 
existed for'the Institute, to cooperate with agriculture, manufacturers, 
and processors in aiding the American community to obtain a greater 
participation "in the good things of life." The Oklahoma merchant then 
quoted extensively from the work of Harvard University economist 
Sumner Slichter on the influence of special-interest groups. Slichter 
viewed such combinations as trade unions and farmers, the aged and 
veterans, as basically narrow and selfish thus unable to draw much 
support outside their own groups. The ecor9mist also criticized pres-
sure groups for failing to develop influehi:ial leaders of thought~ 
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they lacked a disinterested viewpoint and deep concern for the welfare 
of those outside their own co.teries. 35 
Goldman interpreted these observations to dictate a change in SMI 
policy away from day-to-day problem solving to a broader community 
service philosophy. Accordingly he offered his two projects. He noted 
the inability of the majority of SMI members to support the wide employ-
ment of specialists nor could they afford to send representatives long 
distances to conferences of the specialized instruction ·type. To ful ~-
fill the need for such consultative resources a regular schedule of 
regional managers meetings ought to be inaugurated and sponsored by the 
Institute. twice a year in the spring and in the fall. The nation would 
be divided into four regional areas1 Pacific and Mountain, Central, 
Southern, and Eastern, for the two.or three day programs. 
The meetings would be devoted to specialized subjects, the first 
of which, Goldman suggested, could be fresh fruits and vegetables. 
Since operating and merchandising problems on produce differed mater-
ially from section to sectiqn the program and agenda would have to be 
tailored to each local area. The responsibility for the meetings would 
be assumed by the regional directors who would arrange for panels, 
speakers, and demonstrations. The cost of the project need not be high 
since delegates would pay their own expenses. 36 
Although the SMI board of directors approved of Goldman's proposal 
it discussed the concept at some length. Several board members express-
ed misgivings about the responsibility for-programming, claiming that 
they would hesitate to assume such a duty. Goldman mentioned the 
possibility that some of the Institute's permanent staff could arrange 
the meetings, however, Don Parsons, the executive director explained 
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his people were already overloaded. The SMI president then revealed 
that he had previously experimented with programming by using his own 
company specialists who had turned out a complete presentation in a 
week's time. Another objection was raised by a member who was fearful 
that the meetings would duplicate and interfere with similar NAFC 
{National Association of Food Chains) clinics. Goldman countered this 
objection by pointing out that over fifty per cent of SMI's membership 
' were single unit operators and thus could not attend NAFC activities. 
He also argued that the envisioned SMI meeting would go into much 
greater detail than NAFC clinics and would involve men who were directly 
connected with the daily workings of the meeting topics. In the face 
of their president's obvious preparations to answer all objections the 
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board voted unanimously to accept Goldman's proposal. 
Characteristically Goldman played a large part in developing the 
first round of regional m~etings on produce. Just as he always insisted 
on his own company store managers demonstrating techniques to workers, 
Goldman demonstrated the efficacy of his own proposal by helping with 
its practical application. At the second meeting held in Oklahoma City 
four of the twelve program committeemen, including the chairman were 
~tandard=Humpty Dumpty executives. The program itself was an epitome 
' . . 
ot J?ragmatism covering the entire process of produce merchandising 
from ordering to displaying the fresh fruits and vegetables.38 The 
regional meeting became a standard part of the Super Market Institute's 
programming. 
Goldman's second recommendation to the 1951 board of directors 
meeting aimed at a piece of pure scientific research. From SMI's own 
questionnaire poll the future rapid expansion of the supermarket 
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industry was already well known. Reports from many sections of the 
nation indicated that this expansion had begun to create an intensely 
competitive situation. For some companies the only sales gains were 
coming through the addition of new units while the volume of individual 
markets was stationary or dropping. The question of overexpansion was 
openly discussed by some operators. Goldman proposed that the Institute 
hire an outside fipn of management consultants and engineers to study 
the problem of increasing production per-man:...hour in an effort to lessen 
the rise in the cost of doing business. 
The study, as Goldman planned it, would go beyond a mere statisti~ 
cal approach; professional e~gineers would be required to do field work 
at the store level. Their findings in turn would not constitute a list 
of minor techniques and devices such as the placement of a roll of 
Scotch Tape on the stocking truck to repair torn labels. Instead the 
end product of the study would be the development of a "Labor Expense 
Control Manual" for each of several types of organizations studied. 
Goldman estimated the probable cost might be about $50,000. He proposed 
an initial investment of $10,000 to finance an exploratory study which 
would be assigned to an outside firm of management consultant engineers. 
If their findings justified it, then an additional sum would be appro-
priated to complete the study. 
In contrast to his first proposal the SM! president's suggested 
research project met with virtually unqualified approval. The board 
actually exceeded Goldman's initial funding request by suggesting that 
the $50,000 figure should not become a limiting factor in view of the 
importance of the proposed study. Once again his board members dis-
covered that their chairman had done his homework. Goldman r'evealed 
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that he had already been in contact with two management consultant 
companies; Boaz, allen & Hamilton of Chicago and Dunlap & Associates of 
New York, which had submitted estimates on the cost of the study at 
approximately $50,000. He realized along with the board that after the 
project was started additional money would probably be necessary. The 
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proposal was enthusiastically endorsed by a unanimous vote. 
Inimediately after the meeting adjourned, Goldman asked William 
Applebaum, director of research for Stop & Shop, Incorporated, of 
Boston, to head the Research Advisory Committee. The choice was a logi.-
cal one as Applebaum had made several outstanding contributions in the 
f 1 . h d d . . k . 40 area o app ying met o s an statistics to superma1,· eting. He chose 
fifteen SMI members to serve on the committee including Goldman and 
Parsons in an ex officio capacity; later this aggregate proved too 
unwieldy and the number was reduced to five. By the time Goldman left 
office in 1953 his original proposal had blossomed into a full grown 
and ongoing program. 
A long range research-program was prepared with- the object of 
accomplishing three goals: to reduce waste in food, material and equip-
ment; to make work in the industry simpler, easier and more productive; 
and to achieve improvements in merchandising, operating, and management 
techniques. Toward this end liaisons with processors and manufacturers 
were established. Applebaum reported his opinion that these were 
likely to produce cooperative ventures in research attracting as much 
as $1,000,000 yearly. To handle the Institute's part in the joint 
endeavors a permanent research staff working under Curt Kornblau was 
added to the SMI organizational chart. 
Under Kornblau's direction the first issues of the Store Manager 
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Guide had published by 1953. Every SMI member received a free copy of 
this continuing series plus an extra one if the individual employed a 
personnel or research director. So popular was this compendium of 
practical information that each issue sold over two thousand copies 
beyond the initial free subscription list. Another publication inaugu-
rated under the·new research project's auspices was an "Index of Super 
Market Articles" published between 1936 and 1952 in the three major 
trade journals, Chain Store Age, Progressive Grocer, and Super Market 
Merchandising. Over 2,400 articles appeared in the index's first com-
• 
pilation. A third published product of the research project was a 
11Figure Exchange." Distributed monthly, this report analyzed and inter-
preted statistics garnered from over 100 participating companies. 
Not all of Goldman's work during his .tenure as SMI president dealt 
directly with the organization and its inner workings. As chief execu-
tive of the Institute he was called upon ·to act as a spokesman for the 
supermarket industry. Among the occasions of this type was included a 
guest editorial for Food Field Reporter, a grocery trade newspaper. 
Goldman addressed himself to one of the most pertinent problems that 
faced all retail food manufacturers, how to receive the fullest benefit 
from their advertising dollar. · He noted that each year grocery and· 
food processors spent hundreds of millions of dollars in advertising 
their products to the consumer and that the amount was charged against 
the cost of distribution. Such an expense, Goldman reasoned, could 
only be justified if it increased volume and reduced unit costs to the 
consumer through the economies of mass production and distribution .• 
However, many manufacturers were not getting full value for their 
advertising investment. 
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Before the advent of supermarkets and self-service merchandising 
strong, direct consumer demand was required to break the service counter 
barrier. Open displays of merchandise had changed that, allowing adver-
tising to exercise a much greater influence than previously, in the 
instance of some products up to 40 per cent sales increases were 
recorded with the shift to self service. Too many manufacturers, 
Goldman believed, had forgotten that this benefit did not come automa-
tically. The supermarket still controlled preferred shelf position; 
special displays, and local store advertising. These factors could 
dramatically affect sales. Operating on an average net profit of 1.5 
per cent, the supermarket managers were inclined to use their merchan-
dising skills to raise sales on products whose manufacturers had 
adjusted their trade practices to meet modern retailing needs. 
Those in the food industry were urged by Goldman to make a strenu-
ous effort toward better trade relations with retailers. Packages 
should be re-designed to allow for an adequate clear space, or "white 
dot" in the grocer's jargon, in which the price could be written or 
stamped. Shipping containers should be loaded in such a manner that 
price-marking could be accomplished efficiently. Promotions and prices 
should be carefully planned to give the retail grocer a fair margin of 
profit. Goldman summed up his arguments by referring to the importqnce 
of the manufacturer-distributor discussion panels organized by the 
Super Market Institute. He suggested closer cooperation in them and 
with the new joint research projects sponsored by the supermarket 
. . 42 organization. 
When Goldman stepped d.own from the presidency of SMI in 1953, he 
could view the results of the Institute's and his efforts. The regional 
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programs and research projects were well launched and already bearing 
recognizable returns. A successful publicity campaign had been waged 
which had partially thwarted the machinations of potato black market-
eers. Membership in the Institute had risen to 595 companies operating 
over 6,600 stores with sales in excess of $6 billion. Few of the 
operations were large chain complexes; only 19 per cent of the member-
ship owned more than one store. Despite the fact that SM! represented 
less than two per cent of the nation's food stores, the membership's 
markets produced 16 per cent of the national sales volume. 43 
Goldman continued to take an active part in SMI activities·until 
the mid 1950's accepting no offices but retaining a seat on the execu-
tive board, his by virtue of being a former president. Not all of 
his energies were devoted to the Institute as he also held membership 
in the National Association of Food Chains and attended some of the 
meetings of the International Food Congress. The NAFC, organized in 
1933, was composed of companies who operated grocery chains rather than 
single store operations. Its activities were similar to those of the 
Super Market Institute, however, the membership was less active in 
promoting primary research since these larger retail combinations 
frequently possessed their own research staffs. 
Goldman, a member of NAFC from its beginning, was elected to the 
organization·' s vice presidency in September, 1946, and served in that 
capacity for two years. His duties were not nearly as strenuous as 
those connected with the same position in the super Market Institute. 44 
Goldman contributed to many of the periodic panels and clinics con-
ducted by NAFC. Although somewhat removed from actual store operations 
by 1958, he chaired the NAFC Management Clinic on Operating Efficiency 
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and Productivity held that year. Two years earlier Goldman moderated a 
panel discussion for the national convention on architectural and oper-
ations analyses of new shopping centers and solo markets, a subj;ect in 
which he was particularly well qualified. 45 
In June, 1953, Goldman attended the Second International Congress 
on Food Distribution. At the Ostend, Belgium.meeting Goldman was 
chosen as a vice president and member of the committee' of honor. The 
convention featured discussions. and lectures concerning the general 
area of collaboration between producers and distributors of food empha-
sizing self service concepts. 46 Three years later a third congress was 
scheduled for Rome, Italy. Goldman was one of those who represented 
the Super Market Institute which contributed $100,000 worth of groceries, 
fixtures, and equipment to build an American style supermarket within 
the special exposition hall on the outskirts of the Italian city. It 
was probably.the only market in history with marble floors. The United 
States government spent a quarter of a million lira on the exhibits 
building which had formerly been an athletic center erected 'by Mussolini; 
the supermarket had 'to u:s·e ·as 'flooring material the same, expensive 
Carrara marble that dominated the architecture of the remainder of the 
structure. over 400,000 Italians visited the SMI exhibit which featured 
a completely stocked store. The American food merchants wanted to 
donate all of the grocery exhibits to the poor of Rome as a good will 
gesture. Instead the Italian government insisted that the gift be 
delivered to the state in order that the national welfare department 
could gain credit for the eleemosynary act. 
Before returning home Goldman, accompanied by his wife, toured 
several European nations examining the state of the retail food 
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industry in each. He discovered that Switzerland's storekeepers had 
adopted more of the modernized American concepts than any other 
European country. England, France, Sweden, and West Germany were next, 
according to Goldman, in changing from the inefficient traditional 
47 merchandising of the past. Because of overcrowding and overbuilding 
in most European cities sites for markets of a size common in America 
were simply not available. Transportation also limited the develop-
ment of supermarkets as relatively few European families owned auto-
mobiles with which to carry home large purchases. Scarcity of merchan-
dise, lagging development of brand name selling, and inferior but 
expensive packaging also contributed to the retardation of Europe's food 
. d 48 in ustry. 
Goldman's contributions to the development of the supermarket 
extended beyond his inventions and commercial enterprises in Oklahoma. 
As a member of national and international organizations he did much to 
spread the innovative ideas which culminated in the revolutionizing of 
the nation's retail food industry. Despite this obvious devotion to 
business on all levels of concern Goldman still found ample time for 
other activities which were to make his name remembered by many who 
were only vaguely aware of his commercial background. 
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GIVING AWAY MONEY AND 
OTHER PHILANTHROPIES 
Americans have earned a worldwid~ reputation for exceptional 
generosity. Nowhere has this notion gained wider acceptance than in 
the United States whose Twentieth Century news media have consistently 
celebrated individual and group giving. So prevalent has the convic-
tion become that its citizens are the world's most compassionate and 
open-handed, that the country believes the philanthropic impulse to be 
an integral part of the national character. Yet the word phil.anthropy 
has assumed connotations which are not altogether suggestive of good 
works or deserving of approbation. 
Despite the fact that many citizens have feared the international 
consequences of American generosity, distrust and criticism of philan-
thropy and philanthropists has sprung from a more profound and 
fundamental belief in democracy. A person might be quite willing and 
eager to help others, but does not wish to humble himself enough to 
accept the charity of those seeking to aid him. Rich men are expected 
to share their wealth generously and are roundly criticized if they 
do not. Yet every evidence of philanthropy elicits comments 
impugning their motives, questioning the means by which they gained 
their wealth, and disparaging the worth of their benefactions. 1 
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Unwise or hypocritical giving would seem to have characterized the 
efforts of most philanthropists according to American literature and 
many Americans. Some have sneered at the activities of "do gooders" 
while conservatives have condemned "sentimental humanitarianism" and 
radicals have stigmatized generosity from the wealthy as a substitute 
for more substantive reform. This prejudice has so permeated thinking 
on the subject that philanthropists themselves resent the appellation 
and deny that their works have a philanthropic intent. 2 
No amount of individual misgivings and public criticism, however, 
can obscure the reality of American philanthrophy's worth. It has 
been one of the principal methods of social advance in the United 
States. The goal of philanthropy has had a much broader aspect than 
charity; it has encompassed a wide range of endeavor aimed at improving 
the quality of human life. Every segment of society has benefited 
from philanthropic reformers, scientific research funded by philan-
thropists, and a host of tax-supported services and institutions which 
began as privately financed enterprises. 
The motivation which has animated individual philanthropists has 
remained obscure despite numerous attempts to explain the giving habit. 
In today's cynical society news of charitable donations or endowments 
of worthy causes has most often occasioned offhand remarks about the 
tax advantages accruing to the donor. Those fancying themselves · 
shrewd judges of human behavior have claime~ to perceive an act of 
contrition for past wrongs as the motivating factor behind every 
eleemosynary impulse. Philanthropists themselves have hesitated to 
ascribe specific reasons for their benevolence and probably. that has 
been the wisest course. It seems unlikely that anyone could accurately 
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judge their feelings about a subject that tends to embarrass both 
the giver and the recipient. 
Some groups have achieved special recognition in the general 
field of philanthropy. Among them the most impressive record has 
been established by.American Jewry. Statistically the Jews have con-
· tributed more to charities on a proportionate ba~is than any other 
3 
recognizable grouping in the United States. Annually 1 the aggregate 
amount of Jewish philanthropy totals over $680 million of which one 
quarter goes to non-Jewish individuals and organizations. 4 Not a re-
cent phenomenon this devotion to giving can be traced back in American 
history through many generations. For example, the Community Chest 
movement began in the United states in 1914, but Boston Jews had pre-
dated that multiple financing idea by organizing the Federated Jewish 
Charities in 1895. 5 
Several Jewish scholars have tried to explain their religious 
group's enviable philanthropic record. Their findings have helped 
illuminate some of the salient characteristics of American Judaism. 
The earliest Jewish immigrants were imbued with the concept of the 
community. So universal was this belief that no Jew could imagine 
an existence apart from their small enclaves in America. Jewish mer-
chants who lost their livelihoods and impoverished, wandering Jews 
could expect and obtain financial help from their religious brethren. 
This practice has not been discontinued today despite the fact that 
the American Jews have undergone a constant assimilative process which 
has rendered them at times nearly invisible within the United States' 
twentieth century homogenized society. 6 Thus some observers of Jewish 
life have suggested that community pressure has played an important 
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role in determining individual Jews' charitable actions, not merely 
social prestige but the desire for acceptance. The giving habit has 
grown so prevalent that one scholar has applied the term,· "the Charity 
Establishment;" to the complex of Jewish philanthropic organizations. 7 
The fact of long term activities by a variety of frequently competing 
Jewish philanthropies has caused another writer to'regard fundraising 
"almost as an end-in-itself, it seems to have become the key function 
8 
and purpose of Jewishness and Judaism." 
For ,the Jews charity has had little of the mysticism connected 
with it that has always been a feature of Christian p~ilanthropics. 
Aid has not been offered to persons because they deserve it, but 
rather because they have a natural right to it. Whether due to commun-
ity pressure, obligations of wealth, or compassion for the unfortunate 
the motivation for Jewish charities ha.s become a way of life strongly 
reinforced in each succeeding generation by early parental training. 9 
One particular area of humanitarian concern has attracted con-
sistent Jewish support for more definite reasons than those already 
acknowledged. Among Jewish people there has developed a sensitivity 
toward social and political liberalism and a determination to erect 
safeguards against any sort of despotism. The fight for civil rights, 
especially racial equality, fbund Jews in the forefront of the struggle. 
As long as Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, and James Farmer were 
working with the nonviolent and religiously oriented student leaders 
of th<! Negro civil rights movement strove for equal rights, Jewish 
10 
groups and individuals joined with them. In the summer of 1964, 
of the three civil rights workers martyred at Philadelphia, Mississippi, 
two were Jewish. This interest and participation in liberal social 
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causes can be easily understood. Having experienced discrimination, 
Jews felt an identification with other oppressed groups. They realized 
that a society which tolerated a minimum of systematic prejudice would 
11 
offer Judaism its best defense against anti-Semitism~ 
Sylvan Nathan Goldman was born and reared a Jew and had become 
a wealthy man by 1960. In January of that year he received a letter 
from Robert A. Magowan, former president of Safeway Stores. tt was a 
congratulatory message marking Goldman's retirement. Magowan expressed 
his opinion that while the Oklahoma Cityan "was not likely to find a 
hobby as engrossing as making.money," he would "discover that it is 
almost as much fun to give it away. 1112 Actually.Goldman had started 
much earlier in sharing a part of his accummulating material possessions. 
His philanthropies have been representative of his widely varied 
interests in charities, religious causes, human relations, family, art, 
and civic affairs. All of them bore the stamp of his genuine concern 
for community welfare and several projects the acumen that distinguished 
his entrepreneurial pursuits. Whether the motives which prompted 
Goldman's generosities stermned from his Jewishness, sympathy for the 
less fortunate, or psychological expiation for some heal or imagined 
shortcoming can only be partially perceived. However, the broad nature 
of his benevolence and the length of his community service strongly 
indicates that simple good will has directed much of his nonbusiness 
activities. 
There has rarely lived a man with a claim to financial means that 
has not been constantly approached by those with propositions to help 
him spend his excess funds. Goldman has responded to many such pro-
posals but characteristically has.also discovered worthy causes on 
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which to bestow his time and money. Certainly the project which had 
its origin in 1950 was typically Goldman in the manner in which he 
started with what· seemed tb be· a relatively simple beque~t ana· ehded 
by setting a trend toward a vastly increased patronage of the arts in 
Oklahoma. 
At an Oklahoma City Chamber of Conunerce meeting in 1950 Goldman 
listened as E. K. Gaylord, president of the Oklahoma Publishing Company, 
casually conunented on the absence of any likeness of Will Rogers at the 
municipal airport. This revelation failed to elicit any suggestions 
for inunediate action to rectify the situation. Goldman did not become 
interested in providing an artistic remembrance of Will Rogers for the 
airport until he read a newspaper account of a Fort Worth statue un-
veiling. Amon Carter, publisher ot the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 
presented the Texas city with a life-size equestrian statue of Will 
Rogers. Carter had also presented castings of the artwork to the Will 
I 
Rogers Memorial at Claremore, Oklahoma and Texas Technological College 
13 at Lubbock, Texas. 
Thinking of obtaining another casting of the sculpture. for· 
Oklahoma City, Goldman called Mrs. Electra Waggoner Biggs, designer of. 
the model. She directed him to the Texas sculptor who had completed 
the work and he suggested that the Oklahoman ask Carter about additional 
castings. Believing that his quest was nearly finished, Goldman tele-
phoned the Fort Worth publisher. His request for a casting of the 
equestrian pose was flatly refused by Carter. It seemed that the 
Texan wanted to present Oklahoma City with a casting himself. Faced 
with the prospect of accepting as a Texas gift, a statue of Oklahoma's 
illustrious1 cowboy humorist, quickly touched the Oklahoma merchant's 
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state pride. He rejected the offer, telling Carter, "we're not that 
hard up in Oklahoma. 
14 We don't have to take anything from a Texan." 
Not t:ontent with making the embarrassing gesture of providing 
a statue for Will R.Qger's home state, Carter proceeded further to 
nettle Goldman's civic feelings. The publisher jokingly queried the 
whereabouts of Oklahoma's pride all the years since the plane crash of 
1935 which had ended in death for Rogers and Wiley Post. He claimed 
that his fellow Texans had contributed more to the Claremore memorial 
than Oklahoma and California combined. 15 After a few more taunting 
remarks in the same vein Goldman, now thoroughly aroused, reached the 
decision to find an alternate statue, preferably one sculpted by as 
eminent an artist as could be found. 16 
Preoccupied with the problem of locating a suitable statue, the 
Oklahoman overlooked the tenacity of Amon Carter. Seventy-two-years-
old at the time of the controversy, Carter was a self-made man. Trying 
to escape the poverty of his early life, he had drilled 99 dry holes 
before finally striking oil. When he sold his holdings years later 
the selling price was $16.5 million. Carter spent part of this fortune 
in purchasing the Fort Worth ~-Telegram. His editorial policy was 
sheer boosterism as he utilized all his resources to battle the 
pre-eminence of archrival Dallas·with vitriolic attacks on that city's 
character ahd generous philanthropies to enhance Fort Worth's appear-
17 ance. · While Goldman searched for a sculpture and a sculptor, the 
irascible Carter telephoned Oklahoma City and expressed his desire of 
presenting the city with a Rogers bust and of Goldman's refusal of the 
offer. Street immediately notified his fellow cityan and received a 
determined reassurance that the airport would have its statue, but not 
18 from a Texan. 
Goldman had visited the Claremore memorial and recalled seeing 
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a life-size standing sculpture of Will Rogers. It was one of two 
commissioned by the state of Oklahoma which paid $35,000 for the 
statues, the second of which rested in the Hall of Statuary in the 
capitor building in Washington. The artist's name that Goldman sought 
was Jo Davidson, world famous as the "Biographer in Bronze." Pleased 
at the renowned identity of his chosen .statue's artist, Goldman located 
Davidson in New York. The sculptor readily agreed to make a bust 
casting from the original mold. However, there was a drawback, the mold 
had been stored in Davidson's studio in Paris since before World War II 
and had gone through the German occupation. He did agree to search for 
the mold upon his return to France. 
Several months later Goldman received a note couched in typically 
lighthearted Davidson prose. "God bless the Germans. They love art," 
he wrote. The Will Rogers mold had weathered the invasion of Hitler's 
storm troopers. The bronze casting from the mold arrived at Goldman's 
Humpty Dumpty warehouse in the early part of November, 1951. The 
Oklahoma groceryman's acquisition received one of its highest accolades 
when one of the Humpty Dumpty warehousemen cautiously unpacking th7 
statue instantly recognized it as a likeness of Will Rogers -- after 
glimpsing the bust from the rear. 19 Davidson would have been pleased 
at hearing the unconscious compliment since the original sculpture 
almost did not become a reality. 
The sculptor had been shocked at the suddenness of Rogers' demise 
in August of 1935. A longtime acquaintance and friend of the humorist, 
Davidson had on several occasions attempted to persuade him to pose, 
1s1· 
only to have Rogers repeat a favorite. sally: "You lay off of me, you 
old head hunter." Wanting to keep his memory alive, Davidson talked 
to Sidney Kent of Fox Films and accepted the latter's loan of some of 
Rogers' movies to work from. Two cameramen installed a movie.screen 
in the sculptor's Parisian studio. For a week Davidson immersed him-
self in his subject and finished some small models of the Oklahoma 
cowboy standing casually "and giving the world his drawled nuggets of 
wisdom and his precious humor. 1120 
Soon afterwards the Oklahoma state legislature passed a bill 
authorizing the funds to commission a statue of Will Rogers. His wife 
Betty, recommended Davidson for the contract. She sent the sculptor 
her husband's clothes which Davidson used on a model to achieve the 
insouciant nature that was Will Rogers. Twenty thousand people crowded 
the rotunda of the Claremore memorial to witness the unveiling of the 
sculptor's art, an eight foot statue that Davidson regarded as one of 
h . b 21 is est. 
On December 31, 1951, the Goldmans gave a party, inviting their 
guests "to share a private showing of a bit of sculpture. 1122 The next 
day Davidson's bust of Will Rogers was presented to Oklahoma City and 
on April 20, the statue was formally dedicated. It stood on a five 
foot marble post facing the west entrance of the airport lobby. The 
Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce voted a special resolution of appre-
ciation to Goldman. Not only had the acquisition marked the possession 
of a product of one of the world's greatest contemporary sculptors, but 
more important the gift's value lay in its being "a pioneer event in 
the beautification of Oklahoma city. 1123 The resolution expressed the 
hope that the Rogers bust would be followed by similar gifts from other 
public spirited citizens, a sentiment echoed by state newspaper 
editors. 24 
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Ordinarily the unveiling ceremony would have ended the sculpture 
episode, but Goldman's persistent style of philanthropy dictated other-
wise. Two days after the bust was unveiled its creator died of a heart 
attack at the age of 68 on January 3, 1952. The Will Rogers casting 
was his last completed work of art. Goldman, who had not yet issued 
payment for the bust called the sculptor's widow and asked if she could 
use the commission immediately while waiting for Davidson's estate to 
be settled. Payment was made personally by the Goldmans who flew to 
Paris to complete the transaction. Seven years later while visiting the 
French city, the Oklahoma couple called on Davidsbn's studio again and 
questioned the widow about the possibility of procuring some additional 
works by the deceased sculptor. Most of his collection was absent on 
loan to museums or had been sold previously but she agreed to send 
pictures and descriptions of any available pieces. Six busts were 
eventually uncovered and Goldman decided to purchase all of them. Three 
of the statues were heads only, Abraham Lincoln in terracotta, Woodrow 
Wilson in marble, and Franklin D. Roosevelt in bronze. Two other busts 
were head and shoulder bronzes of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John J. 
Pershing, both represented the men in their roles as commanders-in-
chief of the United States Army in Europe. The sixth portrait, a Will 
Rogers bronze was presented to the Oklahoma Hall of Fame while the 
remaining five were placed in Oklahoma City at the Oklahoma Art Center 
25 
on permanent loan. 
Nor was this the end of Goldman's excursion into the fine arts. 
During the next several years he presented various institutions with 
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works of art, some of which were originals that he directly commis-
sioned. Eighteen months after his initial gift to Oklahoma City he 
presented a Will Rogers bust, another casting from the Davidson mold, 
t h 1 · · 1 · 26 "h' h d f f ' o t e Tusa mun1c1pa airport. Tis waste secon o our maJor 
Will Rogers art works that Goldman purchased and later bestowed on 
Oklahoma institutions. The Oklahoma City merchant never met the man 
whose portraits he dispensed. However, Goldman held a memory of Will 
Rogers that dated back to his World War experiences. Upon returning 
home from France at the war's end he had gone to a showing of the 
Ziegfield Follies in New York City. Goldman later recalled that the 
sight and sound of the cowboy philosopher from Oolagah, Oklahoma, 
standing nonchalantly and delivering the witticisms for which he was 
famous, helped ease the memories of the st. Mihiel salient and the 
Meuse-Argonne forest in the mind of a young Oklahoman. 27 
The only painting of Rogers that Goldman acquired was given to the 
Will Rogers High School of Tulsa, Oklahoma. on January 27, 1954, Will 
Rogers, Jr. appeared at the unveiling ceremony at the Tulsa school. He 
expressed his satisfaction that the school was receiving the portrait, 
one of two originals painted by Count Analdo Tamburini, Italy's court 
painter. He regarded the two paintings, the other hung in the 
Claremore memorial, as the best portraits of his father. Goldman had 
obtained the painting after learning of fund raising efforts by the 
high school's alumni and student body to buy a portrait for the school. 
Part of the money that already had been collected was used to frame 
28 
Goldman's gift. 
This particular philanthropy resulted in a curious aftermath. The 
artist's widow, the Countess Dalia c. Tamburini, filed suit _in federal 
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court in Tulsa for the recovery of the painting presented to city high 
school. She claimed that Maurrie Morrison of California who sold 
Goldman the portrait was not authorized to sell it havin~ only exhibi-
tion rights on the painting. The suit noted that the Goldman Foundation 
had purchased the painting for $2,500 and remained the owner while the 
Tulsa board of education was named the beneficiary of a trust agreement 
which allowed Will Rogers High School to possess and exhibit the 
portrait. The Countess Tamburini valued her deceased husband's work 
at $15,000 and insisted that according to the terms of his 1925 will 
all his possessions in the United States were bequeathed ~o her. The 
issue was settled verbally out of court. In exchange for a financial 
consideration the Countess relinquished all her rights to the portrait 
with the stipulation that a bronze plate identifying Tamburini as the 
. 29 
artist be placed beside the picture. 
Once launched into the business of providing portraits of schools' 
namesakes Goldman looked around for similar possibilities. The building 
of a new high school in Ardmore offered him an opportunity. Dr. 
Charles Evans, onetime president of Central State College at Edmond, 
Oklahoma, and a past secretary of the Oklahoma Historical Society, 
was to honored in 1960 by his hometown through naming a newly con-
structed high school in his memory. Goldman had attended school in 
Ardmore when Evans had held an administrative position in the town's 
school system. on January 30 he presented a portrait of the educator 
30 
to the school. Two years later a new high school in Oklahoma City 
was the recipient of a portrait. This time Goldman went a step further 
and managed to get former president Herbert H?over to sign the painting 
which he had purchased for the school bearing the chief executive's 
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name.31 
Having served the memory of Oklahoma's Will Rogers by placing 
portraits of bronze and paint in public buildings, Goldman turned his 
attention toward another state son, Wiley Post. A close friend of 
Rogers, Post had piloted the airplane that crashed into the Alaskan 
landscape in 1935 depriving Oklahoma of its famous humorist and its 
foremost aviation pioneer. A transplanted Texas sculptor, Leonard 
McMurry, was approached about the possibility of providing an original 
statue of Post to help dedicate the Wiley Post Airport opening in 
October, 1961. McMurry accepted this first of several Goldman commis-
sions and the Post bust was completed in time to enhance the 
inauguration of the new airport. 32 Four months later a casting of the 
Post sculpture was presented to the Tulsa airport. 33 
McMurry was Goldman's choice of sculptors again when he decided 
to add a bust of Sequoyah, the innovator of the Cherokee alphabet, to 
the lobby of the new·state capital office building. On the same 
occasion in December, 1964, Goldman also distributed the last of the 
Davidson busts of Will Rogers to grace the lobby of the second new 
office building. 34 Eight years later a casting of McMurry's Sequoyah 
bust made a companion donation to Carl Linkts "Blackfoot Indian," an 
oil painting, which Goldman gave to the Cowboy Hall of Fame in Oklahoma 
City. The two works of arts were appraised at a combined figure in 
excess of $17,000. 35 
Numerous additions to this listing of Goldman's patronage of the 
arts could be made. However, of more significance was the manner in 
which this notable record was compiled. Many so-called patrons of the 
arts have ordered commissions and purchased works of artistic merit 
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without ever becoming involved in the processes of appreciation and 
discrimination. The story of Goldman's search for the Will Rogers 
bust demons.trated his interest and ability to recogni~e the need for 
a piece of art and to fill the requirement. Was this merely a manifes-
tation of the competitive spirit that had characterized his business 
career? While it was true that Amon Carter's presence in the scenario 
quickened his initial interest in the matter, Goldman also possessed 
an excellent taste for art and a regard for the sensibilities of 
artists. 
Leonard McMurry has presently been working on a nine foot statue 
of Stanley Draper, one of Oklahoma City's two or three most outstanding 
civic leaders. The work was commissioned by a group of interested 
citizens including Goldman. Having dealt with the philanthropist 
before in similar contractual agreements, McMurry knew what to expect 
from his patron and was quick to compare Goldman's actions with those 
of other wealthy men who have paid for his talents. Periodically 
Goldman, now a septuagenerian, has visited McMurry's studio to check on 
the progress of the project. Not content with a cursory glance at 
the imposing statue, Goldman has climbed a ladder to scrutinize the 
sculptor's rendition of Draper's physiognomy. Upon his d(;!scent he 
has consulted with McMurry concerning the accuracy of the likeness . 
. I 
Far from becoming annoyed with this procedure, ;the sculptor welcomed 
the real interest shown by Goldman whose suggestions, McMurry has 
contended, reveal a critical insight that he has frequently taken 
into account on the Draper statue and past projects. McMurry has ex-
perienced many situations in which the person ordering a commission 
has virtually ignored the end result much less bothered with the 
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intermediate stages of creation. He can also be sure that Goldman's 
perserverance of purpose will extend to the niceties of insuring the 
artist's presence at unveiling ceremonies and the inclusion of his 
name on any plaque or other device commemorating the occasion. 
McMurry can still recall some instances when such recognition·was not 
accorded his efforts but never when Goldman was' involved with the opera-
t . 36 1.on. 
These then were the characteristi.cs of Goldman's patronage of the 
I 
arts: recognition of the need for beautification, possession of the 
critical instinct to distinguish excellence, genu'.i.ne interest in the 
progress and culmination of the artist's work, and careful attention 
to the finalization of the art object's ultimate destination. Perhaps 
all the just mentioned might be summarized in a single word, involve-
ment. Goldman sometimes gave as much as many have given -- with 
money -- instead of time and interest. However, the distinctive aspect 
of his patronage was the frequent contribution of his personal energy 
and attention in addition to financial considerations. 
The same qualities that distinguished Goldman's patronage of the 
arts also characterized his other philanthropies. Hi~ contributions 
to the field of human relations have provided an outstanding example 
bf Goldman's philanthropic style. In 1959, Donald Sullivan, the 
Oklahoma state director of the National Conference of Christians and 
Jews (NCCJ) asked Dr. Glenn Snider, Director of Teacher Education at 
the University of Oklahoma to request that the school sponsor a work-
shop for people in education in the area of human relations. Snider 
called an interdisciplinary faculty meeting to discuss the feasibility 
of offering such a program. After several meetings the committee 
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agreed to establish courses for credit in the suggested field. The 
enthusiasm of the faculty members of the committee led the body to 
propose a permanent center for the study of human relations as an 
integral part of the university system. University of Oklahoma presi-
dent, Dr. George L. Cross, responded favorably to the committee's 
proposal, however, he pointed to the total lack of funds and the 
extreme unlikelihood of funds becoming available through normal univer-
sity channels to support the project. 37 . 
The committee turned to the representatives of the voluntary 
organizations which had provided the original stimulus for the 1959 
and 1960 workshops. Dr. Sterling Brown, a national director of the 
NCCJ introduced the committee to Oklahoma City businessmen Harvey 
Everest and Charles Bennett. These two joined Snider, Donald E. 
Sullivan, J. Clayton and Dr. Feaver in the formation of an informal 
committee to expedite the establishment of a human relations center. 
One of the first men asked to help with the project was Goldman. At a 
meeting in Bennett's newspaper office, the latest £:!cruit in the propo-
sal's movement, stated the situation in his customarily direct fashion: 
"Apparently what you need is $100,000 to guarantee operation of the 
center for five years. 1138 
To offset the disadvantage of approaching potential donors with 
such a figure, and out of a commit~ent to the concept, Goldman volun-
teered a contribution of $40,000 to underwrite the center's expenses 
for two years. During the next three years he reinforced his support of 
the center by vigorous fundraising efforts which included trips with 
members of the committee to Tulsa, Ardmore, and other state communities. 
' 
He also attended regular meetings of the center's founders constantly 
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pressing for the rapid implementation of the project's activities. 39 
The Southwest Center for Human Relations Studies was officially 
inaugurated October 1, 1961, as a continuing program of the Oklahoma 
Center for Continuing Education. According to the proposal, the cen-
ter's major goal was "to reduce tension and conflict as it may exist 
between and among people or between and among groups." Included in 
this rather broad category of concern were the areas of race relations, 
religious group interaction, labor-management relations, school-
community contacts, and problems arising from industrialization, 
urbanization, and feelings of alienation on the part of communities 
and individuals. To accomplish an alleviation of these problems the 
center would offer workshops, seminars, adult education classes, consul-
tative services, and engage in primary research. 40 
The center's activities have been as varied as its goals. The 
Indian Education Unit was very energetic in its attempts to increase 
the social and political awareness of Oklahoma Indian groups. Beginning 
with a series of organizational meetings in the western part of the 
state the education unit's workers developed SOLID, the Southwestern 
Oklahoma League for Indian Development. Concentrating on the Indian 
population of Comanche and Colton Countries, Lawton-based SOLID 
directed a variety of services, most notably a tutoring program with 
older In~ian youths helping younger children. It also conducted a 
continuing series of conferences on Indian alcoholism. A subsidiary 
operation of the Indian Education Unit was responsible for publishing 
and distributing 5,000 copies of "Know Your Rights" booklets to Indians 
in western Oklahoma. 
Another human-relations-oriented program involved the establishment 
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of the Consultative Center for School Desegregation on July 1, 1968. 
Funded by the United States Office of Education and implementing 
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the center sought to aid 
educational personnel in dealing with special problems occasioned by 
school desegregation and integration process. It provided technical 
assistance and in-service programs to public school systems, institute 
programs for teachers, and activities which reached thousands of 
public school teachers and administrators. 
Exemplifying the catholicity of the Human Relations Center's 
interests has been the Law Focused curriculum Project which was funded 
by the Oklahoma Crime Commission in February, 1973. The project has 
worked to establish a program to positively influence the attitudes of 
school-age students towards the role of law in society. More specifi-
cally this goal has been approached through workshops and seminars 
which educationally prepare teachers law enforcement, and legal 
personnel to use law-focused curricula in fourteen selected Oklahoma 
schools and communities. 41 
The research and teaching functions of the center has been greatly 
enhanced by Goldman's philanthropic interest beyond his initial contri-
bution in 1961. In the summer of 1968, Goldman and Mrs. Leta M. 
Chapman of Tulsa made a combined gift of $70,000 to advance the work 
of the center. The bequest was earmarked for the inauguration of a 
new University of Oklahoma academic unit in human relations. Goldman 
pledged additional annual payments to support the Goldman Professorship 
of Human Relations. This position would be the first of several which 
would comprise·a department offering Bachelor of Arts and Master of 
Arts degrees. Within four years the new department had 26 human 
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relations students enrolled in the MA program which held the distinction 
42 of being one of three in the country. 
Goldman's interest in the center has never flagged from the 
moment of his initial involvement. He regarded its work as essential 
to a viable solution of the seemingly insoluble social problems at the 
local, state, and national level. At a November 1973 special meeting 
at the_ center in Norman he voiced this belief on behalf of the center's 
Founders.Council whose membership was honored at the event. Just as 
he insisted on following the creation of art projects to a finished 
conclusion, Goldman. regularly inquired as to the progress of the cen-
ter's o.r.ganization, growth, and programming. On numerous occasions 
his special ta_lents as a fundraiser were solicited by the center's 
administrators. The human relations council was almost wholly depen-
dent on. such. efforts during its first years and remained heavily 
. l' . . 43 supported by private so 1c1tat1on. 
Although the bulk of his philanthropic endeavors have been chan-
neled through the Pioneer Foundation, an entity incorporated in the 
1950's to simplify the giving process, Goldman was an active philan-
thropist while at the peak of his business activity. Beginning in 
1936 the William Jenning Bryan Crippled Child,ren's School of- Oklahoma 
City received an annual visit from the busy supermarket entrepreneur. 
Each November, 70 to 80 children enrolled at the school enjoyed the 
Thanksgiving Party arranged and attended by Goldman. 44 Nor was Goldman 
reluctant to extend his philanthropy to the world of business. The 
Folding Carrier Company received a special award of merit from the 
President's Committee on National Employ the Physically Handicapped 
Week for its record in hiring the partially disabled. 45 Recalling 
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from his Ardmore youth the plight of Indians left stranded in the new 
society dominated by an invading white culture, ~,oldman also made it 
1 . ' 'bl 46 a company pclicy to emp oy as many Native Americans as possi e. 
A list of private, informal Goldman benevolences could never be 
accurately or completely compiled. The number of his known contribu-
tions to the state of Oklahoma and city of Oklahoma city has exceeded 
his own remembrance. Among the civic organizations that have claimed 
his attention was the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce. in which he 
served as vice president for two terms in 1951-1953 and 1957-1959. 47 
As a result of his community services he was named a lifetime director 
of the Chamber. In April, 1973, President Richard Nixon saluted 
Oklahoma's Frontiers of Science Foundation which numbered Goldman 
, . . l 48 among its origina trustees. He has also served on the board of 
trustees for the Oklahoma City Mercy Hospital Advisory Council, the 
Thomas Gilcrease Institute at Tulsa and the Oklahoma Zoological Society. 
such diverse organizations as the Boy Scouts of America, Young Men's. 
Christian Association, the Oklahoma City Symphony, and the Oklahoma 
Heritage Association have benefit~d from his services as a director. 
In addition Goldman was president of the Oklahoma Art Center and with 
fellow cityan J. B. Saunders provided the 'financial assistance to give 
the Oklahoma City Arts Council a permanent office in 1970. 49 
For his contributions to these and many other 'causes Goldman has 
received the encomiums due his active civic life. In 1966 Governor 
Henry Bellmen named him as a member of the Oklahoma Ambassadour Corps 
organized the previous year during ceremonies at the state's exhibit 
at the New York World's Fair. 50 Two Oklahoma schools have awarded 
Goldman, a man without a high school education, honorary doctorates. 
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Oklahoma City University in May, 1974 and the University of Oklahoma 
in May, 1971 gave him the opportunity to don academic robes in recog-
. . f h' 'b ' t h' h d · 51 n1t1on o 1s contr1 ut1ons o 1g ere ucat1on. The Oklahoma 
chapter of the National Conference 'of Christians and Jews gave Goldman 
a special citation in 1963 for his civic and religious leadership. 
Two years later he was the recipient of the Eleanor Roosevelt Humanities 
Award National Citation. Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire presented 
this honor which had been awarded only once before 1965. 52 
On November 16, 1971, Goldman was elected to the Oklahoma Hall 
of Fame. The enumeration of his business, civic and philanthropic 
activities within the state made the choice an obvious one. 53 Goldman 
has received awards, citations, congratulations, and finally, official 
historical recognition. Yet the breath of his concern for the better-
ment of society was perhaps best reflected in a statement by an 
admirer who meant no irony or slur when he praised the Jewish philan-
thropist II as a man, as a citizen, and as a Christian. 1154 
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CHAPTER IX 
A BUSINESSMAN'S RETIREMENT 
In 1959 Goldman retired from the chairmanship of ACF-Wrigley. 
This marked the end of a career in the grocery business spanning four 
decades. At the age of sixty-one the supermarket developer could 
have been expected to slow down the busy tempo of managing a constantly 
expanding corporation and set a more sedate pace of travel, relaxation, 
and rest. One of his closest business associates remarked to him on the 
occasion of the conferring of his second honorary doctorate that the 
newspaper stories outlining his past business career "all make you 
sound as if you died twenty years ago. 111 
The man who made this observation, H. Arthur Littell, had reason 
to know the truth; he has been responsible for much of the direction 
of Goldman's business affairs since February 1, 1962. Littell was 
brought into the Oklahoman's company from Texas. Following an academic 
career during which he received a BA and MA in finance and investments 
from the University of Texas; he had gone directly into the related 
fields of insurance, investments, and real estate. He brought to 
Oklahoma at the age of 39, twelve years' experience with two large 
investment firms. It would be a necessary background for the task which 
his new business affiliation required. 
Goldman's future course was somewhat uncertain in 1962. His 
liquid assets totalling several millions of dollars were waiting to be 
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used in some manner. Littel's job was to work with him concerning 
the diversification of his interests. So successful has this collabo-
ration proven that Goldman Enterprises in fifteen years' time earned 
far greater sums from a variety of investments then Goldman's grocery 
2 
businesses did in forty years. 
Probably one of the reasons that newspaper accounts had ignored 
the proliferation of his financial interests since 1959 was Goldman 
himself. When asked what his most absorbing business venture was, 
he replied that "The only thing I ever knew was gorceries--groceries· 
and produce. 113 This modest disclaimer did not quite reveal the actual 
content of Goldman's career. For some years prior to his retirement 
from ACF-Wrigley he had engaged in business enterprises that were not 
necessarily related to the supermarket industry. 
One of Goldman's investments, begun in 1955, showed that he was 
not only an inventor himself but could recognize the worth of others 
ingenuity as well. A Philadelphia inventor, Serenus Arthur Harry 
Young, pioneered a revolutionary process which caught Goldman's 
interest. A specialist in reinforced plastics, Young worked in the 
early 1950's to develop a low cost process by which glass fiber rein-
forced plastic products could be mass produced. The breakthrough came 
in the molding apparatus which had handicapped the entire industry up 
to the 1950's since it depended la~gely on hand labor. Yound devised 
a method by which the molding materials were metered automatically 
into a tank, where they were mixed, then piped into preform molds. 
These items in the past were made by mechanisms similar to hat-felting 
machines or by hand, neither process capable of producing products of 
varying thicknesses required for many commercial uses. Young's system 
170 
was entirely automatic and reduced the time for making a plastic con-
tainer from several hours to four minutes. Not only time but production 
costs were cut drastically as a competitive container costing $118 to 
manufacture with the old methodology could be produced the new way for 
about $43 apiece. 
The inventor obtained the backing of David Kahn and Herbert 
Weisburgh of New York who helped a:r:range demonstrations for government 
purchasing officers and potential investors. Goldman and Kurt 
Schweitzer, president of the Folding Carrier Company, became interested 
in the commercial possibilities almost immediately. In September, 1955 
Kahn, Weisburgh, Schweitzer, and Goldman invested $75,000 in the pro-
ject and later added $400,000 more. Young was designated executive vice 
president of a new company and assumed the responsibility for building 
a pilot plant near Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. There production was 
gradually increased until a licensee contract was signed with Banner 
Fiber Glass Co:r:poration of Paterson, New Jersey. The four investors 
had decided that their infant company, Pressurform Container Co:r:poration, 
would not go into large-scale manufacturing but license the process 
instead. 
Pressurform had already broken ground in merchandising the con-
tainers produced by Young's perfected process and would continue to 
manufacture for developmental and demonstration pu:r:poses. Goldman was 
chairman of the company's board and Schweitzer its president. They 
were old hands at finding markets for new products. There was little 
trouble in utilizing Young's process in making reusable military 
shipping and storage containers. An indication of the size of this 
market was illustrated by the fact that seven per cent of the national 
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defense budget for defense materials in the 1950's was spent on pack-
aging. Until_ Young's breakthrough reinforced plastics production had 
been too slow and cumbersome to permit their use for this purpose. 
Pressurform produced the first reinforced plastic containers for 
military use. As the news of .the Young process spread there was a rush 
of applicants applying for liicenses so that by October, 1956 Pressurform 
had issued 30 of them and were negotiating with industrial representa-
tives from France, England, and Columbia. Among the uses suggested for 
the Pressurform process were shipping containers for missle and radar 
parts, television cabinets, luggage; bath tubs, machine housings, and 
. 4 
chair frames. 
From the esoteric world of plastics production to life insurance 
sales was a long jump but one that Goldman was able to ~omplete with-
apparent ease. On July 6, 1955, Norman Hirschfield, pr~sident of 
' s. N. G. Industries, and he signed the charter which brought into being 
the Western Life Insurance Company. This venture was the farthest 
removed from the supermarket business of any in which Goldman ever 
5 
engaged. Nevertheless the insurance c;ompany enjoyed a steady growth 
after its inception as an old-line,_ .legal reserve company which in the 
arcane v~rnacular.of the business meant that Western Life's premiums 
would be stable for all ages without any special assessments. The 
charter also provided that the company could issue health and accident 
l . . 6 po ic;1-es. Capitalized ~ith $100,000, Goldman's company had reached a 
$1,000,000 sales figure only a year after its organization. 7 
Goldman never took as active a role in Western Life as in his 
other investments. He sold the company in February, 1966 to the Gulf 
Insurance Company of Dallas, Texas. By that time the company had 
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been licensed in 22 states and had over $161 million life insurance 
in force with a 1965 premium income of $2,653,157. Gulf bought all of 
Goldman's 35,000 outstanding shares of stock in the deal which left 
Western's Oklahoma City management and offices virtually intact. 8 
The business in which Goldman Enterprises has specialized in the 
l960's and l970's has been real estate. Goldman's interest in this 
area stenuned directly from his earlier experiences in supermarketing. 
In fact the two facets of his business career were natural concomitants. 
The continuing search for available and suitable market sites virtually 
assured an eventual competence on the part of a chain groceryman. And 
as the majority of new supermarkets were built in suburban areas, it 
was not surprising that Gold.man gradually slipped more and more heavily 
into the retail phenomenon of the post-World War II period, shopping 
centers. He acquired several properties that were beyond the fringe of 
Oklahoma City's polulated area fearing that a delay in buying would 
mean a possible shortage of choice market locations later. 
On April 20, 1955, plans for a combination shopping-medical center 
in southwest Oklahoma City were announced by Goldman Enterprises. 
For Goldman the news was a "lucky" culmination to a land purchase made 
with some trepidation. According to the grocery magnate, he had paid 
more than he intended for the land on which the shopping center would 
be built. Nick N. Reding, the original owner, had been reluctant to 
sell the tract which was once part of a farm before Oklahoma City 
burgeoning suburban growth threatened to engulf the crops and livestock. 
Anxious to obtain the advantageously situated land, Goldman after 
months of negotiations with Reding raised his buying price and offered 
payment in ·a manner giving the seller a tax break. As a clincher he 
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promised to name his intended project after Reding and painted a 
glowing verbal picture of the future grandeur of the completed shopping 
9 
center. 
The first step in developing his new acquis~tion sent Goldman to 
the Oklahoma City planning commission. That body granted a zone change 
on Goldman's request to local commercial listing to four acres north 
of Southwest 44 between South Western and South Klein on April 15, 
10 
1955. · Five days later a $500,000 building pennit was issued to the 
Manhattan Construction Company covering the first unit of the projected 
center. Twelve tenants would occupy the 750 feet long by 150 feet wide 
structure. A medical center was planned for a later development which 
would provide six offices along the rear of this building unit. The 
second unit which continued north almost to Southwest 39 extended the 
center's length to 1,330 feet and completed a parking area large 
enough to mark off 700 parking spaces. Taking advantage of the expected 
automobile traffic, Phillips Petroleum Company decided to occupy a 
separate building which would house a service station. 
Early in September the shopping center was still six weeks from 
completion. May winds and rain had caused bogging mud and material 
damage to the construction site. Despite these delays the center 
finally opened fonnallyOctober 20. The edifice was strictly modern in 
appearance and construction. The main architectural feature of the 
complex, which was the largest erected in Oklahoma City up to that 
time, was the overwhelming expanse of plate glass relieved only.by 
shop partitions, aluminum strips, and doors. A granite base with 
stone trim decorated. the facade of the brick structure which was 
'· completely air-conditioned. In keeping with the hopefully style-making 
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modernistic design the center's. largest store, a Humpty-Dumpty market 
of course, contained the latest twist in supermarketing technology, a 
power-run food conveyor. Loaded sacks of groceries could be placed on 
a conveyor belt located near the checking stands and moved through 
openings in the plate glass windows to the sidewalk. Humpty Dumpty 
employees would be waiting outside to carry the bags to the customers' 
cars as they drove by the covered exterior walk. 11 
The entire shopping center was equipped with a 12-foot, aluminum-
covered canopy. This feature was included for two reasons. It 
afforded protection from bad weather while shoppers walked beneath its 
cover and gave the center's developars a chance to eliminate store 
front parking in an effort to avoid traffic congestion. Adding to this 
inducement to shop at several stores on foot the center provided 
free strollers for carting children along the mall. The source of 
this latter innovation was rather easily ascertained given the history 
of Goldman's folding carrier and its popularity with harrassed mothers 
of small children. The formal opening of the center was attended by 
i 
all the ballyhoo associa~.ed with a supermarket opening which was among 
the scheduled events. The city's largest shopping center should have 
had and did possess the community '·s biggest neon sign wh.:i.ch measured 26 
feet across and stood 36 feet above the ground. A free circus capable 
of entertaining 2,000 persons at a time ran for two weeks completing 
the major promotional attraction for the .center. 12 
The Reding Shopping Center must be remembered as a trend-continuing 
project which was to eventually help alter the retail merchandising 
pattern of Oklahoma City. Most of the complex's tenants were branches 
. 13 
of downtown establishments. While in 1955 this expansion of existing 
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urban stores to the suburbs was not regarded as an ominous sign for the 
continuation of the inner city's commercial hegemony, subsequent events 
proved otherwise. Goldman was one of those who recognized the import 
of Oklahoma City's tendency to sprawl in every direction from the down-
town area dispersing the metropolitan area's population. Lacking an 
effective commercial mass transit system the subruban shopping center 
was the natural alternative to driving long distances to a downtown 
area increasingly plagued with traffic congestion and expensive parking. 
Goldman bought several parcels of land, in some cases in section-
sized lots, on the periphery of the city. Often the risks were consid-
erable because the purchases were made in advance of zoning regulations 
and the placement of rival commercial properties. On more than one 
occasion he acted defensively by bidding on additional property to pro-
tect his original investment plans. The constant danger of 
overextension spurred the always aggressive Goldman imagination to more 
and larger developments. In 1956 his Almonte Development Company publi-
cized plans for a residential subdivision located on Oklahoma City's 
southwestern, side, west of May Avenue from SW 52 to SW 59. When fully 
developed it would cover approximately 265 acres. A shopping center 
utilizing 27 acres of this total would serve 1,000 homes in the $9,000 
to $12,000 class. The Almonte Company set a new pattern later followed 
by virtually all of the future Goldman real estate developments, in 
not actually building the houses or shopping center. Instead the com-
pany exercised architectural supervision and arranged an integrated 
promotional program for the whole qivision. Goldman provided the major 
share of the project's financial underpinnings while Donald Davidson 
' White, William A. Coleman, and Norman Hirschfield were general partners 
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in the company. Coleman and Hirschfield of course were senior execu-
tives in Goldman's operations. White was an architectural graduate 
of the University of Nebraska and held a master's degree from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In addition to his academic 
background he brought to the project his acquired expertise in land 
development gained as an FHA land planner for Oklahoma and Arkansas 
and as Oklahoma City planning director. 14 
Three years after the launching of the Almonte subdivision Goldman 
helped form a finance company with seven other Oklahoma City business-
men. Along with Goldman the incorporators, Sylvanus G. Felix, Jean 
I. Everest, Dean A. McGee, John J. Griffin, Guy H. James, John E. 
" Kirkpatrick, and R. A. Young, took all the stock of the $1 million 
Great Western Business Investment Company. William Gill, Sr. was 
named president of the company which proposed to offer capital for the 
construction of new and expanded business and industrial projects all 
over the state. It was estimated that the organization could expand 
their authorized capital to $12 million through credit which would in 
turn release as much as $60 million more for a variety of projects. 
The eight stockholders also served on Great Western's board of 
directors.15 
Thus Goldman was hardly a novice in the real estate development 
business in 1962 when Littel joined in reshaping his finances. After 
the initial diversification of type and geography had been agreed upon, 
Goldman's holdings spread until the term "business empire" would not 
be an exaggerated adjective to employ in their description. For the 
next fifteen years the basic pattern of Goldman Enterprises remained 
fairly constant. Littel suggested areas for investment and Goldman 
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added his merchandising talents to aid in the development of the 
projects. Delegating to Littel the tasks of overseeing the entirety 
of Goldman Enterprises position, the former grocer has concentrated on 
the success of each venture relying on Littel's monthly situation 
· . 16 reports for a general overview •. 
By 1974 Goldman interests were scattered over several states, 
cities, and Puerto Rico. The two major concerns of his interests 
centered on real estate development and saving and loan institutions. 
Some of the ventures were fully owned businesses while others were 
joint projects with associate investors. Included in the planned 
diversification program were apartment complexes in Atlanta, Georgia and 
San Juan, Puerto Rico; housing and commercial developments in Houston 
and Dallas, Texas and Tucson, Arizona; and banking and savings and 
loans in Houston and Otero, Colorado. Not all of these investments 
met with Goldman's initial approval. He maintained a businessman's 
understandable reluctance to become involved in coinmercial areas un-
familiar to his experience. 17 
To guard against failure Goldman has always kept in mind the 
basic business principles that he evolved in building his grocery 
chain. All of his accummulated knowledge of merchandising concepts 
and financial dealings when reduced to a common denominator meant 
understanding people. Just as a successful political officeholder 
generally developes an instinct about how their constituencies will 
react in a given situation so does a businessman learn to guage in 
advance what will effectively appeal to his customers. In most in-
stances where selling an idea or product was the requirement for 
achieving a financial goal, Goldman simply applied the selling 
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techniques learned while vending groceries. 
The Otero Savings and Loan Association of La Junta, Colorado was 
one of those opportunities for investment that Goldman only reluctantly 
undertook. However, once embarked, he felt no qualms. His closest 
business associate, Littell, has remarked that the key to Goldman's 
success has been self discipline in maintaining an inner confidence 
so that if he "doesn't always make the right decision, he can always 
make the decision right. 1118 Goldman attempted to insure the vindica-
tion of the Otero investment by recalling a lesson learned in the past. 
When he had purchased grocery stores in Oklahoma City during the de-
pre~sion years the original names of the stores were left unchanged 
at first on the theory that people enjoy the feeling of dealing with a 
known, local individual. When Goldman Enterprises gained a controlling 
interest in the Colorado savings company no sweeping per,sonnel changes 
were affected. The officers and the board of directors stayed nearly 
intacti they were replaced only when death or retirement created a 
vacancy. The exception of course was the president of the comp~y 
and chairman of the board, Merle c. Carpenter who was hired away from a 
Pueblo, Colorado firm thus maintaining an image of a local institution 
serving local interests. 19 
Carpenter has succeeded in retaining the flavor a home-owned and 
operated business while expanding the scope of the-Otero company's 
activities. Offices for the enterprise in January, 1974 were located 
in Pueblo, Colorado Springs, and Denver as well as La Junta while 
three additions were planned for the next year. Otero's publicity has 
dwelled less on the firm's assets in excess of $5-5 million than on its 
linkage with local past history. Much has been made of the fact that 
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the savings and loan association was begun in Otero County, Colorado 
"83 years ago in July, 1890." Reflecting that pride in a common her-
itage that all area Coloradoans feel, the association adopted as the 
company symbol, Six Flage--the United States, Colorado, Texas, Spain, 
France, and Mexico--that flew over Southeastern Colorado and Otero's 
first office. 20 
The same caution Goldman displayed in furthering the Otero invest-
ment was evident in his ventures into the much larger community of 
Houston, Texas. Despite his large share in the projected $150,000,000 
Regency Square development Goldman's name has not been prominent in 
the wealth of publicity surrounding the project. Instead the firm of 
Marvin E. Legget & Associates, Houston residential and commercial 
developers and Anrem Corporation, ·a subsidiary of American National 
Insurance Company, were named as the program planners. Legget and 
Goldman have been partners since 1964 but few Houston businessmen 
were aware of the connection since it was believed that resentment and 
possible obstacles might have been placed in the project's path if 
it were known that an out of state developer was involved. 
The Regency Square project made public in September, 1971 began 
its cons_truction of what its publicity material has termed "the Golden 
Micropolis" in 1972. It comprised 125 acres at the corner of Houston's 
Southwest Freeway and Hillcraft Drive bounded on the north by Harwin 
Drive. Thus far only one building, the 12-story Texas Bank & Trust 
Tower, has been erected from among the projected 14 high rise office 
buildings. The structure contained 234,000 square feet of floor space 
and was to have an 893-car garage. Among the directors' names of the 
building's principle tenant, Texas Bank & Trust, were those of Legget, 
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Littel1l, and Goldman.21 
Obviously at seventy-five years of age Goldman has. not retired in 
the ordinary sense of the word's meaning. Most individuals at a simi-
lar stage in life would be reluctant, if indeed they were physically 
and mentally able, to continually enter new fields of business endeavor. 
Yet Goldman has set an unusuai standard of success in his retirement 
years. It must be considered as extremely doubtful that he will ever 
quit the lifelong habit of conducting his own business affairs. One 
might easily gain the assumption that Goldman's entrepreneurial career 
has represented his total life. 
If a man who has survived over seven d.ecades of life and possesses 
wealth whose aggregate totals in the millions of dollars and still 
works on a routine basis then that individual appears suspect of being 
driven by habit or compulsion. In Goldman's case his devotion to his 
business can be explained in other ways. He has felt no need to escape 
to the golf course for relaxation because no tension or apprehension 
results from: his daily attention to business detail. The intricacies 
of finance and merchandising offer a familiar and welcome challenge_, 
free of any attendant worry. For Goldman his vocation has also been 
his still very enjoyable avocation. 
Many social scientists and social critics have condemned American 
businessmen whose careers have seemingly dwelled wholly on the art of 
making money. The stereotype of the capitalist who cannot quit his 
appointed rounds due to an insatiable greed or because of an atrophied 
consciousness of the world around him has been unfortunately prevalent. 
Goldman's fascination with business has stemmed less from any desire 
to accummulate greater wealth than from the satisfaction that comes 
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from utilizing one's painfully acquired skills a~d knowledge _to the 
fullest extent. When speaking of his latest business venture Goldman 
made no reference to the profit possibilities of the Regency Square 
project. It was the unusual beauty of the central fountain plaza that 
he emphasized just as in earlier years the real thrill of building 
a larger, more modern grocery market was not the prospect of bigger 
profits but the satisfaction of creating a. new commercial concept. 22 
Goldman's personal life has been marked by the same steady tenor 
that has characterized his business and public career. Although he 
has probably not thought of himself as part of the mainstream of 
American Jewish life his family relations, religious beliefs, philoso-
phy and even his business affairs have reflected his presence in this 
ethnic grouping. According to a statistical description of the Jewish 
community in the United States Jews have tended to.have closer family 
ties than other societal groups. They have compiled a lower divorce 
rate and birth rate than the national average with the average number 
of children being two. The Jewish. community has produced more self-
employed businessmen than any other group. · · Al though regular in 
attendance at temple services few Jews' personal religiosity has been 
very profound. Reform Jews have emphasized the moral and ethical 
values of Judaism rather than the theological content. Despite their 
intense interest in politics they have not been known to vote for 
ethnics especially but have been more consistent voters thari other 
groups because of a greater awareness of the power potential of poli-
tical hegemony. 23 
Goldman married when past thirty years of age. He and his wife 
reared two sons, Monte and Alfred. Both of them ·.entered the family 
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business after college educations and show an unusually high regard 
and affection for their father. 24 Goldman's philanthropies have pro-
vided more than ample evidence of his adherence to the ethical and 
moral values of his religious faith. He has been a frequent contributor 
to political campaigns and a friend of several state and national 
figures of the Democratic and Republican parties yet he has never 
espoused the particular causes of Jewish officeholders. 
If Goldman has failed to view himself as a member of the Jewish 
community, readily identifiable from ·a non-Jew majority, he has done 
so quite accurately. Oklahoma Jewry, and especially the Reform branch, 
has become very similar to the surrounding Christian community~ their 
culture patters "are to a large extent, the same as those of the general 
American community in terms of language, leisure time activities, 
and •.. even of stereotypes in thinking--including religious concepts 
as well. 1125 
A man's life can never be adequately chronicled or explained, 
only a partial description is possible. Goldman's hearty constitution 
and logical but imaginative thinking processes render premature any 
final statement of his contribution to the historical development of 
Oklahoma. That his career as a pioneer businessman, inventor, and 
philanthropist has had a beneficial effect on the course of the state's 
progress from frontier to modernized society cannot be challenged. 
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